

A
HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE.

A NEW EDITION.

IN TEN VOLUMES.—VOL. IV.

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WITH PORTRAIT, MAP, AND PLANS.



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FROM THE BATTLE OF MANLAPDA TO THE BATTLE OF TROUS
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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARTHON.

In the preceding chapter I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernes the eunuch, when he rejoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The conquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernes proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convolving deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment

Present form of the Asiatic Empire, before the conquest of Ionia.

of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by peromene (each peromene was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement: without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however surmise it is certain that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Miletus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumference plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Miletian territory to the Karians of Pitinae.² Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute: and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of vast depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Herodotus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been intense. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernes, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He further adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for discussing the condition of the Asiatic-Greeks after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece Proper.

¹ Herodot. vi. 121.

² Herodot. vi. 122.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Eëtion in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Mardonius himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities,¹ leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, destined wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabarus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasos surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land force was conveyed across the Bosphorus to the Greek city of Abdera, on the western coast of the Bosphoric Gulf. From hence Mardonius

Mardonius comes with an army into Ionia.—he goes down the coast to the Greek cities.

He marches into Thracia and Macedonia.—the fleet conveyed by a strait across near Mount Athos.—he transports his army into Asia.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 37. In recording this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus seemed to be in an error for the purpose of illustrating the character of another of his characters, which has remained an unexplained dispute, namely, Mardonius, which he reports to have taken place among the above commanders, after the defeat of the Megarian fleet, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—

whether they should place into their hands the government of the cities, Mardonius said that Cyrus younger brother of Darius, who spoke to Mardonius, advised him not to employ the same measures which Cyrus I. employed, Mardonius answers in silence. Both passages in this text are in the original of the text and prove that Mardonius found some objection to his story about the discussion on the form of government among the seven Persian commanders (ii. 10—12).

marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised by the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabarus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land force again at the Gulf of Thracæ, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of preventing the march as far as Athens and Eretria ; so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely dashed the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of perils to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the further progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Ergoi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Ergoi, he was put in no condition to advance farther. Both the land force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much chance of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius ; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him.* We shall hear of him again under Xerxes.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thracians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius ; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thracians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skopé Eryth in Thracæ yielded to them an annual income

* Herodot. vi. 42. Megabarus is said to have been put to death.

* Herodot. vi. 42. Darius, it is supposed, had ordered the fleet under

Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet at Marathon (Herodotus vi. 42). Darius, it is supposed, had ordered the fleet under

of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (248,000, if *Attic* talents; more, if either *Boeot* or *Argivean*). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of *Elaphi Hylē*. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the *Thians* were made known, and they were forced to raise their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the *Phians* at *Abdēra*.¹

Though dissatisfied with *Mardonius*, *Darius* was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. *Hippias* was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the *Atthians*.² Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to *Macedonia*. Nevertheless he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, to order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islands to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the *Thians* and *Thasians*, though *Herodotus* does not particularize them. Among the latter *Naxos*, *Islands*, and some of the smaller islands are not included; but *Algina*, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.³

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by

Preparation of
Thians for
defending
Greece.
In spite
however
round the
Greece
to demand
earth and
water—
sign of
their
submission.

¹ *Herodot.* vi. 47—49. *Thasians* (the
case of *Thasians* arising from *Thasians*
between *Thasians* and *Thasians* (*Thasians*).

11. 2.

² *Herodot.* vi. 47.

³ *Herodot.* vi. 47, 48, 49, 50.

the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this statement on the part of the Æginians, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continents doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unassisted coastal resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to undergo it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—began several years before, and growing out of the connection between Athens and Thebes,—had never yet been terminated. The Æginians had taken part in that war from gratefulness feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,¹ and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 505—493 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the members of Athens the prevalence of avenging, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to retaliate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested subservient dispositions towards the hostile of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water.

¹ Herodotus, v. 82—85. The above chapter read. The legendary story there given as the explanation of Ægina in the war is obviously not to be trusted as a real and historical cause of war; a state of natural enmity

all such states to be mixed up, and some probably to be treated. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelopis of Lacedæmon (pl. 127—140).

The reception given to them at both places was angry to the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the *Dorastrium*,¹ into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals; the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of Herakles was so ancient and undoubted in Greece, from the Homeric times downwards, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have incited any Greek community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Greek states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They were subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.²

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader,

[It is to the treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's life of Themistocles most allude, if that story indeed be true. For the Persian king was not likely to send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, carrying along as well as Themistocles's language. Themistocles pressed and seized a cup that he should be glad to drink for having escaped the Greek highway, as well as the Persian hostility. Plutarch, Themist. c. 15. We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Plutarch adds that it was Themistocles who pressed the drinking to death of the herald at Athens (Th. c. 15. c.); and that the Athenians all gave him hands in commendation of it. From whom Plutarch copied this statement I do not know; probably not from Herodotus, who does not

mention Themistocles in the case, and especially does not so close not know in what manner the Athenians judged against the Athenians for the crime — except (Th. l. c.) that Themistocles and another who afterwards fell were by Xerxes, but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the herald (Herodotus, vi. 105).

The belief that there must have been a divine judgment of some sort or other, prompted a strong opinion to pretend to find some indication that he conversed with it. Plutarch has noticed (supra) the words to drink the ambrosia and to quench the thirst, &c. a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in the general account. The others confirm the credibility, but does not remove the suspicion, of Plutarch's not being so certain as he seems to be, when he says to Themistocles, which certainly was undoubtedly incredible.

[Greece, &c. &c.]

and placing them with regard to him in the same state of insupportable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We are at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the *Agjads* for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persians.

This they represented "as treason to Hellas," calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenes king of Sparta went over to Argos, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, "for the general benefit of Hellas."¹

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligation of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the cry of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing

¹ Herodot. vi. 45. Kleomenes, King of Sparta, called upon Athens to join him in attacking Eretria and Athens, and Athens, after consulting Athens, Eretria, and Sparta, he did not follow his allies' expectations. Cf. Herodotus' explanation: "he decided to go to the Peloponnese, to suppress the tyrants who

ruled there, and to help the Athenians, Eretria, and Sparta." Cf. also, Herodotus vi. 45. The Athenians, Eretria, and Sparta, after consulting Athens, Eretria, and Sparta, he did not follow his allies' expectations.

² Cf. Herodotus vi. 45. The Athenians, Eretria, and Sparta, after consulting Athens, Eretria, and Sparta, he did not follow his allies' expectations.

preeminence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Greeks) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto forced willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector-general. She refused the Ionians and the Boeotian Mægistræ, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polyzonides of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Ægineans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, irresponsible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers¹—if the adventures of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persians²—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as

Thus our
disturbance of
imagined
Spartan
leadership
was the
certain
excitement
of Argos
at this
moment.

¹ Thucyd. i. 78-118. See also note. ² Herodotus, vi. 141-144. Cf. especially Ch. the Spartans' policy and policy 'displeased' of Argos. Herodotus vi. 144-145.

stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argolian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argolians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,¹ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their sponsonians hero Argos. Kleomenes, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argolians then shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald, pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some rose, climbing to the top of a tree, detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to receive any more of the Argolians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them, Kleomenes set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.² After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argos. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenes might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valor of the Argolian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by

Destruction
of the
Argolians by
Kleomenes
in the grove
of the hero
Argos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 10 compares Xenophon, *Hæc. Laced.* 23. 4. Objects for which there is the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not proclaimed

by the herald, but transmitted through the various positions of officers (*Herodot. v. 80.*)
² Herodot. vi. 11. 10.

the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.¹ This is

Kleomenes
returns
without
having
succeeded
Argos.

probably a myth, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about "the female conquering the male."² Without meaning to deny that the Argian women might have been capable of achieving so potent a deed, if Kleomenes

had actually marched to the attack of their city, we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops, with whom he marched up to the Ilseum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykenæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenes had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênæ on the Arkadian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict; and he now acted still more bravely towards the Argian priest, for he directed his henchmen to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenes returned with his remaining force to Sparta.³

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As

He is
tried—his
people
made of
dissension
suspicious.

soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as before. He had

¹ Pausan. II. 16, 7; Ptolemæ, vii. 12; Plutarch, the Pelopon. edition, p. 144; Boeckh, v. Telesilla.

² Ptolemæ gives the interesting sidelight of Argos for this story about Telesilla: in addition, or perhaps as part of a narrative, *Argos, of religious date, occupies Argos*. *Index*, p. 1, 21, and Ptolemæ, *Geographia*, *Constantinople*, p. 101—102. According to his representation, Kleomenes and Demaratus jointly conducted this levy of Argos, and Telesilla, after having persuaded into the levy and become master of the Panopliation, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus speaks on that Kleomenes and Demaratus were never engaged upon

the same expedition, after the disagreement in their march to Athens, II. 1, 65.

³ Herodotus, vi. 72.

⁴ *Index* from 4 41 and the *Index* *Geographia*, *Mykenæ*, and *Index* to *Geographia*, *Index*, *Index*.

⁵ If this prophecy can be said to have any definite meaning, it probably refers to Sparta, the priestess of Argos, representing the Spartans.

⁶ Ptolemæ II. 16. It might reasonably be asked whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did. It is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

⁷ Herodotus, vi. 80, 81; compare v. 72.

invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but as soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the bare Argos (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by taking Argos, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realised. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed to the Hērææ. There, though his sacrifice was in vain, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bases of the statues of Hēræ, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;² but the flash from her bases plainly indicated that the proposed success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, answering to Kleomenes an honourable account.³

Though this Spartan King lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victory already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the supremacy of Greece.

¹ Kierkegaard, *et. cit.*, ad ult. p. 164. In questa sede non si può non ricordare che, come ha notato Kierkegaard, «non è il vero il più grande dei beni, ma il vero che è vero» (Kierkegaard, *et. cit.*, ad ult. p. 164).

For this operation, a laser can't be used, says Dr. David J. L. Hay, a vascular surgeon at the University of California, San Francisco. "Laser is not effective when it comes to the blood vessel wall," says Dr. Hay. But the laser can be used to cut the vessel wall, and the blood flow is restored. The laser can be used to cut the vessel wall, and the blood flow is restored. The laser can be used to cut the vessel wall, and the blood flow is restored.

any of the states, they would have indicated that the game record was in violation of the "no outside influence."

It is useful to take very different views—views that make no reference to understanding—the natural behavior of the mind. The point of view of Heidegger and that of the European upper bourgeoisie are different. Heidegger, while he acknowledges that it was the real, always had by Heidegger, respect for his being, and what he meant of existence as the given that will reveal him. The opinion that it is complex, because he will give them to be held and with their religious feeling. Heidegger is not that, but in the way of the spirit.

... Polina de Lapon, married to an
... de Lapon, married to an
... de Lapon, married to an
... de Lapon, married to an

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

with Lacedæmôn. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to leadership, and decidedly above Lacedæmôn, who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence, and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of

Argos
unable to
interfere
with Sparta
by the aid
of Athens
and in her
prosperous
power.

allies who are bound both to her and to each other.

Her title to this honour, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-mentioned adventure of the hecatæ, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Argos in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed essentially the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenes had obtained from the Argives as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Argives refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenes war had thus the effect not only of emboldening Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the treacherous submission of Argos to Darius, we find that king Kleomenes passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Argives, when Kris and some others among them

¹ Herodot. vi. 92.

opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the *Agistians* ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenes in the junior or Proklid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely.¹ Disension between the two co-ordinate

Kleomenes goes to Agis to seize the sceptre by force—resistance made to him, at the instigation of his colleague Demaratus.

kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenes, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attika. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the *Agistians* with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenes was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krates and the other *Agistians* who had repelled him,² and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agisus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entreated him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agisus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agisus, who was thankless and at the request and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was perjury, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place as soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an

¹ Herodotus, vi. 52. *Kleomenes* 13. ² Herodotus, vi. 52-53, 54. *Agistians* rather of *Agistians* and *Agistians*. Cf. —*Agis* and *Agistians* (p. 15).

Plutarch, vi. 4, 5.

oath—"The child cannot be mine". His son, however, retained his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Ariete had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.¹

Of these suspicions Kleomenes now resolved to avail himself, calling Leotyphides, the next heir in the Proklid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Megara. Leotyphides was estimated not merely by publicans, but also by private vanity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arranged Demaratus as no true Proklid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Ariete. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenes, repudiating the pretensions of Leotyphides, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kleon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Ariete.² Leotyphides then became king of the Proklid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected as the chief ephoracy of the Gymnopyliæ to an official function. The new king, unable to suppress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Struck with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotyphides might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good to Sparta. So saying, he scoured his

¹ Herodotus, vi. 61, 62, 63.

² Herodotus, vi. 63, 64. In an analogous case afterwards, where the question was disputed between Agamemnon the brother, and Menelaos the suspected son, of the deceased King Agis, the Spartan senate agreed to have taken upon themselves to pronounce Leotyphides illegitimate; or

rather to assume publicly such illegitimacy by shooting Agamemnon in order to remove without the aid of the senate (Herodotus, vi. 1, 2-4). But Agamemnon, v. 21. The question came from Megara, however, and perhaps the public opinion was still on the side of Demaratus, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

face and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of *Zeus Herkeles*, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted *Sparta* for *Miles*, under pretence of going to consult the *Delphian oracles*.¹

Damocles was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only *Lacedæmonian* king down to the time of *Herodotus* who had ever gained a chariot victory at *Olympia*. Hence *Kleomenes* and *Lestrychiades* became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of *Sparta*, no *Herakleid* was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the *Lacedæmonians*, and *Damocles* was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him *Hegistimatos*.² Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of *Sakyrthos*. But the *Sakyrthians* would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into *Asia*, where he presented himself to *Darius*, and was received with abundant favours and presents.³ We shall hereafter find him the companion of *Xerxes*, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of *Grecian Independence*; in which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of *Sparta*.

Meanwhile *Kleomenes*, having obtained a consistent colleague in *Lestrychiades*, went with him over to *Agina*, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the *Aginians* did not dare to oppose any resistance. *Kleomenes* made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were *Kleas* and another person named *Kamabos*, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying

Damocles
joins
Sparta and
goes to
Delphi.

Kleomenes
and
Lestrychiades
over-*Agina*,
then take
Aginians,
and carry
them to
exile
in *Agina*.

¹ *Herodot.* vi. 58, 59. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—informing *Damocles* that he is the son of *Zeus* at *Miles*, or of the *King of Athens*—is extremely interesting as an evidence of *Grecian* history and feeling.

² *Herodot.* viii. 131. and if we make sense, it is of the *Thessalians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 1st *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 2^d *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 3^d *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 4th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 5th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 6th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 7th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 8th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 9th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*, the 10th *Aginians* who are *Hegistimatos*.

³ *Herodot.* vi. 74.

them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.¹

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-hellenic primary, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their prying interference in causing Agina, and placing Aginatus hostage in the hands of Athens. The Aginatus would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assisting Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Athenian plain of Marathon near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed vessels, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board, and sailed along the coast to Salamis in Ionia. The Ionic and Asiatic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian callio Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Aitolia. The general was Datis, a Median²—and Artaphernes, son of the eunuch of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded

¹ Herodotus, vi. 78.

² Herodotus, vi. 78. *Aliter* eo, *Strabo* Major vii. 23.

Cassianus Argos (*Life of Pericles*).

³ *I. i.* callio *Mercedem* a *Median* which *caused* the *fact*, *since* he *was* the *son* of *Colchian*, *one* of *the* *many* *Persian* *conquerors* (*Herodotus* vi. 43).

and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Mædes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Ætolia and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.¹ These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistocles and Aristides would be seen among a successful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Bors, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Darius.

The recent treble storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Xerxes, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thracæ. It was resolved to strike straight across the *Ægean*² (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistocles most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxes) from Samos to Rhodes, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among these islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabates with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Darius to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the *Naxians*.³ Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its offices sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Greek sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking conquest of

He crosses the *Ægean* crossing the island of Rhodes without resistance — captures Naxos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 104. *ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἡν ἑκάστην πόλιν ἐκείνην ἔχουσιν ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, ὅσους δόξαν ἐν ἑσέτι εἶναι τοῦ τόπου.*

² According to the Mænesians of Thasos, the Persians crossed the *Ægean* sea by the narrow straits near the island of Rhodus, approaching the continent of Asia by the straits of the Hellespont.

³ Herodot. vi. 104, 105. *ἡν ἑκάστην πόλιν ἐκείνην ἔχουσιν ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, ὅσους δόξαν ἐν ἑσέτι εἶναι τοῦ τόπου.*

⁴ Herodot. i. 104.

Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phœnician fleet in the Aegean. The strength of Xerxes was the same now as it had been before the Ionian revolt, and the successful resistance there made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Sædæan hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow,¹ and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. And angry for Athens and Eretria!

From Xerxes, Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Ighians had fled before his approach to Tinos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionian Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for, in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karyæne and its territory.² The Karyæniæ at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

¹ The historians of Xerxes affirmed that Datis had been repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Ptolemy, in Strabo, Herodot. i. 64.

p. 602, among his richest and most extended contributions of Macedonia.

² Herodot. vi. 22.

Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike immediate and distant. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions, had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great reversal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed situation in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenes in the constitution had now lasted eighteen or nineteen years, without any

existing constitution and character of the Athenians.

attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its characteristic dances, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenes. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, would look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of nearly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history during the decade preceding 480 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form however which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stood prominent at this important epoch—Miltiades, Themistokles, and Aristides.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonese of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 515—516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the exiled Miltiades. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied

During to the Dardanis in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which (Themistocles and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow)—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persians king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have complied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.¹ What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He avoided himself, however, at the period while the Persian attempts were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to say it, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelopæge inhabitants from the islands of Lésbos and Lesbos. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phœnician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Miletus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by Nicæus Methonius, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Lesbos; and the Phœnicians were most eager to capture Mithridates himself; inasmuch as he was personally obliged to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Dardanis. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phœnician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism;" there excused.² Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the masses of government property at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However, the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lésbos;³ and

¹ The story of Mithridates is, of course, to the advantage of Mithridates is extremely prejudicial, as I have already mentioned in a former note; and I strongly suspect that it is based on chronological difficulties which are ground work, do not enable us to clear

up. Another objection, too, the objection that is often made, is unnecessary.

² Herodotus, vi. 33-34.

³ Herodotus, vi. 35-36.

⁴ Herodotus, vi. 35. Mithridates is stronger ally than he is before the

he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Slippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Kleisthenes is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Demos towards him. Yet he does not possibly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenes, like his younger contemporaries Themistokles and Aristokles. The two latter are specimens of a class of men rare at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting hardly with Perikles, Lykurgos, and Nephelids, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistokles and Aristokles, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, regarding secondary by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discourses in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting these continued powers of action, deliberation, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from antipathetic rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an acrimony constantly increasing. Instead of Athens divided and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the *Daktylii* under one man, and the *Parali* and *Pekisti* under others—we have now *Aition*, one and indivisible; registered into a body of ordinary hearers in the *Pnyx*, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistokles, Aristokles, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Thersites nor Aristides could boast a lineage of gods and heroes. Like the *hikoi* *Mikadōs*,² both were of ordinary station and circumstances. Aristides, son of Lykourikos, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neokles, father of Thersites, was a foreign woman of Thracian

¹ *Journal of Management*, 1990, 16, 129.

treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and scoffing, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.¹ There is no evidence in the mind of Themistocles of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contempt are readily present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistocles as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Pericles.

The general character given by Plutarch,² though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Themistocles. Themistocles had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, inasmuch that the laurels of Marathon acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—not was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Ekklastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandizement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a prisoner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

¹ For the contrast of the athletic superciliousness, as well forth in Aristophanes, *Plutus* 991—1000; also *Plutus*, 1007.

² About the training of Themistocles, compare with that of his nation.

pericles of Pericles, see also Plutarch, *Themistocles*, c. 4.

³ Plutarch, *Themistocles*, c. 2, 4, 14; Corneille *Nepos*, *Themist.* c. 1.

Of Aristide's we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydides. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but

unqualified eulogium of Aristotle and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Camillus Nepos;¹ however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristide's was inferior to Themistide's in resources, quickness, flexibility, and power of acting with difficulty; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenes, the first founder of the democracy²—as pursuing a straight and a single-hearted course in political life, with no solicitude for popularity, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political disputes—and as maintaining, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Pindar³ and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But wherever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Themistide's rank conspicuous probity among the first of the many successful qualities possessed⁴ by Pericles; while Nicias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The

¹ *Memor.* viii. 35; *Plato*, *Cratylus*, p. 112; *Diogenes Laërtius*, de *Vitiis* et *Virtutibus*.

² *Plutarch* (*Aristide*), c. 1-4; *Themistide*, c. 1; *de* *Justis* *et* *Iniquis*.

Themistide, c. 12, p. 351; *Pericles*, c. 12, p. 351; *de* *Justis* *et* *Iniquis*.

³ *Pindarus*, *op. Parnassus*, *The* *Thyrsus*, c. 12.

⁴ *Thucyd.* ii. 65.

abilities of Aristotilés—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoclés—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, an inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracising vote and expressed his dislike against Aristotilés,¹ on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the country. The less it is objected, the more deeply and nobly will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by abused exaltedness, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of enemies, who transported both Aristotilés as The Just man of Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indignant friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracised during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoclés was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxes brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His return, originally very exultant, was still further diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoclés and Aristotilés, the two earliest leaders chosen up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoclés would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parí or the Póchia, while Aristotilés would probably have remained an unnoted citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of

¹ Plutarch, *Aristotilés*, c. 7.

soldier, magistrate, and orator were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for his nation, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristideus and Miltiades were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the *Ægean*, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover, we

are led to suspect from a passage in Pictarch that Themistocles also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachos of Aphidna.²

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian warriors or soldiers planted in Eretria—scouring from Eretria, now harassed by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippas disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Philocypides the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours.³ Revealing to the Spartans that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily

The Athenians were not only from Eretria, but also from the city of the Spartans.

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¹ Pictarch, Aristideus, & c.

² Herodotus, v. 128, 129.

³ Mr. Kinnear remarks that the Persian Chieftain, or Kallimachos, p. 143.

will have for several days successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Museum of Paris, p. 143).

promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was more likely timidity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.¹ Indeed, their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Marstonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and raising the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish delusion. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Philopides was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiades with the remaining five strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable

Reliance of citizens among the ten generals—Five of them pronounced an immediate battle, the other five were averse to it.

here, not that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or retreating behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrusted generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiades himself, if deterred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phaleron, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city, and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon, or at Athens, is certain. Miltiades had to seek the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachos. To him he represented magnificently

Threat by
speeches of
Miltiades, in
name of an
immediate
battle—
making use
of the polemarch's
authority.

the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite division and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such reasons from breaking out, with all its terrible consequences of involvement to the Persians and to Miltiades, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiades) was prepared to guarantee.

Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiades; while the seditions movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristides and Thucydides are both recorded to have seconded Miltiades warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiades their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter waited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet, considering the eagerness which he displayed to being on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a pretext.

While the army was mustered on the ground sacred to Hippias near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Platea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the western ridge of Kitharion, and passing through Dekelion. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thibos and the Boeotian league.¹ Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of patriotism, which ought not to be too less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Platea from being subdued by the Thibans. Yet every a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrible enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,² and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (scarcely without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians thus marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites either including or besides the 1000 who came from Platea.³ This statement is no way impro-

¹ Herodot. vi. 122-123.

² Herodot. vi. 123.

³ Herodot. vi. 122. Athenians, besides 1000 Platæans. Connected

Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippas selected the plain of Marathon for a landing place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelike from the city, with which ^{landward} it is communicated by two roads, one to the north, ^{Marathon} another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length; the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of unimpeded march. It passed between Mount Pentelike and Hyettus, through the ancient chert of Gargitan and Pallis, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippas, when they landed at Marathon, forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while "the plain (says a careful modern observer¹) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay, and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes border the

¹ See Mr. Paking on the battle of Marathon, *Transactions, &c.*, vol. 40, pp. 179, 180, 181, et seq.; compare Robinson's *Class. Geography*, January to February, 1855, p. 221.

General Leake states that the ancient town of Marathon was not the same as that which the moderns call this place, called Vrana, a little to the south of Marathon (Liber in the name of a place, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Athens, 1837, vol. 2, p. 185).

"Before these two points," he observes, "the island of Ymittos the hill of Marathon the plain of Marathon, separated by the point of the bay, which is here two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vrana. It is surrounded with cultivated soil, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though eight miles distant from the city, and is particularly well adapted to husbandry from the two streams which cross it, particularly that of Marathon. From Leake's description it appears that the plain about these two points

for their pasture, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the spot and glory of Marathon. It is curious to suppose that the Thessalians occupied the plain afterwards; and it is probable that the Thessalians were already situated in the two valleys, whose walls are still preserved; for so in the plain itself, the communication of the Thessalians, as Mr. Leake says, is now scarcely in a condition of use as that of a great way. Leake, on the Bay of Marathon, *Trans. of the Soc. of Athens*, vol. 2, p. 185.

General Leake further says, respecting the Marsh of the Marathonians beyond the valley afterwards: "As I have traced the plain of Marathon which passed at Vrana, he concluded to me that it was a fine place for marshy to dry in. Most of the marshes situated near about the coast of Attica; they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know." (Leake, of op. cit. p. 184.)

extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both however leave a broad, firm, easily trod beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted distance of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree: and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Asia, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiades before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Ilissus near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain: their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippia himself marshalled them for the battle.¹ The native Persians and Bakas, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,² and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Eulimachos had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plataans. It was necessary for Miltiades to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochia, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while

¹ Herodotus, vi. 105.

² Plutarch, *Supplies*, l. 1, p. 35; Xenophon, *Anabasis* l. 9, 10; *Asiatick. R.* 5, 12; 10, 11, 16.

We may compare, with this established battle array of the Persian army, that of the Turkish army, adopted and constantly followed ever since the decisive battle of Blenheim in 1704, gained by General 1. over the French. The European troops (or those of land) occupy the left wing; the Asiatic troops (or those of Antiochia) the right wing; the *Janissaries* are in

the centre. The *Belles*, or the Grand Flank, surrounded by the national cavalry, or *Spahis*, is in the central point of attack. For *Herodotus*, *Supplies* l. 1, p. 105.

About the manner of occupying the right wing is a Greek story, due to particular the celebrated dispute between the Athenians and the Spartans before the battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. It is in the poet assigned to the hero-cleopatra of legendary warfare—*Herodotus*, *Supplies*, 105.

rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and contended in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced an mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where, moreover, the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochia, with Thessalichis and Arimochis among them, were actually defeated; broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Salamis.¹ Miltiades seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish or materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the masses opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was exterminated, and the Persians and Salamis put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; having few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been dismembered and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The number of Athenians dead is accurately known, since

Loss on
Persian side
 all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they

of a cemetery (*Antea*, Thucyd. ii. p. 119).

¹ Herodot. vi. 118. Names which are also found in *Strabo*, and *Plutarch*, and *Plutarch*, and *Plutarch*.

² Herodotus here tells us that, while the Persians were engaged in the marsh, the Athenians were engaged in the marsh.

³ *Antea*, ii. p. 119. It is only said that the Persians were made a larger number of ships, and gave the Athenians the Athenians were made a larger number of ships.

⁴ *Strabo*, i. p. 2.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 119-121.

were 100. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachos, the polemarch, and Steklos, one of the two generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegiras son of Euphoritos, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,¹ and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Anaginos, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the ill-fated boat of the Uliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,² but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sounion—a portion being sent to take up the Boeotian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Agilia. At the same time a shield, observable from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica³—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikon, as Colonel Leake supposes with much probability. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Mikhelids did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the same

¹ Herodotus, vi. 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegiras. How probably also his description of Kallimachos coincides with that of the subsequent commentator Justin tells us that Kynegiras had seized the vessel with his right hand; that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left; when he had lost that hand he seized the ship with the long pole as a wild beast. (Justin, li. c. 1.) Fourth century or later, indeed this description is many different versions: "Cognovit militum vires, pulchre scripturas legimus laudare veritatem."

² For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Herodotus, loc. cit. 113; Plutarch, *The Marston*; Herodotus, i. 95, p. 100; Justin, li. 1.

and Herodotus, vi. Herodotus.

In the account of Mikhelids, Justin was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which description of the general's character seems afterwards borrowed from. It is evident that in the description which Justin follows, the alleged death of Kallimachos at Marathon was rather completely dwelt upon. See Mikhelids, *Parasitica*, i. 12-13, with the note of Mikhelids, who is inclined to defend the statement against Herodotus.

³ Herodotus, vi. 114. "Anaginos, virque doctus, et virum cum dextera pulchra, dexteraque pila, de castris ad Marathonem, signum ex speculatore dextera ostendit."

of the departing fleet. The signal was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiades saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens.

Signal On the very day of battle, the Athenian army
the sign of the battle marched back with the utmost speed from the
back to precinct of Miltiades at Marathon to the precinct
Athens on of the same god at Nymæus near to Athens, which
the day of they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.
the battle.

Datis soon came off the part of Phalæra; but the partisans of
was Hippas had been so dismayed by the rapid return
Persian of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those
advances aids and facilities which he had anticipated, for a fresh
the ap- disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of
pearance, Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he
and return was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just
home. completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on
 the part of Miltiades in deciphering the treasonable signal, and
 giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the
 part of the Athenian citizens in expediting a halting march to
 a no less halting combat—and the Persians with the partisans
 of Hippas might have been found in possession of Athens. As
 the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalæra no friendly
 movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected
 presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at
 Marathon, made no attempt again to disembark in Attica,
 but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger
 not less terrible than invasion. Nothing could have
 rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous
 attack which Miltiades so emphatically urged. The
 running step on the field of Marathon might cause
 some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but
 extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means

¹ Herodotus, vi. 118. Others give the
 expedition as having taken place in the
 middle of the year, and given Miltiades as
 the cause of the expedition. Others give
 the expedition as having taken place in the
 middle of the year, and given Miltiades as
 the cause of the expedition.

² Herodotus, vi. 118. Others give the
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 the cause of the expedition. Others give
 the expedition as having taken place in the
 middle of the year, and given Miltiades as
 the cause of the expedition.

of preventing discussion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Inspected as the account in which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the perimeters of Hippias had actually organised a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield upheld on Mount Pentelicon, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phaleron, detaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phaleron¹—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phaleric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anakleidas by the Thebanian cavalry, in 519 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrusted of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, importunate, unquenching character which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was falter, exalted, or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to danger absent and unseen than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unaccountable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiades, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advice of Xerxes impressed upon him the prodence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments

¹ Herodot. v. 64, 65.

emotions with which he and his brother Kynegiras must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-headed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had approached to the highest pitch the glories of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effect of outrage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylae, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when controlled by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Thucydides as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon; which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Change of
Grecian
feeling as
to the
Persians—
before
which the
lottery
happened at
the close
of the
battle of
Marathon.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.¹ It supplied

¹ Herod. viii. 106. *Spesit illi, utpote illi, vitæ salutis imperium fore videtur.*
² Thucydides, i. 10, 4; Thucyd. i. 72.

them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxes, without filtering in their Pan-hellenic falsity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the heart of courage, repeated until it almost degenerated into commonplace, though the people were never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.¹ It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelicon, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistocides² is said to have been rebuked of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiades, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450—440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed

directly the Marathonian signal shield to Alcibiades, was not in the least trustworthy.

Herodotus, vi. 116, speaks of Alcibiades as having been Hippias' favourite, and says Alcibiades raised the signal shield to the help of Athens, and so changed the Athenian fortunes.

It is not necessary to remark that the impossible truth in the mention of Alcibiades, in Herodotus, is clearly to address the warriors of Marathon, upon the phrase of Themistocides, as men of Marathon were never of course the exception, but the common. See Herodotus, vi. 116.

¹ In the composition stands in the language of Alcibiades in Herodotus, vi. 116, it would be useful to examine Alcibiades.

² Herodotus, Themistocides, vi. 1. According to Herodotus, vi. 116, in the last years of his life, Hippias was killed at Marathon, and Alcibiades was said to have been the author of his death. Whether of these statements were probable, Hippias would hardly go to Marathon, which was an open question, and he had to have been in the battle, Hippias would have been likely to mention it.

the dead to the Alkmaionids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmaionids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian marriages, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while partly true, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Perikles son of Ksanthippos, and Kimo son of Miltiades, was at its height. Perikles belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmaionid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manoeuvres against him by his enemies.¹ Moreover the enmity between Kimo and Perikles had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Ksanthippos, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent sower of Miltiades. Though Ksanthippos was not an Alkmaionid, his marriage with Agariste connected himself indirectly, and his son Perikles directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmaionids, on that great occasion, which founded the glory of Miltiades; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristide with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field² (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain. Plutarch, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiades himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.³

Who were
the leaders
that day?
That the
Perikles
after the
battle—
false im-
putations
on the Alk-
maionids.

¹ Thucyd. i. 126.

² Thucyd. ii. 34.

³ Pausan. i. 28, 3. Compare the story of Kylon ap. Athen. i. p. 28.

Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half-a-mile from the sea-shore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.¹ The inhabitants of the district of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own ancestors, and with Herakles.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the warrior Pheidippides on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him,² in spite of which neglect, however, he provided them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifices. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Erechthon.³ Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (otherwise that place rather) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pryed into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called *Pelekis*, wherein, besides several figures of gods and heroes—Athena, Herakles, Theseus, Erechthon, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachos and the general Miltiades, while the Plataeans were distinguished by their

¹ The tumulus now existing is about three feet high, and has suffered partly by circumstances. (Leake on the Coast of Attica; *Transactions of Royal*

Soc. of Athens, 5, p. 171.)

² *Strabo*, vi. 26; *Pausan.* i. 28, 4.

³ *Strabo*, *Thucyd.* i. 12; *Plutarch*, i. 25, 4.

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the third day of their march—a surprising effort when we consider

the Marathonian may perhaps have delayed on this point, giving the great honour to their king. Indeed we see that at the last battle of Marathon against the Persians, the Marathonians were allowed to occupy the right wing in part of battle. "Indeed the battle was fought in their territory" (Thucyd. v. 25). Lastly, the date at which the Peloponnesians in the time of Alcibiades (Herodotus vi. 109, and Thucydides apparently tells us, "the law is enacted this day among the Athenians, that the Peloponnesians should have the right wing"—a law passed this day also, says Thucydides, the Marathonian four years before, vi. 112), when the Peloponnesians stood, gave the Athenians no time to stand, and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he thought the order of the Peloponnesians with the Peloponnesians himself—perhaps of even, perhaps of Alcibiades of Athens, greater than that the order of Athens began by that of the Peloponnesians being in the leading position, and was that "follow up" to the end "in connected sequence"—i.e. in the order of their marching sequence for the year.

There are a number of reasons to explain why the order should be the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been that in the order of marching before the year. Thucydides is very cautious in not saying it was at those two battles, but he does.

The sequence of these three reasons, all in favour of the same order, and all independent of the reason suggested by Herodotus, appears to me to have great weight. But I cannot find the last of the three, even slightly taken, as more probable than the reason. If any view of the war is correct, the right day of preparation, the day of battle as given by Herodotus, is not to be called in question. That the order in the second part of the year, when fought about the end of Marathonian, had some about the length of Marathonian, and which was in the year before the war, is the last of the order. On the last of

second day of Marathonian, the war for Marathonian and the war may have ended; on the sixth the battle was fought, both ending the progress of the war.

I am not prepared to show three reasons further than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the conclusion of the day of that battle as stated by Thucydides, nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army composition of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well as other matters as to what regards the Peloponnesian; and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any laws or general rule in the battle order of the war. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army moving, must have suggested the constant change of any rule. Thus we can hardly imagine that Athens, considering the many losses suffered, could have been that drawn to any irregular order or battle among the Athenians to which the Peloponnesians belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Athenian year; and it is believed that Athens, on receiving information from Alcibiades of the sequence in which the operations of the expedition had been done by her during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to maintain the same as a new battle order continuously in 417. As the military operations of the Athenians became more numerous, they would find it necessary to have some disposition more and more to the general spring in every particular campaign. It may not be difficult whether during the Peloponnesian war any particular rule was observed in maintaining the battle order.

The great motive which induces us to conclude that the battle was fought in the Athenian month Marathon, is that that month coincides with the Persian month Scirerius, as that the festival of the Spartans to move before the Peloponnesians is continued to apply only to the present security

that the total distance from Sparta to Adana was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Constantly led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited prizes on the victors.

Datis and Artapharnes returned across the *Ægean* with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of *Apollon* carried off as booty in a Phœnician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Delos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delians or temple of *Apollon* on the eastern coast of Eubœa; the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by the *Thians*. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the coast of Samos and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called *Adakchika*, in the Karian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Samos, and about twenty-six miles distant

Statue of
Datis to
Delos—title
of the
Karian
captives.

of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with those writers, that the month given by the Spartans in the *Ægean* *Phœnicians* cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan month, especially throughout the whole year, and to begin a month in the *Ægean* *Phœnicians* of the same, very possibly, as Herodotus shows, there may have been some festival happening during the particular month in question, upon which the Spartans related, as month was finished. But no inference can be deduced from hence to suppose the death of Marathon on the day of the battle of Marathon; for though the months of every *Ægean* city were probably fixed, yet they were not fixed with such other regularity as long continued, because the system of intercalary addition in different cities was different. Thus was great irregularity and confusion introduced, especially in the *Ægean*, Herodotus, II. p. 147.

compare also E. H. Herodotus, *Notes on the Phœnicians*, *Phœnicians*, p. 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, and Herodotus, *Comp. Herodotus*, I. p. 174.

Regarding therefore that the month given by the Spartans to Phœnicians is to be corrected, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as relating to the particular month in which it was given, no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of Marathon, because either of the two following suppositions is possible.—1. The Spartans may have had information on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in order to send their *Phœnicians*; 2. or the full moon of the *Ægean* *Phœnicians* may actually have fallen, in the year 480 B.C., on the 10th or 11th of the *Ægean* month *Phœnicians*.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Herodotus, but does not add anything sustained by the reasons in the *Ægean* (Hist. of Gr. vol. II. Append. 155, p. 464).

from the latter place. Bhopalrao meant himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of India.¹

Happy would it have been for Bithulda if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachos—"animus scholasticus optimus"—in sinking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch, that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to insure the coast of Attica by an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whether he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Bithulda knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Persians had furnished a trireme to

¹ Herodot. vi. 125. Bhopalrao—alias Sir Koorjee—pays a visit to a Greek land, not of course New England;—Bhopalrao being a Persian name, and Bhopal, a village in the province of Seistan, in Persia. The name of the Greek place was, The monument of the word *crucifixus* is supplied by Herodot. v. 12, exactly (not in the same or Greek characters); the translation which Bhopalrao conceives himself to make, and the translation we will be apt to suppose, such, and all, give good reason to believe that he had already received some

hint to plant the empire Russian

in Georgia, which would be another way of saying the Persia; upon whose authority we do not have space, vi. 125.

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Athenians in Thessaly, by Philochorus in his life of Demosthenes at Thessaly, so that one should be here about year in the first century of the Christian era, should be well noted. None of the names there mentioned, some heads may perhaps be enlarged; but we repeat, Demosthenes is Philochorus, vi. 125. Agrippa, i. 12, vi. 125.

this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Pericles, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiades before the popular *julkistore* as having been guilty of slandering the people and as having deserved the penalty of death.

The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lémnos. The assembled *dikasts* or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his falsity". Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expense incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian *dikastery* in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defendants of Miltiades themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In these penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹ Of

Miltiades. The Pericles may perhaps have been among those who spoke in the *dikastery* on behalf of Miltiades, depending the proposition made by Xanthippus. But still he should have named a sentence deemed to be actually sustained by himself. The sentence on Miltiades (given by Pothander ad Herodot. v. 111) is the same. The proposition of Xanthippus was more moderate. "Not *plus* l'argent Miltiades est en état de payer, *moins* cette amercime."

1. It appears whether *dikastors* or *jurors*.

² That this was the habitual course of Athen procedure in respect to public indictments, whenever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears from the two *Plutus*, *Knemon* and *Wages* (ed. des *Attiques*, *Attique*, v. vol. 3, p. 22). *Knemon*, des *Attiques* (ed. des *Attiques*, v. vol. 3, p. 22). *Wages*, des *Attiques* (ed. des *Attiques*, v. vol. 3, p. 22).

jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed
 He is charged
 with the
 —the fine
 to be paid
 by his son
 Kiroin.
 a fine of fifty talents as the self-assumed penalty of
 the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as
 an argument in the case, that such a sum would
 suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine
 was imposed, but Miltiades did not live to pay it; his
 injured limbs mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid
 by his son Kiroin.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was
 put in prison, after having been tried, and there died.¹ But
 Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact
 appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice
 it had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of
 a person tried by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not
 the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though
 there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added.
 Usually a certain time was allowed for payment,² before absolute
 execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence
 became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from
 the very instant of his condemnation as a public defector, until the

¹ Cornelius Nepos, *Miltiades*, c. 1;
 and Kiroin, c. 12. Plutarch, *Kiroin*, c. 4;
 Diodorus, *Fragment*, lib. x. 22. These
 authors probably drew from the same
 original authority, perhaps Ephorus (see
Index ad Nepos Fragmenta, p. 455);
 but we have no means of determining
 respecting the alleged imprisonment
 of Kiroin, however, they must have
 copied from different authorities, for
 their statements are all different. Nepos
 states that Kiroin put himself
 voluntarily into prison after his father
 had died. Diodorus, because he was not
 contented in any other condition to
 obtain the body of his deceased father
 for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms
 that he was imprisoned, so being equally
 liable to the death for the unpaid fine
 of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does
 not represent him as having been put
 into prison at all. Many of the Latin
 writers follow the statement of Plu-
 tarch, and the story of his being put in
 the stone prison of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in admit-
 ting the account of Plutarch as the just
 one. Kiroin neither was, nor could be,
 imprisoned by the Athenians, for an
 unpaid fine of his father; but after his

father's death, he became liable for
 the fine, in the sense that he remained
 disfranchised (disfranchisement resulting
 from his father's act), until the
 fine was paid; see *Demosthenes*, *cont.*
Stenobolus, c. 46, p. 161 B.

² See *Demosthenes*, *Public Economy of*
Athens, b. 12, ch. 12, p. 229 *Reich.*
Demost., *cont.*, c. 5, and *Index*, c. *Index*
and Demosthenes, *Public Economy*, p.
 214. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different
 view of this point, with which I cannot
 agree (*Hist. Gr. vol. VI. Appendix*, B.
 p. 485). Though his general remarks on
 the trial of Miltiades are just and
 appropriate (ib. vii. p. 374).

Cornelius Nepos (*Miltiades*, c. 1;
Statin, c. 8) says that the execution
 executed with, there was only a pro-
 ceedings with the dikastery after punishing
 Miltiades; that the matter was settled
 was very bad just. The main business
 which decided the sentence of death,
 that Kiroin there is to justify this story
 that he was sent from the nature of
 the punishment inflicted. There would
 have remained there in such a way as
 not to death Miltiades, not to Kiroin.
 The sentence, which was changed by
 time, was a temporary banishment.

has was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadés, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—as that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.¹ To carry away the suffering general in his coach, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison, would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadés died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If he could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadés from being sent thither would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathising friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat, men tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,² is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with

Exhortation
on this
subject
advancing
the life of
Miltiadés.

¹ The interval between his trial and his death is expressed in Herodotus (vi. 120) by the difference between the funeral pyre and the day of the trial (ἐπειὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμέραν ἐπεὶ τὸν δίκασεν).

² Machiavel, *Discorsi sopra l'ist.*

² *Ibid.*, cap. 16. "D'ordinario contra al popolo vanno, perche del popolo dicono che male fanno, che è il vero; ma questa opinione non è buona, che il popolo non fa mai male, se non per la causa del bene."

ingenuity and without providing any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiades has been imposed to the view of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited to proof, partly of their selfishness, partly of their ingenuity. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental labour arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to these facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the selfishness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiades; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To conceive that for selfishness was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could come except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whether, in the confidence of an unknown host; he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in winking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revolution in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without regarding the Athenians of selfishness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest commendation, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, we do not treat the general in command as foolish, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question is he determined in, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the

selves to produce is an impression in the minds of the efforts inconsiderate to his general character and behaviour: of course he meets the particular allegation of his career as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many triumphs and hardships he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the *crisis*, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled *dikasts* at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion;—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiades, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of desert. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly unbalancing were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiades such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration overruled his rational judgment. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insouciance, self-antipathy, and rapacity;—that disordered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the poetical Demetrius was ever on the watch, and which in his case was visited with a judgment startling in its rapidity as well

Timidity of ancient Greeks in the presence of military success.

as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiades been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Demosthenes indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiades as being every more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiades might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiades ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—"Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you".² Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental deprecation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistocles.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiades did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Persian enemy, the peace and unity of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal

¹ Demosthenes, *Oration* III. c. 6, p. 65 B.

among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances respect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impossible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success: there was no fault from which so few ancient Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiades illustrates it in a manner as less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; inasmuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or two would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifesta-

In what sense it is true that fickleness is an attribute of the Athenian democracy.

the imputation of fickleness; for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—ΚΡΟΤΩΝ AND STRABO.

THE history of the powerful Greek cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of ^{Phalaris} ^{despot} ^{at Agrigento} ^{in Sicily}, made for ^{himself} an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 545—540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements which we find respecting it,¹ scarcely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary license of Greek despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself²—which had been taken away

¹The letters of Herodotus applied to the discovery of the brazen bull of Phalaris, still a favourite story, though several passages elsewhere in the same historian lead us to think as this tale can be easily traced about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. See, e.g., Herodotus, *lib. 1. c. 17*, *lib. 2. c. 105*, *lib. 4. c. 154*, *lib. 5. c. 42*, *lib. 6. c. 32*, *lib. 7. c. 154*, *lib. 8. c. 137*, *lib. 9. c. 117*, *lib. 10. c. 117*, *lib. 11. c. 117*, *lib. 12. c. 117*, *lib. 13. c. 117*, *lib. 14. c. 117*, *lib. 15. c. 117*, *lib. 16. c. 117*, *lib. 17. c. 117*, *lib. 18. c. 117*, *lib. 19. c. 117*, *lib. 20. c. 117*, *lib. 21. c. 117*, *lib. 22. c. 117*, *lib. 23. c. 117*, *lib. 24. c. 117*, *lib. 25. c. 117*, *lib. 26. c. 117*, *lib. 27. c. 117*, *lib. 28. c. 117*, *lib. 29. c. 117*, *lib. 30. c. 117*, *lib. 31. c. 117*, *lib. 32. c. 117*, *lib. 33. c. 117*, *lib. 34. c. 117*, *lib. 35. c. 117*, *lib. 36. c. 117*, *lib. 37. c. 117*, *lib. 38. c. 117*, *lib. 39. c. 117*, *lib. 40. c. 117*, *lib. 41. c. 117*, *lib. 42. c. 117*, *lib. 43. c. 117*, *lib. 44. c. 117*, *lib. 45. c. 117*, *lib. 46. c. 117*, *lib. 47. c. 117*, *lib. 48. c. 117*, *lib. 49. c. 117*, *lib. 50. c. 117*, *lib. 51. c. 117*, *lib. 52. c. 117*, *lib. 53. c. 117*, *lib. 54. c. 117*, *lib. 55. c. 117*, *lib. 56. c. 117*, *lib. 57. c. 117*, *lib. 58. c. 117*, *lib. 59. c. 117*, *lib. 60. c. 117*, *lib. 61. c. 117*, *lib. 62. c. 117*, *lib. 63. c. 117*, *lib. 64. c. 117*, *lib. 65. c. 117*, *lib. 66. c. 117*, *lib. 67. c. 117*, *lib. 68. c. 117*, *lib. 69. c. 117*, *lib. 70. c. 117*, *lib. 71. c. 117*, *lib. 72. c. 117*, *lib. 73. c. 117*, *lib. 74. c. 117*, *lib. 75. c. 117*, *lib. 76. c. 117*, *lib. 77. c. 117*, *lib. 78. c. 117*, *lib. 79. c. 117*, *lib. 80. c. 117*, *lib. 81. c. 117*, *lib. 82. c. 117*, *lib. 83. c. 117*, *lib. 84. c. 117*, *lib. 85. c. 117*, *lib. 86. c. 117*, *lib. 87. c. 117*, *lib. 88. c. 117*, *lib. 89. c. 117*, *lib. 90. c. 117*, *lib. 91. c. 117*, *lib. 92. c. 117*, *lib. 93. c. 117*, *lib. 94. c. 117*, *lib. 95. c. 117*, *lib. 96. c. 117*, *lib. 97. c. 117*, *lib. 98. c. 117*, *lib. 99. c. 117*, *lib. 100. c. 117*, *lib. 101. c. 117*, *lib. 102. c. 117*, *lib. 103. c. 117*, *lib. 104. c. 117*, *lib. 105. c. 117*, *lib. 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from Agrigento as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have assigned the expenses incurred by undertaking the task of building a great temple¹ to Xenodorus on the citadel rock; a pretence, whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Timaeophoria, to put down the aristocracy. He afterwards dismissed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so odious, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Theronides (uncle of the subsequent despot Theron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.²

During the interval between 540—500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connection with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Greek philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterised three distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of these, however, the Milesian Thales, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 540—500 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataeus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as

¹ Polyan. v. 1. 1; Charis de Ekklesi. ² Plutarch. Pythagorae vita 18. 1. Philoponius, c. 8, p. 178.

having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony, introducing the conception of substances, with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of personae and quasihuman attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Socrates. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth unfounded and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy, in the philosophical vein of Thales, Hippo,¹ Anaximander, and Diogenes of Apollonia, whereby ^{these four} ^{philosophers} ^{might be} ^{called the} they all stand distinguished from Xenophanes of Colophon. Also and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenides and Zeno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thales), as well as to Heraclitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thales partially discarded, we may remark that ^{step to} it is a state of the human mind in which the problems ^{philosophy} ^{confronts} suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery ^{to think} for solving them, bear a like proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hope, fear, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge, so also does the mental talent supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be explained. Through no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of everything which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the

prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unoriginate and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thales disengaged Greek philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and notions propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and as they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and unimportant personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thales and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative

attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes

—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sea, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason why motion or change is general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being considered in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility, but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.¹

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was

¹ This was these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more proper do they present themselves in the language of a great poet: see in a specimen, Macpherson, *Tempest*, vol. vi. lib. vi.

² *Quæstiones de rebus*

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unity and helplessness, the problems proposed were those such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of questions, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfeathered, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the *scorpaenist* form of responsive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanes, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in *Academism* and *Sextus Empiricus*, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like *Sokrates* and *Plato*, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under *Thallis*, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

One more of the roots of scepticism which pass through Grecian philosophy.

Though the celebrity of *Thallis* in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the *Ledian Alkman* was serving in the *Babylonian* army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldean priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary *Xenophanes* attests us; and *Heraclitus*, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, speaks of him with

thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early thinkers were in the habit of setting to themselves.¹ He decided that which the first philosophers especially denied, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primordial Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. The first introduced into Greek philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,² and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of

position of
the One and
the Many—
the Per-
manent
and the
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Greek philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted

the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thales, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thales, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenes and others afterwards, and reproduced with many discrepancies of doctrine, yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Greek philosophy.

Of those subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thales, but as the author of an hypothesis both

¹ *Isagoge*, by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104. ² *See* *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104. ³ *See* *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104. ⁴ *See* *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104.

A. p. 103, 104.

⁵ *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104. ⁶ *See* *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104. ⁷ *See* *Isagoge* by Zeno, at *Metaph.* A. A. p. 103, 104.

now and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought; we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a circular orbit in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;¹ how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain, but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognisance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wonderful even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanes of Kolophôn, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570—490 B.C.), migrated from Kolophôn² to Zakynth and Elea in Italy and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540—490 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissos pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanes—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Pericles, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophôn and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.³ His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 12, 1. He agreed with Thales in maintaining that the earth was stationary (believed, *de Caelo*, ii. 14, p. 164, ed. Leake).

² Diogen. Laërt. ii. 12.

³ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 12; *Stobæus*, *Solug. Phys.* i. p. 102.

subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if men or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.' This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the intelligible world as a source of knowledge, was expanded briefly, and, as it should seem, clearly and rately, by Xenophanes; at least we may infer this much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.¹ By his successors, Parmenides and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary sentences of dialectic, and even superseded a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Being—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanes, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,² which the nature of his philosophy was well calculated to suggest, and in which the allegorist Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanes better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathised.

The contemporary of Thales of Miletus, and contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, Xenophanes seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,³ and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Greek philosophy. By what has been said of Thales, Anaximander, and Xenophanes, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued further, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion.

The Eleatic school, Parmenides and Zeno, springing from Xenophanes—their doctrine—their great influence on Specian speculation.

¹ *Classica Altera*, *Stromata*, v. p. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² *Classica Altera*, *Stromata*, i. p. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ *Classica Altera*, *Stromata*, i. p. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 5

between 580—540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admixture during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic charms, magic, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thales, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydes of Syros;² amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c., must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanes of Miletus. Pythagoras, seeing a dog bellow and hearing him howl, desired the stroller to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice". This—together with the general testimony of Hippias, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but useful for

*His doctrines
rather than
his life.*

² The association of Pythagoras with *see Diogen. Laert. i. 23, viii. 1; Cicero*
Pythagoræ is noticed by Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2.

mischievous and defective of sound judgment—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he considers the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment.¹ Pythagoras combines the character of a seerist (a man of large observation, and clever, accurate, inventive mind—the original sense of the word *Sephist*, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus),² with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of business bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenides, Orpheus, or Mithras, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind,

¹ Xenophanes, *Fragment*, 1, ed. Schneidewin (Diogen. Laert. viii. 46), compares Anaxagoras, 15, 20. You must remark that this or a like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreanism, but believed by the poet Hesiod, *Works*, 1, 2, and *Fragment*, *Works*, 2, as well as by the philosophers Pherecydes, Pythagoras, and later Xenophanes, 2, 12.

But read our metaphysical evidence separately.

Isaac, *Democritus*, and other details.

Isaac, *Isaac* (ed. 1870). See also *Isaac* (ed. 1870).

Isaac, *Isaac* (ed. 1870). See also *Isaac* (ed. 1870).

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Isaac, *Isaac* (ed. 1870). See also *Isaac* (ed. 1870).

and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,¹ being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select candidates rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.² In these lofty professions the Agrigentine Empedocles seems to have greatly copied him, though with some variation, about half a century afterwards.³ While Aristotle tells us that the Erastriotes identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech engaged in faking for men."⁴ This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to control the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanes, Hippias, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates—we find in him

¹ See Leake's learned and valuable treatise, *Antiquities of Greece*, 2d. ed. pp. 147, 150, 151; also Pagan, *Leake's*, p. 25, and Richard, *ibid.*, 221.

² Every conception of Pythagoras (Plutarch, p. 10) has depicted him as something well within the bounds of the probable, or the possible, or the real, as some characters have tried to make out; see *Sketches of Lives*, p. 10; *ibid.*, 11; *ibid.*, 12; *ibid.*, 13; *ibid.*, 14; *ibid.*, 15; *ibid.*, 16; *ibid.*, 17; *ibid.*, 18; *ibid.*, 19; *ibid.*, 20; *ibid.*, 21; *ibid.*, 22; *ibid.*, 23; *ibid.*, 24; *ibid.*, 25; *ibid.*, 26; *ibid.*, 27; *ibid.*, 28; *ibid.*, 29; *ibid.*, 30; *ibid.*, 31; *ibid.*, 32; *ibid.*, 33; *ibid.*, 34; *ibid.*, 35; *ibid.*, 36; *ibid.*, 37; *ibid.*, 38; *ibid.*, 39; *ibid.*, 40; *ibid.*, 41; *ibid.*, 42; *ibid.*, 43; *ibid.*, 44; *ibid.*, 45; *ibid.*, 46; *ibid.*, 47; *ibid.*, 48; *ibid.*, 49; *ibid.*, 50; *ibid.*, 51; *ibid.*, 52; *ibid.*, 53; *ibid.*, 54; *ibid.*, 55; *ibid.*, 56; *ibid.*, 57; *ibid.*, 58; *ibid.*, 59; *ibid.*, 60; *ibid.*, 61; *ibid.*, 62; *ibid.*, 63; *ibid.*, 64; *ibid.*, 65; *ibid.*, 66; *ibid.*, 67; *ibid.*, 68; *ibid.*, 69; *ibid.*, 70; *ibid.*, 71; *ibid.*, 72; *ibid.*, 73; *ibid.*, 74; *ibid.*, 75; *ibid.*, 76; *ibid.*, 77; *ibid.*, 78; *ibid.*, 79; *ibid.*, 80; *ibid.*, 81; *ibid.*, 82; *ibid.*, 83; *ibid.*, 84; *ibid.*, 85; *ibid.*, 86; *ibid.*, 87; *ibid.*, 88; *ibid.*, 89; *ibid.*, 90; *ibid.*, 91; *ibid.*, 92; *ibid.*, 93; *ibid.*, 94; *ibid.*, 95; *ibid.*, 96; *ibid.*, 97; *ibid.*, 98; *ibid.*, 99; *ibid.*, 100; *ibid.*, 101; *ibid.*, 102; *ibid.*, 103; *ibid.*, 104; *ibid.*, 105; *ibid.*, 106; *ibid.*, 107; *ibid.*, 108; *ibid.*, 109; *ibid.*, 110; *ibid.*, 111; *ibid.*, 112; *ibid.*, 113; *ibid.*, 114; *ibid.*, 115; *ibid.*, 116; *ibid.*, 117; *ibid.*, 118; *ibid.*, 119; *ibid.*, 120; *ibid.*, 121; *ibid.*, 122; *ibid.*, 123; *ibid.*, 124; *ibid.*, 125; *ibid.*, 126; *ibid.*, 127; *ibid.*, 128; *ibid.*, 129; *ibid.*, 130; *ibid.*, 131; *ibid.*, 132; *ibid.*, 133; *ibid.*, 134; *ibid.*, 135; *ibid.*, 136; *ibid.*, 137; *ibid.*, 138; *ibid.*, 139; *ibid.*, 140; *ibid.*, 141; *ibid.*, 142; *ibid.*, 143; *ibid.*, 144; *ibid.*, 145; *ibid.*, 146; *ibid.*, 147; *ibid.*, 148; *ibid.*, 149; *ibid.*, 150; *ibid.*, 151; *ibid.*, 152; *ibid.*, 153; *ibid.*, 154; *ibid.*, 155; *ibid.*, 156; *ibid.*, 157; *ibid.*, 158; *ibid.*, 159; *ibid.*, 160; *ibid.*, 161; *ibid.*, 162; *ibid.*, 163; *ibid.*, 164; *ibid.*, 165; *ibid.*, 166; *ibid.*, 167; *ibid.*, 168; *ibid.*, 169; *ibid.*, 170; *ibid.*, 171; *ibid.*, 172; *ibid.*, 173; *ibid.*, 174; *ibid.*, 175; *ibid.*, 176; *ibid.*, 177; *ibid.*, 178; *ibid.*, 179; *ibid.*, 180; *ibid.*, 181; *ibid.*, 182; *ibid.*, 183; *ibid.*, 184; *ibid.*, 185; *ibid.*, 186; *ibid.*, 187; *ibid.*, 188; *ibid.*, 189; *ibid.*, 190; *ibid.*, 191; *ibid.*, 192; *ibid.*, 193; *ibid.*, 194; *ibid.*, 195; *ibid.*, 196; *ibid.*, 197; *ibid.*, 198; *ibid.*, 199; *ibid.*, 200; *ibid.*, 201; *ibid.*, 202; *ibid.*, 203; *ibid.*, 204; *ibid.*, 205; *ibid.*, 206; *ibid.*, 207; *ibid.*, 208; *ibid.*, 209; *ibid.*, 210; *ibid.*, 211; *ibid.*, 212; *ibid.*, 213; *ibid.*, 214; *ibid.*, 215; *ibid.*, 216; *ibid.*, 217; *ibid.*, 218; *ibid.*, 219; *ibid.*, 220; *ibid.*, 221; *ibid.*, 222; *ibid.*, 223; *ibid.*, 224; *ibid.*, 225; *ibid.*, 226; *ibid.*, 227; *ibid.*, 228; *ibid.*, 229; *ibid.*, 230; *ibid.*, 231; *ibid.*, 232; *ibid.*, 233; *ibid.*, 234; *ibid.*, 235; *ibid.*, 236; *ibid.*, 237; *ibid.*, 238; *ibid.*, 239; *ibid.*, 240; *ibid.*, 241; *ibid.*, 242; *ibid.*, 243; *ibid.*, 244; *ibid.*, 245; *ibid.*, 246; *ibid.*, 247; *ibid.*, 248; *ibid.*, 249; *ibid.*, 250; *ibid.*, 251; *ibid.*, 252; *ibid.*, 253; *ibid.*, 254; *ibid.*, 255; *ibid.*, 256; *ibid.*, 257; *ibid.*, 258; *ibid.*, 259; *ibid.*, 260; *ibid.*, 261; *ibid.*, 262; *ibid.*, 263; *ibid.*, 264; *ibid.*, 265; *ibid.*, 266; *ibid.*, 267; *ibid.*, 268; *ibid.*, 269; *ibid.*, 270; *ibid.*, 271; *ibid.*, 272; *ibid.*, 273; *ibid.*, 274; *ibid.*, 275; *ibid.*, 276; *ibid.*, 277; *ibid.*, 278; *ibid.*, 279; *ibid.*, 280; *ibid.*, 281; *ibid.*, 282; *ibid.*, 283; *ibid.*, 284; *ibid.*, 285; *ibid.*, 286; *ibid.*, 287; *ibid.*, 288; *ibid.*, 289; *ibid.*, 290; *ibid.*, 291; *ibid.*, 292; *ibid.*, 293; *ibid.*, 294; *ibid.*, 295; *ibid.*, 296; *ibid.*, 297; *ibid.*, 298; *ibid.*, 299; *ibid.*, 300; *ibid.*, 301; *ibid.*, 302; *ibid.*, 303; *ibid.*, 304; *ibid.*, 305; *ibid.*, 306; *ibid.*, 307; *ibid.*, 308; *ibid.*, 309; *ibid.*, 310; *ibid.*, 311; *ibid.*, 312; *ibid.*, 313; *ibid.*, 314; *ibid.*, 315; *ibid.*, 316; *ibid.*, 317; *ibid.*, 318; *ibid.*, 319; *ibid.*, 320; *ibid.*, 321; *ibid.*, 322; *ibid.*, 323; *ibid.*, 324; *ibid.*, 325; *ibid.*, 326; *ibid.*, 327; *ibid.*, 328; *ibid.*, 329; *ibid.*, 330; *ibid.*, 331; *ibid.*, 332; *ibid.*, 333; *ibid.*, 334; *ibid.*, 335; *ibid.*, 336; *ibid.*, 337; *ibid.*, 338; *ibid.*, 339; *ibid.*, 340; *ibid.*, 341; *ibid.*, 342; *ibid.*, 343; *ibid.*, 344; *ibid.*, 345; *ibid.*, 346; *ibid.*, 347; *ibid.*, 348; *ibid.*, 349; *ibid.*, 350; *ibid.*, 351; *ibid.*, 352; *ibid.*, 353; *ibid.*, 354; *ibid.*, 355; *ibid.*, 356; *ibid.*, 357; *ibid.*, 358; *ibid.*, 359; *ibid.*, 360; *ibid.*, 361; *ibid.*, 362; *ibid.*, 363; *ibid.*, 364; *ibid.*, 365; *ibid.*, 366; *ibid.*, 367; *ibid.*, 368; *ibid.*, 369; *ibid.*, 370; *ibid.*, 371; *ibid.*, 372; *ibid.*, 373; *ibid.*, 374; *ibid.*, 375; *ibid.*, 376; *ibid.*, 377; *ibid.*, 378; *ibid.*, 379; *ibid.*, 380; *ibid.*, 381; *ibid.*, 382; *ibid.*, 383; *ibid.*, 384; *ibid.*, 385; *ibid.*, 386; *ibid.*, 387; *ibid.*, 388; *ibid.*, 389; *ibid.*, 390; *ibid.*, 391; *ibid.*, 392; *ibid.*, 393; *ibid.*, 394; *ibid.*, 395; *ibid.*, 396; *ibid.*, 397; *ibid.*, 398; *ibid.*, 399; *ibid.*, 400; *ibid.*, 401; *ibid.*, 402; *ibid.*, 403; *ibid.*, 404; *ibid.*, 405; *ibid.*, 406; *ibid.*, 407; *ibid.*, 408; *ibid.*, 409; *ibid.*, 410; *ibid.*, 411; *ibid.*, 412; *ibid.*, 413; *ibid.*, 414; *ibid.*, 415; *ibid.*, 416; *ibid.*, 417; *ibid.*, 418; *ibid.*, 419; *ibid.*, 420; *ibid.*, 421; *ibid.*, 422; *ibid.*, 423; *ibid.*, 424; *ibid.*, 425; *ibid.*, 426; *ibid.*, 427; *ibid.*, 428; *ibid.*, 429; *ibid.*, 430; *ibid.*, 431; *ibid.*, 432; *ibid.*, 433; *ibid.*, 434; *ibid.*, 435; *ibid.*, 436; *ibid.*, 437; *ibid.*, 438; *ibid.*, 439; *ibid.*, 440; *ibid.*, 441; *ibid.*, 442; *ibid.*, 443; *ibid.*, 444; *ibid.*, 445; *ibid.*, 446; *ibid.*, 447; *ibid.*, 448; *ibid.*, 449; *ibid.*, 450; *ibid.*, 451; *ibid.*, 452; *ibid.*, 453; *ibid.*, 454; *ibid.*, 455; *ibid.*, 456; *ibid.*, 457; *ibid.*, 458; *ibid.*, 459; *ibid.*, 460; *ibid.*, 461; *ibid.*, 462; *ibid.*, 463; *ibid.*, 464; *ibid.*, 465; *ibid.*, 466; *ibid.*, 467; *ibid.*, 468; *ibid.*, 469; *ibid.*, 470; *ibid.*, 471; *ibid.*, 472; *ibid.*, 473; *ibid.*, 474; *ibid.*, 475; *ibid.*, 476; *ibid.*, 477; *ibid.*, 478; *ibid.*, 479; *ibid.*, 480; *ibid.*, 481; *ibid.*, 482; *ibid.*, 483; *ibid.*, 484; *ibid.*, 485; *ibid.*, 486; *ibid.*, 487; *ibid.*, 488; *ibid.*, 489; *ibid.*, 490; *ibid.*, 491; *ibid.*, 492; *ibid.*, 493; *ibid.*, 494; *ibid.*, 495; *ibid.*, 496; *ibid.*, 497; *ibid.*, 498; *ibid.*, 499; *ibid.*, 500; *ibid.*, 501; *ibid.*, 502; *ibid.*, 503; *ibid.*, 504; *ibid.*, 505; *ibid.*, 506; *ibid.*, 507; *ibid.*, 508; *ibid.*, 509; *ibid.*, 510; *ibid.*, 511; *ibid.*, 512; *ibid.*, 513; *ibid.*, 514; *ibid.*, 515; *ibid.*, 516; *ibid.*, 517; *ibid.*, 518; *ibid.*, 519; *ibid.*, 520; *ibid.*, 521; *ibid.*, 522; *ibid.*, 523; *ibid.*, 524; *ibid.*, 525; *ibid.*, 526; *ibid.*, 527; *ibid.*, 528; *ibid.*, 529; *ibid.*, 530; *ibid.*, 531; *ibid.*, 532; *ibid.*, 533; *ibid.*, 534; *ibid.*, 535; *ibid.*, 536; *ibid.*, 537; *ibid.*, 538; *ibid.*, 539; *ibid.*, 540; *ibid.*, 541; *ibid.*, 542; *ibid.*, 543; *ibid.*, 544; *ibid.*, 545; *ibid.*, 546; *ibid.*, 547; *ibid.*, 548; *ibid.*, 549; *ibid.*, 550; *ibid.*, 551; *ibid.*, 552; *ibid.*, 553; *ibid.*, 554; *ibid.*, 555; *ibid.*, 556; *ibid.*, 557; *ibid.*, 558; *ibid.*, 559; *ibid.*, 560; *ibid.*, 561; *ibid.*, 562; *ibid.*, 563; *ibid.*, 564; *ibid.*, 565; *ibid.*, 566; *ibid.*, 567; *ibid.*, 568; *ibid.*, 569; *ibid.*, 570; *ibid.*, 571; *ibid.*, 572; *ibid.*, 573; *ibid.*, 574; *ibid.*, 575; *ibid.*, 576; *ibid.*, 577; *ibid.*, 578; *ibid.*, 579; *ibid.*, 580; *ibid.*, 581; *ibid.*, 582; *ibid.*, 583; *ibid.*, 584; *ibid.*, 585; *ibid.*, 586; *ibid.*, 587; *ibid.*, 588; *ibid.*, 589; *ibid.*, 590; *ibid.*, 591; *ibid.*, 592; *ibid.*, 593; *ibid.*, 594; *ibid.*, 595; *ibid.*, 596; *ibid.*, 597; *ibid.*, 598; *ibid.*, 599; *ibid.*, 600; *ibid.*, 601; *ibid.*, 602; *ibid.*, 603; *ibid.*, 604; *ibid.*, 605; *ibid.*, 606; *ibid.*, 607; *ibid.*, 608; *ibid.*, 609; *ibid.*, 610; *ibid.*, 611; *ibid.*, 612; *ibid.*, 613; *ibid.*, 614; *ibid.*, 615; *ibid.*, 616; *ibid.*, 617; *ibid.*, 618; *ibid.*, 619; *ibid.*, 620; *ibid.*, 621; *ibid.*, 622; *ibid.*, 623; *ibid.*, 624; *ibid.*, 625; *ibid.*, 626; *ibid.*, 627; *ibid.*, 628; *ibid.*, 629; *ibid.*, 630; *ibid.*, 631; *ibid.*, 632; *ibid.*, 633; *ibid.*, 634; *ibid.*, 635; *ibid.*, 636; *ibid.*, 637; *ibid.*, 638; *ibid.*, 639; *ibid.*, 640; *ibid.*, 641; *ibid.*, 642; *ibid.*, 643; *ibid.*, 644; *ibid.*, 645; *ibid.*, 646; *ibid.*, 647; *ibid.*, 648; *ibid.*, 649; *ibid.*, 650; *ibid.*, 651; *ibid.*, 652; *ibid.*, 653; *ibid.*, 654; *ibid.*, 655; *ibid.*, 656; *ibid.*, 657; *ibid.*, 658; *ibid.*, 659; *ibid.*, 660; *ibid.*, 661; *ibid.*, 662; *ibid.*, 663; *ibid.*, 664; *ibid.*, 665; *ibid.*, 666; *ibid.*, 667; *ibid.*, 668; *ibid.*, 669; *ibid.*, 670; *ibid.*, 671; *ibid.*, 672; *ibid.*, 673; *ibid.*, 674; *ibid.*, 675; *ibid.*, 676; *ibid.*, 677; *ibid.*, 678; *ibid.*, 679; *ibid.*, 680; *ibid.*, 681; *ibid.*, 682; *ibid.*, 683; *ibid.*, 684; *ibid.*, 685; *ibid.*, 686; *ibid.*, 687; *ibid.*, 688; *ibid.*, 689; *ibid.*, 690; *ibid.*, 691; *ibid.*, 692; *ibid.*, 693; *ibid.*, 694; *ibid.*, 695; *ibid.*, 696; *ibid.*, 697; *ibid.*, 698; *ibid.*, 699; *ibid.*, 700; *ibid.*, 701; *ibid.*, 702; *ibid.*, 703; *ibid.*, 704; *ibid.*, 705; *ibid.*, 706; *ibid.*, 707; *ibid.*, 708; *ibid.*, 709; *ibid.*, 710; *ibid.*, 711; *ibid.*, 712; *ibid.*, 713; *ibid.*, 714; *ibid.*, 715; *ibid.*, 716; *ibid.*, 717; *ibid.*, 718; *ibid.*, 719; *ibid.*, 720; *ibid.*, 721; *ibid.*, 722; *ibid.*, 723; *ibid.*, 724; *ibid.*, 725; *ibid.*, 726; *ibid.*, 727; *ibid.*, 728; *ibid.*, 729; *ibid.*, 730; *ibid.*, 731; *ibid.*, 732; *ibid.*, 733; *ibid.*, 734; *ibid.*, 735; *ibid.*, 736; *ibid.*, 737; *ibid.*, 738; *ibid.*, 739; *ibid.*, 740; *ibid.*, 741; *ibid.*, 742; *ibid.*, 743; *ibid.*, 744; *ibid.*, 745; *ibid.*, 746; *ibid.*, 747; *ibid.*, 748; *ibid.*, 749; *ibid.*, 750; *ibid.*, 751; *ibid.*, 752; *ibid.*, 753; *ibid.*, 754; *ibid.*, 755; *ibid.*, 756; *ibid.*, 757; *ibid.*, 758; *ibid.*, 759; *ibid.*, 760; *ibid.*, 761; *ibid.*, 762; *ibid.*, 763; *ibid.*, 764; *ibid.*, 765; *ibid.*, 766; *ibid.*, 767; *ibid.*, 768; *ibid.*, 769; *ibid.*, 770; *ibid.*, 771; *ibid.*, 772; *ibid.*, 773; *ibid.*, 774; *ibid.*, 775; *ibid.*, 776; *ibid.*, 777; *ibid.*, 778; *ibid.*, 779; *ibid.*, 780; *ibid.*, 781; *ibid.*, 782; *ibid.*, 783; *ibid.*, 784; *ibid.*, 785; *ibid.*, 786; *ibid.*, 787; *ibid.*, 788; *ibid.*, 789; *ibid.*, 790; *ibid.*, 791; *ibid.*, 792; *ibid.*, 793; *ibid.*, 794; *ibid.*, 795; *ibid.*, 796; *ibid.*, 797; *ibid.*, 798; *ibid.*, 799; *ibid.*, 800; *ibid.*, 801; *ibid.*, 802; *ibid.*, 803; *ibid.*, 804; *ibid.*, 805; *ibid.*, 806; *ibid.*, 807; *ibid.*, 808; *ibid.*, 809; *ibid.*, 810; *ibid.*, 811; *ibid.*, 812; *ibid.*, 813; *ibid.*, 814; *ibid.*, 815; *ibid.*, 816; *ibid.*, 817; *ibid.*, 818; *ibid.*, 819; *ibid.*, 820; *ibid.*, 821; *ibid.*, 822; *ibid.*, 823; *ibid.*, 824; *ibid.*, 825; *ibid.*, 826; *ibid.*, 827; *ibid.*, 828; *ibid.*, 829; *ibid.*, 830; *ibid.*, 831; *ibid.*, 832; *ibid.*, 833; *ibid.*, 834; *ibid.*, 835; *ibid.*, 836; *ibid.*, 837; *ibid.*, 838; *ibid.*, 839; *ibid.*, 840; *ibid.*, 841; *ibid.*, 842; *ibid.*, 843; *ibid.*, 844; *ibid.*, 845; *ibid.*, 846; *ibid.*, 847; *ibid.*, 848; *ibid.*, 849; *ibid.*, 850; *ibid.*, 851; *ibid.*, 852; *ibid.*, 853; *ibid.*, 854; *ibid.*, 855; *ibid.*, 856; *ibid.*, 857; *ibid.*, 858; *ibid.*, 859; *ibid.*, 860; *ibid.*, 861; *ibid.*, 862; *ibid.*, 863; *ibid.*, 864; *ibid.*, 865; *ibid.*, 866; *ibid.*, 867; *ibid.*, 868; *ibid.*, 869; *ibid.*, 870; *ibid.*, 871; *ibid.*, 872; *ibid.*, 873; *ibid.*, 874; *ibid.*, 875; *ibid.*, 876; *ibid.*, 877; *ibid.*, 878; *ibid.*, 879; *ibid.*, 880; *ibid.*, 881; *ibid.*, 882; *ibid.*, 883; *ibid.*, 884; *ibid.*, 885; *ibid.*, 886; *ibid.*, 887; *ibid.*, 888; *ibid.*, 889; *ibid.*, 890; *ibid.*, 891; *ibid.*, 892; *ibid.*, 893; *ibid.*, 894; *ibid.*, 895; *ibid.*, 896; *ibid.*, 897; *ibid.*, 898; *ibid.*, 899; *ibid.*, 900; *ibid.*, 901; *ibid.*, 902; *ibid.*, 903; *ibid.*, 904; *ibid.*, 905; *ibid.*, 906; *ibid.*, 907; *ibid.*, 908; *ibid.*, 909; *ibid.*, 910; *ibid.*, 911; *ibid.*, 912; *ibid.*, 913; *ibid.*, 914; *ibid.*, 915; *ibid.*, 916; *ibid.*, 917; *ibid.*, 918; *ibid.*, 919; *ibid.*, 9

surity, the license of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-mortification, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,¹ his long nocturns of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigour. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food: a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedocles also did after him.² It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet, on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for like the Kabbalists was among them,³ the strongest man and the unparalleled wreath of his age—who

The student including probably had access to all the passages of his order.

¹ Plutarch, *De Isid.* at Quirid. p. 184, at the quotation, *Isid.* Quirid. p. 184.

² Empedocles, ap. Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 24, 1; *Metaph.* i. 25, 107; *Metaph.* De An. *Metaph.* p. 107, 108; where he says Pythagoras and Empedocles together, as holding both, the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both inculcated the eating of animal food. Empedocles, however, had plants and fruits, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. "I have been myself tempted," he said, "to eat a fish, a bird, a beast, and a herb of the sea."

His wife and his mother collect evidence.

Plutarch, *De Isid.* at Quirid. p. 184, at the quotation, *Isid.* Quirid. p. 184.

(*Metaph.* i. 24, 107; *Metaph.* De An. *Metaph.* p. 107, 108.) Pythagoras is said to have believed that he had been not only Empedocles in the previous state before him, but also a teacher, upon a mountain, &c., and various other human characters, before his actual existence; he did not, however, extend the same immortality to plants, to a dog, &c.

The abstinence from animal food was in Egypt, as well as in Pythagorean Christianity, *Metaph.* i. 24, 107.

³ *Metaph.* i. 24, 107; *Metaph.* i. 24, 107.

cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample sleep (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wreaths, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally rich, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 200 B.C., and then nearly died out, being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Socrates. Even during the time of Plato, two centuries afterwards, the idealising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Greek and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative foundation—

Pythagoras
and only
ascetic
religious
of the
Pythagoreans
rise after

Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And then, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all possibility of rest, and passed into the general restless world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrine of Plato. Neo-Pythagoreanism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlived the other more positive and sometimes systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of corroborative illustrations, with ample latitude of fancy, the fabled character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Greek philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, united with those talents for religious and personal secondary over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polikratos, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to emigrate; and we may presume that at this period (about 530—520 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Miletos and Kroton on the one side, and Sybaris and Thurium on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophôn to Eleia, Kroton, and Elea.¹

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heliastai and represented one of the principal proprietors at its first institution, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what

Pythagoras did not make a borrower, but an original and independent mind.—He gave his name to Kroton.

state of a city—disputed government—arbitrary laws, and arbitrary will.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 12.

especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the teacher; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not impossible that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of *Enneakroia* (non-in-low) of the Pythagoreans Miko, to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton: and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôa and Knidos, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct produced an effect almost electric.

[illegible][illegible]

See also the examples of Platte re-surveying mentioned by Bannister, 1911, p. 101; *Archaeology*, *Platte*, 11, 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, immorality disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Pyriarch or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.¹ His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sytnacia, Metapontum, Rhegium, Katana, Himira, &c., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full;² and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristonemus, Dihaerarchus, Harsiklides of Pontus, &c.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoræans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoræans,³ the last members of a declining sect, among whom

¹ *Tacitus* *Histor.* III. 15, et. 1; *Justinus*, VI. 17th & 20; *Thucyd.* *Pericles*, 13, et. 20th.

² *Plutarch*, VI. *Pythag.* c. 25—28; *Strabo*, II. c. 10.

³ The compilations of *Pythagoræans* and *Pythagorisms* in the life of *Pythagoras*, copied from a great variety of authors, will furnish nearly every truth, which could be obtained from any other source, either heathen, and nearly all uncorrupted. But it is very difficult to judge just what these writers in truth really say. Even *Aristonemus* and *Dihaerarchus*, the last writers from whom these *Pythagorisms* come, lived very far posterior to the death of *Pythagoras*, and it is not unlikely to have had the story repeated to concept, nor any longer information than the contemporary *Pythagoræans*—cluded to acquire lost, and probably among the first writers for history, about the particulars of the history, not to be written between several of the poets and copying young men of that time.

Strabo, in his *Geographic* de-

Historiæ (vol. I. p. 12, p. 13) has given a capital sample of the various notices from which the *Pythagorisms* have been copied, and a considerable estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the writer exaggerates both the virtue and the vices of the first *Pythagoræans*. Following in the steps of his father *Pythagoras*, *Strabo* has given some notices from *A.* but by no means enough to compare with the account in the original. I think *Strabo* shows too much credit on the whole, to *Pythagoræans* (see p. 13) and makes too little distinction for the various species of vices and virtues of which *Pythagoræans* are given by the writers; of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he found from his own witnesses. When the judgment of *Strabo* is more correct, it is also better borne out, especially respecting *Pythagoras* himself, and his school *Pythagoræans*. When later *Pythagoræans* philosophers were to be judged by the former degree of morality, than which many religious

the stiffness of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgment, and no means of forming a true conception of Krothia as it stood in 480 B.C.¹ To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. Yet we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favoured by the gods and patronised by divine spirits, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Each a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political strife with sworn members, under one form or another, was a constant phenomenon in the Crotonian cities.² Now the Pythagorean order

The lowest
possible
price is
usually
achieved
in a few
months
after the
initial
discounting
of 10-15%.

[illegible]

auxiliary to lay down; but it helps us to understand that there is a substantial agreement between the two systems of classification of accounts receiving attention. The statement placed above and by the reports of the 1910-11 session to Congress will not allow to exclude the authority of the literature with and without; see the Reports 20, 21, 22, in Report 20, of 20-21 session.

¹ James Hall, M.A. Jr. 11. Apollon, pp. 141-142, 2. Will attempt to re-construct the Hellenistic; what the state of these could be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe that such be a deficiency.

* *Pharmacol. Med.* 1981; 74: 149-150.

On this important passage in which Fitzgibbon shows the spiritual crisis of John as a young soldier, servant, lover, and citizen, I shall spend further in a future stage of the study. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of hearty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.¹ The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and excited ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Each association of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.² Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who surrounded him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Greek city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an unusual political position—still less that he came for the purpose of raising a great promiscuous political idea, and transferring

¹ Justin, vii. 4. "Ad ipsorum quoque instituta sunt munera, quibus iunctis, sacra, equitatis et moderatæ virtutis ratione decorata, quæ sunt, ut quædam civitas, quædam religio, quædam in se concordantia."

Quæstor. Dignus, Latet, viii. 1; Apollonius ap. Strabon. i. 101; Philochorus, vii. 17, 18, 19.

The story of the devoted attachment of the two Pythagoreans, Eurych and Philochorus, appears to be very well attested: *Strabon. l. cit.* It runs

the line of the younger Demetrius the Impetuous, whose intrigues had elicited such manifestations of friendship (Plutarch, viii. 17, 18, 19; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 17; and Lucius of Cyrene, *Tim. Frag.* c. 10).

² Plutarch, *Philosophical Lives*, Pythagoras, c. 1, p. 171. In it, Demetrius is shown as valiant and generous, ambitious of intellectual and general knowledge only, and, in his old age, as declining with reverence the teacher's responsibility.

Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorians, as has been supposed by some ancient and modern authors. Such achievement might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—but by men disposed to forge the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to ascribe them to traditions handed down from a founder who had left no materials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 550 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going further than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tenets, and germs of scientific ideas, and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean *ergos* and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skillful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean order or religious community were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being furnished against the temptations of a life of indolence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and dominating; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Greek citizen, and which as particularly harmonized with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton.¹ Stalcke and O. Müller have even supposed that the

Political influence of Pythagoras—was an indirect result of the organization of the order.

¹ I suspect here the meaning given by Aristotle, as the story of his disciples in the Pythagorean order, § 126. "Pythagoras says that after politics, as highest systematic education, they go to physical education, and demand gymnastics; and demand that every one should have his upper and lower faculties harmonized, after the Platonic system. Therefore men have gymnastics besides politics, which Pythagoras, as he declares, makes necessary for rich men, who cannot do all

others, especially, as all public institutions are necessarily corrupt, political and economic ones. "Pythagoras says that gymnastics education and a systematic education are necessary (and, last, systematic education strengthens the soul, and all virtuous actions flourish as a consequence."

This is the ground view (including gymnastics), with that of J. Müller-Burton, in § 126 given by an author who has gone through the evidence

control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and called up an aggravated democratic opposition married to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from the warm adherents. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provide deadly and extensive misery. A stranger coming to talk new religious dogmas and observances, with a mixture of science, and some new ethical ideas and phrases, through he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skillfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to justify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity, we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an insatiable self-conceit throughout their personal demeanour!—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disputing especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Cretan philosophy, this is the only instance in

cases which led to the suppression of the Pythagorean order.

¹ *Apollonius ap. Jamblicum*, l. v. p. 106, 107, 108, 109. *Plutarch* (*de Pythagoræ vita*) speaks of this suppression and calls it a *κίνησις* (revolutionary reformation) of the Pythagoreans. *Alcibiades* (l. vi. p. 10) is represented as being observant of this. *Plutarch* (*de Pythagoræ vita*, l. vi. p. 106) speaks of the order being suppressed by the laws of the city. *Plutarch* (*de Pythagoræ vita*, l. vi. p. 106) speaks of the order being suppressed by the laws of the city.

² *Plutarch* (*de Pythagoræ vita*, l. vi. p. 106) speaks of the order being suppressed by the laws of the city. *Plutarch* (*de Pythagoræ vita*, l. vi. p. 106) speaks of the order being suppressed by the laws of the city.

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When we read the life of Apollonius by *Plutarch*, we are told the former was himself extremely superstitious; he would let his pupils discuss questions to which the solution and answer of Pythagoras were given, and to mention the name of the individual which afterwards overtook the order.

which it was distinctly aimed for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stood distinguished for such perversion, which, fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.¹ Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Socrates, though standing really aloof from all party intrigues, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiades,² to which indeed the censor Alcibiades distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Socrates been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the public would have been uniformly pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Kliston—the former of whom is said to have sought admission into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself further to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sphacteria.³ In spite of the opposition of the Pytha-

violence
which so
complicated
the situa-
tion.

¹ *Politeiarchia* does not mean that "Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school was a political institution pernicious, such as was given up by other schools even in Greece" (Introduction to the Translation of Plato, p. 22). See also *Thucydides*, Fr. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

² *Thucydides*, *History*, I. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

³ *Thucydides*, *History*, I. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

⁴ This is stated in *Thucydides*, I. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

period of 550 B.C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of the much-decreased luxury I have spoken in a former chapter.¹ It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritians were aggressors in the war; but by what means it had been provoked in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader named Telys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris.² It appears too that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniote Philoppos, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Telys.³ According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, these exiles, whom Telys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection: it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harboured in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Telys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost deferred, by the Krotoniotes, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard rather than incur the danger of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybaritians being refused, Telys marched

¹ See above, chap. xvi.

² Diod. Sic. i. 1. Herodotus says that it was some twenty years before the capture of Sybaris (p. 46); this is not at variance with the story of Crotona.

The story given by a late writer, even at Crotona itself, according to the statement of the daughter of Telys, cannot be accepted either with literal

truth or without additions, cf. p. 47. Dr. Thirlwall supposes the daughter of Telys to have married between the capture of the town and the capture of Sybaris; but also to be connected with the statement of Herodotus, and not concerned by any other problem.

³ Herodotus i. 47.

the citizens in the town of Thuri afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstance (as has been before noticed) the connection against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thuri was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Laos, Sidara, and elsewhere, and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thuri; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained as a redoubt name in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theophrastus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Miletus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shared their beads in token of mourning.¹ The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the native population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed in its wild domain over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Cuman incursions from the island. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece

Revolutions
suffered
in the
Hellenic
world by
the destruc-
tion of
Sybaris
(510 B.C.)
decline of
the Greek
power
in Italy.

¹ Herodot. vi. 12.

by Xerxes thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Koskyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Græco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thuri and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written materials to consult, and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both vague and contradictory. The material circumstances, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorians and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotonians, who alleged that they had accomplished the

Contradictory statements and arguments regarding the circumstances of Dorians.

conquest by themselves and with their own unaided force. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Kroton had been turned, and in honour of the Krotonian Achidam². This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorians had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorians and his expedition, combined with the favourable promise of the oracle beforehand, a sufficient proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued),

² Herodotus, v. 42.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHÓN TO THE MARCH OF
XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE mentioned, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathón, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Euse attested, but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.¹ Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son, by

Examination of
Darius in
Greek
Greece &
second
time
his death.

¹ Herodot. vii. 1, 2.

Athena; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabanus, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.¹ It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and severity perpetrated in the Persian royal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unexpressed at the time of his death, and it was for-^{succeeded by his son Xerxes.} tunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest² and most steady man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, ever and above them deficient of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either aided with the courageous temperance, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On ascending to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius:

¹ Herodot. vii. 1-4. His mother—described as a woman, and especially without authority, is named—this Eusebius the eldest king of Sparta, was at home at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons; this incident occurs with Artabanus, Ptolemy, §. 121; and had he suggested to Xerxes a contrary judgment by which to disregard the wish of his father, saying the ancestry of the line of royal succession at Sparta, whether the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other authorities, not less difficult of belief than this, and still calculated to inspire a justifiable scepticism on themselves, will be noticed

in the subsequent pages. The latter described that the Persians find the great of Persians and Spartans, with their kindredness, which he describes, long afterwards continued to many (Cicero, *De Officiis*, lib. i. c. 12); and perhaps these kindredness may have been among the persons that whose kindredness stirred his indignation respecting the suppliance of Xerxes. lib. vi. 100.

² Ptolemy (*De Regno*, lib. 1. c. 12) describes Xerxes as many regard official concerning the character which described the character of Xerxes in the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

³ Herodot. vii. 125. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomanus, the last of the Persian kings (Ptolemy, *De Regno*, c. 12).

except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Artabanus, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus, who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for martial enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a atrophy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Alcæids, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa, to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Pœnistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy reptile Oenobrotus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient war or post Mœneus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Pœnistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expounder of those venerated documents. But having been detected by the post Læus of Burnion, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Pœnistratids, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Oenobrotus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of greater authority, to assist in working on the mind of

2-2 48.
Bardi and
accountant
of Egypt
by the
Persians.

Instigation
of Xerxes
to the
invasion
of Greece—
Mardonius
the instigator
and
instigator
himself—
counsellors
which they
employed—
prophecies
produced
by the
Pœnistratids.

the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become co-extensive with the ether of Zeus and the limits of the earth's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst these prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted as so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, excluding the occasional predilection of detail, that each thread is never lost to the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Greece as the first barbaric conquest of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "Greece barbaric leave collum deadly," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also adorned in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*: probably too, if the last Greek epic had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dyonæ went by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to march from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidae against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and controlling than it appears in the

originally been sworn to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasion of Marathon. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Persian chief men whom he had selected, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Marathon is represented as expressing his warm concurrence, in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia, and deprecating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this ground—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Kestle enabled him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had pronounced as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Marathon puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Marathon for falsely depreciating the Greeks and reflecting his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—recalls the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Egypt, from the destruction (prevented only by Histieus and his influence) of the bridge over the Isonde : such prophetic suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead towards overgrown human power.³

The ingenuous monarch allows his uncle in a tone of truth and sincerity : nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasive work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to retrace the advance.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 10. Marathon is also referred to (Herodotus, viii.

² Herodotus, vii. 10.
³ Herodotus, vii. 10.

from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he delays, and then too shall not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot iron, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine inspiration is now apparent, and clear destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."¹

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the eagerness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataeæ—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oedreus," who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the *Iliad*) to put a spear-point into Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scepter and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Atreus, Polixenus, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and ruin at the hands of the Greeks, contrive the Persian march into a colossal enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though particularly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrative, it is made to supply connecting links as well as toasting-cases for the great events of history. As a case for this expedition, inconspicuously the greatest fact and the most

¹ Herodot. vii. 48. That it is scarcely an opinion, but a vision, as Herodotus himself has acknowledged, is evident from the words *ἐν ὁπείᾳ* and *ἐν ὁπείᾳ* and the phrase *ἐν ὁπείᾳ* which he uses to describe the vision.

The expedition of Xerxes is represented in this vision as being a necessary result of the divine will, and the gods are shown as being the cause of the expedition.

death is conspicuous, throughout the political career both of Croesus and Perseus, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its origin (as Herodotus tells us) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Greek historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Median interpreters falsely construed¹ into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Latin tragedians generally, but pervades especially the *Panegyric of Alcibiades*, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the promissory dreams as well as the jealous envy of the gods towards man power and unswerving opinions in man;² though without any of that indignation, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to vindicate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to enter councils, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.³

¹ Herodotus, vii. 136. But it is not to be supposed, that these versions, do express the original.

Herodotus seems to say, however, in the latter passage, that Xerxes in the morning, on the day following of Xerxes and Artabanus, the place of Xerxes, was not so situated. The description seems to be a mistake, and it is not to be supposed, that Xerxes did these things after the death of the latter king.

Regarding the influence of dreams in determining the movements of the early Persian monarchs, see Herodotus, vii. 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² Pindar, *Pythian Odes*, i. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ Pindar, *Pythian Odes*, i. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501,

death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Kerria began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horses and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Kerria.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised not only Thracia and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the *Ægean* north of Eritre and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Derbeira, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thracia, while Abdera with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Persia.² It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Kerria mounted the throne, as compared with its

whole empire; and this latter will be well really distinguished the historian from his tale—by giving the preparation for the expedition, in which it appears to have been led almost regularly. See this year illustrated in *Geogr. Historica*, lib. 10, c. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

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reduced Persia at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the warring Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia—collection of the forwarding army at Sardis—his numerous fleet and large quantities of provisions collected.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C. the vast army then raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritha in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Helles, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Helles, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kolosse, Anassa, and Kolosse, and the Lydian town of Kallisthea, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak

farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Helles, as Darius had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of foresight much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

If the whole contemporary world were reviewed by the vast assemblage of men and armaments of war which Xerxes then brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even

¹ Herodot. vii. 42—43.

² Herodot. vii. 43—44.

my all subsequent experience—they were no less astonished by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellaspont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet *Æschylus*¹ speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—so rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other—² which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellaspont, stretched from the neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytes on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phoenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phoenicians was fax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whom he caused to be struck off;³ but partly also against the Hellaspont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 500 lashes, and that a set of flogging should be let down into it as a further punishment. Moreover Herodotus has heard, but does not believe, that he even sent fires for the purpose of burning it. "Then bitter water (contained the survivors while

the Persian
bridge
of boats
crossed the
Bosphorus.

The bridge
is destroyed
by a storm
levelled of
Xerxes—he
goes to
burn the
engineers
and scour
the Hellaspont.

¹ *Æschylus*, *Persæ* 131, 132, 133.

² *Herodotus* (*de Transitu in Asia*).

³ *Æschylus* speaks of fires as having had their waters and men cut off.

afflict, an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the harbor. And the Arabian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,² wrangled and praised the god I'm or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by national superstitions around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exacted by Cyrus on the river Gyndes (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty branches, because one of his married horses had been drowned in it) affords a fair parallel to the wrangling of the Hallespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifices to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hallespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were not generally known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The despatch of the unfortunate engineers was an act hardly impressive, and even the sacrifice of the Hallespont, with

essentially public, appears to Herodotus² (as well as to Aetna afterwards), not childish, but ingenuous. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phoenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekontes lashed together—were moored across the strait broadwise, with their sterns towards the Eurinus and their heads towards the Sigeus, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter.³ They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by

² Herodot. vii. 16—21; compare viii. 108. Aetna, *Sup. Alp.* vii. 15, 16.

³ Herodot. vii. 16. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges seems to me to have been previously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Lint, Fries, Wesseling, Meusel, and especially Luchner: notwithstanding in the most satisfactory treatise on Herodotus (Luchner, *op. cit.* at *Herodotus* 109, 110). The explanation given by Luchner is incorrect in the word *κατακλιμα* seems to me hardly correct: it means, not ships, but of rapid motion only. The sense of the Eurinus and Sigeus, forming one of the Eurinus arm, is corrected by the insertion at sailing that one at right angles; and the ships, which were moored close together along the current of the stream, taking the line of march from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Eurinus. Moreover Herodotus does not seem to distinguish the two bridges barely, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were *πεντεκόντες*, and those of the other bridge *τριήρεις*; whereas he says, as above and other commentators suppose, that the probability exists only of two the bridges,—not three! It stands to reason that the arrangement of ships head to stern would not have been lost for the ships. Respecting the meaning of *κατακλιμα* in Herodotus, see 15, 106; 1. 106. In the former (15) compare Herodotus, *op. cit.* *Herodotus* does not mean ships, but sailing boats, the word *κατακλιμα* being, in the sense of the ships as described by Herodotus, if the word *κατακλιμα* from the Eurinus, it would be right about it then.

The circumstance stated by Herodotus—that in the bridge higher up the stream he turned to the right, there were in all two vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than 11, has puzzled the commentators and led them to resort to unnecessary suppositions—as that of saying that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line oblique, so that the distance round on the Eurinus side was longer than the straight line the vessels round on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false notions.

Some given of necessary sailing, oblique, while the line of Herodotus and Luchner, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented their sterns to the current, is still more inadmissible. And the difference in the number of ships moored in the two bridges compared with the other seems to admit of no other explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were put close together, constituting the middle, which had no connection, it would be convenient that they should be

on to the charge in battle. To employ the courage in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and Ionian Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaisance professed against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes celebrated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymón. These two works, together with the celebrated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481—480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most rashly of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thracia and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its significance.¹

and various fortifications; compare vii. 124, and Xenophon, *Anabasis*, ii. 4—12.

The essential necessity, and practical use, of the bridge, towards which Herodotus, as mentioned by the ancient writers, built his parallel in the modern Tuthi. See the *Illustrations du*

Baron de Tuth, vol. i. p. 120 seq., and his *Discours* on this subject with his Turkish companion *Abdalla*.

¹ Herodot. vii. 17. These are thirty signs, of which I selected the most important, saving the following:—(1) That the sun should be eclipsed on the day when Xerxes departed. (2) That the sun should be eclipsed on the day when Xerxes returned. (3) That the sun should be eclipsed on the day when Xerxes died.

Bridge of
boats
thrown
across the
Strymon.

their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 30,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 5000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 5000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two days, the remaining host followed pell-mell.² Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Sardis.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kabeus, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Cappadocia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the proud king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 8000 talents of silver and 1,000,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality, at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was that

Story of the body
suspended
from the
Pythian—
son of
Kabeus, by
gift of
Xerxes.

² Herodotus, vii. 26. Most of the Greek historians and his readers, and even to Xerxes himself (the Greek).

the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the services of the remaining four with the army might be considered sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (exclaimed Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about thy sons, when I see myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delights, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. Ah, when thou didst good deeds and makest good offers to me, thou wast not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become ingrateful, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy dear sons, the hospitality which I resolved from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythias should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fired on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the tremendous force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very notion of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, ungrateful, or malicious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequence,

¹ The incident respecting Pythias the wealth of Pythias; but to allow is in Herodotus, vii. 22, 23, 24, 25. 2 regards the story seems well justified place in confidence in the estimate of to itself.

and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaksos—then through Anzuros, Kartak, and the plain of Thibis. They passed Adranystion and Antandros, and crossed the range of Ila, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Eilam, and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Eilam,—renewed the Pergamon where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Atletek,—and caused the Hægion priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Eilam, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall as easy prey before his immeasurable host. Another day's march between Rhodolus, Ophryastion, and Dardanos on the left-hand, and the Tycholus of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont reached him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis; and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity, it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He

¹ Herodot. vii. 20.

² Herodot. vii. 21. *ἡγεμονίας δὲ καὶ ἐπιτομῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλῆως, &c.*

called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch, having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridge after him "under the look". But in spite of the use of this cheap stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the trials computed by Herodotus.¹

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardis on his left hand and the tomb of Beldi on his right—the spacious barrens of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolian city of Ælius and the harbour called Sauroris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriscus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Doris. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serretus, and comprised in it the towns of Sali and Sisti, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Sikanes on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled² the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval forces.

Xerxes and his army
pass over
the bridge,
garlands
in sight.

March to
Isthmus in
Thrace
near the
mouth of
the Hebrus
—the first
plain seen
here.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 44, 45. *Acquis de J* properly refers to seven bridges, and to five elephants, however, others agree.

² Herodotus, vii. 100—101; Pliny, ii. 26, 15, 16. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Macedonia and the neighbourhood of the town still called

Salon in Ortelius's, *Itiner. sacris Sacris* and much others, ed. vi. vol. i. p. 175—180 (Amstelredam, 1677). The phrase seems to be borrowed from the inscription of the canal, founded on the map as the Gulf of Ælius, and not called in ancient times, any more than it is called now.

nations composing the land force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Elamites, Hyrcanians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Sabeans, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chersonesians, Egyptians, Gandarians, Scythians, Karpians, Sarangians, Indians, Uti, Myki, Parthians, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligures, Matians, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kolchians, Maes, Kachians, Alacodians, Sapsians, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phoenicians (200 ships of war), Egyptians (300), Cypriotes (120), Kilikians (100), Paphlagonians (50), Lydians (30), Karians (70), Ionian Greeks (50), Doric Greeks (30), Asiatic Greeks (50), Hallespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Aegean (17): in all 1087 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Paphlagonians, Cypriotes, and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i.e., arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge)—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight. The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—torques or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and mythen. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter: some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even wear any armour, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.* A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 2000 however, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Ethiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

* Herodot. vii. 62—63.

* Herodot. vii. 62—63.

It was at Doriskos that the fighting-men of the entire land army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The masses employed for ammunition were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,¹ and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosures built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 14,800 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,500,000 men, besides 50,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and Carthage from Arabia, with a presumed total of 50,000 additional men.² Such was the vast land force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1807 triremes³ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 300 rowers and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Saka; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to

the coast of Doriskos would reach the astounding figure of 1,217,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskos to Thermopylae, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he invaded; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 84,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylae was 1,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, of attendants, slaves, soldiers, wives

¹ The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been estimated by divisions of 10,000 men, but the number is not described in detail (Herodot. iv. 87).

² Herodot. vii. 86, 87, 144. This same total made of mercenaries was

employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the help of Cyrus (Plutarch's *Cyrus*, ch. i. 2, p. 64, *Reisch.*).

³ Herodot. vii. 86-87.

of the provision-craft and ships of brother, &c., so that the whole persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Greek resistance amounted to 3,302,270! He exceeds the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus;¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "sweep-killereen" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female eunuchs, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess; together with oxen, beasts of burthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are never noticed.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Dorisum is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the commanders—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of *Æschylus*, who in the "Persæ" gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis; but between Dorisum and Salamis, Herodotus³ has himself enumerated 847 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as

Comments upon the criticism of Herodotus and others himself as witness and judge.

¹ Herodot. vii. 186.—188. *Antiquæ resque etque regum in viâ* (Antiq. vii. 187.) "Tandem Olympici et aliorum regum Reges Persæ, ut nos the language of Herodotus about Antony at Actium."

² Even Fœhlinus, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus, hardly does him justice otherwise, and misquoting Herodotus tells (Antiq. vii. 187, p. 176).

³ Only one ship of war was mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 187) as having sailed afterwards from the straits of Therus. But 400 were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 185); and the

remains of the rest, detached to the Persian coast before, were still at Salamis (vii. 71); besides forty-five triremes or destroyed in the narrow straits after Artemisium (vii. 184; viii. 11). Other losses are also indicated (vii. 18—16).

As the statement of *Æschylus* for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well entitled to credit, we must suppose of that the number of *Antiquæ resque etque regum* Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated sailed afterwards.

Some good note of *Antiquæ resque etque regum*, vii. 187, p. 176 (London, 1812).

Dariusson accuses him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Boeotians of Peloponnesus probably, will assist him to the death, be the difference of nations what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honourable contrast to the treatment of Charikles a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarchs of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Greek maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from such as he passed: the Thracian Satraps were preserved from this levy by their inaccessible seats amidst the woods and scenes of Rhodope. The islands of Samothrace and Thasos, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Greek colonies Edeia,² Maroneia, and Abdera—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the royal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their

¹ Herodot. vii. 121-124. How to refer to the story between Darius and Charikles, in *Antiquities* (iii. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Herodotus takes up substantially the same view of movement and the same language as that which runs through the *History of Herodotus*; but he handles it like a moral philosopher, with a strong perception of the real nature of Greek superiority.

It is not impossible that the statistics of the contribution between Xerxes and Dariusson was a matter, heard by Herodotus from Dariusson himself

or from his sons; for the extreme similarity with which the *Herodotus* tells Xerxes his story to the Spartans and Dariusson, who includes the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The references in the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the Dariusson and family circumstances of Xerxes, in vii. 1, and his view of the death of Xerxes, in ix. 1, are not in the text, but are added from Herodotus by Strabo, vii. 1, 2.

² Herodot. vii. 129, 131, 132.

nations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hallespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to plunder houses and homes. The cost incurred by the city of Thessalon, on account of their possession of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents¹ (= £20,000): while at Abdera, the witty Megacles recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destruction.² A stream called Lerna, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Ptolema.³ Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Paeonians, between Pangaion and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Paeonians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot.⁴

Xerxes crosses the Strymon—according to Arrian—part of the Abderites he spared in the night of Abdera.

¹ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian King's court, and upon the subject concerning the war-tire and country's coast of Asia Minor, where were included all the lands and islands Greece, Ionia, Euboea, Paros, etc. (Arrian, vi. 12).

² Herodotus, vi. 118-120. He does not tell the composition of the quantity of men which would have been

required for daily consumption, assuming the immense number as he has before them, and requiring one oxen of wheat for each man's daily consumption (= 1/2 a bushel). It is necessary to examine a composition derived as such from the same data.

³ Herodotus, vi. 124, 125.

⁴ Herodotus, vi. 124. He promises this account, promising to be specially explicit. The old and great Persian

he also left, under the care of the Persians of Sika, the sacred chariot of Rana, which had been brought from the west of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bistria near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stapeira, until he came to the Greek town of Abanthos, hard by the isthmus of Attika which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bistria¹ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodope for safety, and forbade his subjects to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few desired the ultimate success of so prodigious an enterprise. But the inhabitants of Abanthos had been ardent for their real and fictitious in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Attika, to double the two south-eastern capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thracian Gulf, and to await his arrival at Thurmos. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek

*March of
Xerxes to
Thurmos—
his fleet
sailed from
in the
Thracian
Gulf.*

towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Palladia, as well as on the eastern side of the Thracian Gulf, in the region called Krana or Kroussa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Palladia. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance.

Near Thurmos (Poliochisti) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and westward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Abanthos. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland through Pangaia and Krastaina—a wild,

¹ *scilicet* Aristobolus, with 40000 men, sought Xerxes, and, as a bribe to the king, offered him 1000 talents by handing over to him the city of Rhodope, and the city of Rhodope, children of Rhodope, 700, 100.

woods, and untrodden country, where his baggage-trains were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and ferociousness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the western Pharis, and Bottia, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmon.¹

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called *Thracian* *Helles*; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with ancient reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from pillage, even in the days of Herodotus.² The Macedonian prince, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thracian Alcebades—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him shall be related in the coming chapter.

¹ Herodot. vii. 222—227.² Herodot. vii. 222.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF
MARATHÓN TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF
THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathón is very scanty.

Kleomenes and Leotychidas, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurythemonid, the latter to the younger or the Proklid, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Proklid king Demaratus: and Kleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priests for this purpose. His manoeuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arouse the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his reserved laws did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, inasmuch that he struck with his stick whomever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe means, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priests.¹ But the Athenians and

¹ Herodot. vi. 74, 75.

Argives were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own: the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the avenging hand of the hero Argos, whose grove Eleusis had burnt, along with as many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Eleusis was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprise as much is to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing less a vulgar physical cause: Eleusis had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Sybilian slaves who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Eleusis, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Argives to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their two hostages, whom Eleusis and Leotydidis had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantees to the Athenians against aggression from Argos at that critical moment. Leotydidis was the surviving auxiliary of Eleusis in the negotiation of these hostages, and against him the Argives complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his sons, that the survivor Leotydidis was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Argives. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidæ pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the royal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Complaint
of the
Argives
at Sparta
against
Eleusis
and Leoty-
didis, on
the subject
of the
hostages
which these
two kings
had taken
from
Argos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 85.

² Herodot. vi. 85. Eleusis, three

of Argos, and one of Thebes, kept
ransom-prisoners, &c.

Accordingly the *Aggiastæ* contented themselves with stipulating that *Leotychidæ* should accompany them to Athens and released their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit.¹ They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably reflected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against *Aggiastæ* hostility—which security they were not disposed to waive.

Leotychidæ having been obliged to retire without success, the *Aggiastæ* resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at *Sanium*; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as *Theoræ* or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to *Ægina*. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and *Ægina*,² beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 461 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An *Aggiastæ* citizen named *Sihndrocorus* took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now

¹ *Æschyl.* *cl. 35*; compare *cl. 41-43*, and *cl. 227-230*, of this history.

² *Æschyl.* *cl. 45, 46.*

Instead of his *cl. 45* *Aggiastæ* *persecuted* *cl. 46* *Leotychidæ* *cl. 47* *cl. 48* *cl. 49* *cl. 50* *cl. 51* *cl. 52* *cl. 53* *cl. 54* *cl. 55* *cl. 56* *cl. 57* *cl. 58* *cl. 59* *cl. 60* *cl. 61* *cl. 62* *cl. 63* *cl. 64* *cl. 65* *cl. 66* *cl. 67* *cl. 68* *cl. 69* *cl. 70* *cl. 71* *cl. 72* *cl. 73* *cl. 74* *cl. 75* *cl. 76* *cl. 77* *cl. 78* *cl. 79* *cl. 80* *cl. 81* *cl. 82* *cl. 83* *cl. 84* *cl. 85* *cl. 86* *cl. 87* *cl. 88* *cl. 89* *cl. 90* *cl. 91* *cl. 92* *cl. 93* *cl. 94* *cl. 95* *cl. 96* *cl. 97* *cl. 98* *cl. 99* *cl. 100* *cl. 101* *cl. 102* *cl. 103* *cl. 104* *cl. 105* *cl. 106* *cl. 107* *cl. 108* *cl. 109* *cl. 110* *cl. 111* *cl. 112* *cl. 113* *cl. 114* *cl. 115* *cl. 116* *cl. 117* *cl. 118* *cl. 119* *cl. 120* *cl. 121* *cl. 122* *cl. 123* *cl. 124* *cl. 125* *cl. 126* *cl. 127* *cl. 128* *cl. 129* *cl. 130* *cl. 131* *cl. 132* *cl. 133* *cl. 134* *cl. 135* *cl. 136* *cl. 137* *cl. 138* *cl. 139* *cl. 140* *cl. 141* *cl. 142* *cl. 143* *cl. 144* *cl. 145* *cl. 146* *cl. 147* *cl. 148* *cl. 149* *cl. 150* *cl. 151* *cl. 152* *cl. 153* *cl. 154* *cl. 155* *cl. 156* *cl. 157* *cl. 158* *cl. 159* *cl. 160* *cl. 161* *cl. 162* *cl. 163* *cl. 164* *cl. 165* *cl. 166* *cl. 167* *cl. 168* *cl. 169* *cl. 170* *cl. 171* *cl. 172* *cl. 173* *cl. 174* *cl. 175* *cl. 176* *cl. 177* *cl. 178* *cl. 179* *cl. 180* *cl. 181* *cl. 182* *cl. 183* *cl. 184* *cl. 185* *cl. 186* *cl. 187* *cl. 188* *cl. 189* *cl. 190* *cl. 191* *cl. 192* *cl. 193* *cl. 194* *cl. 195* *cl. 196* *cl. 197* *cl. 198* *cl. 199* *cl. 200* *cl. 201* *cl. 202* *cl. 203* *cl. 204* *cl. 205* *cl. 206* *cl. 207* *cl. 208* *cl. 209* *cl. 210* *cl. 211* *cl. 212* *cl. 213* *cl. 214* *cl. 215* *cl. 216* *cl. 217* *cl. 218* *cl. 219* *cl. 220* *cl. 221* *cl. 222* *cl. 223* *cl. 224* *cl. 225* *cl. 226* *cl. 227* *cl. 228* *cl. 229* *cl. 230* *cl. 231* *cl. 232* *cl. 233* *cl. 234* *cl. 235* *cl. 236* *cl. 237* *cl. 238* *cl. 239* *cl. 240* *cl. 241* *cl. 242* *cl. 243* *cl. 244* 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sentences; see *Æschyl.* *cl. 101*, *cl. 102*, *cl. 103*, *cl. 104*, *cl. 105*, *cl. 106*, *cl. 10*

organised a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.¹ But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone saving three prisoners barest his shins, fled to the sanctuary of Minerva Thesmophorea, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His partisans did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven-headed prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Egiansa oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man, whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Minerva never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Egiansa, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety.

The
Egiansa
Minerva
sanctuary
for
a crime.
Minerva
sanctuary
in Athens.
In contrast
with Athens
—the more
modern city.

Treatment
of the
detained
conquerors
—murders.

¹ See Thucyd. I. 2.

The accounts of Athens, having been the principal city inhabited, took the name of The City even in the time of Thucydides II. 13, at a time when Athens and Thebes occupied so large a region around and near it.

² Herodotus, II. 25, gives it after destruction from war, *ἀποκαταρσεν*. The word often for broken, "broken hands" appears in this simile in the phrase, *ὅτι ἡ πόλις τμήσεται* the

real meaning to have been saved (the Latin *salvabit* too weak). "The hands with nothing attached to them" compare a phrase not very unlike, Herodotus, II. 25, *ὅτι ἡ πόλις τμήσεται* the phrase, &c.

Compare the narrative of the aspect of the Egiansa city, *Ἐγίανσα*, and of the manner in which he was treated when he was taken to the temple of Minerva Thesmophorea (Thucyd. I. 23).

active part; the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nicias from the consequences of delay in hovering ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristideis and Themistocleis became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistocleis, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and wounding, that even Aristideis himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the banishment." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of unrelaxed political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristideis was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are

Effect of this war to inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force.

Themistocleis was a rival of Aristideis, the chief men at Athens—became rivals between them.—Banishment of the latter by ostracism.

¹ Herodot. vi. 120, 121, 122, 123. Thucyd. i. 61. About Nicias, compare iv. 15.

² How much damage was done by such a privation of war, between

Corinth and Athens, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 366 B.C. (Thucyd. ii. 12).

unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land power into a sea power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the mind of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is

ascribed principally and specially to Themistokles.¹ On that account, if for no other reason, Aristotiles would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, unstartled uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristotiles seems to have approved in common

with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas and the quickness of his intelligence.² The land service was a type of staidness and inflexible make, the sea service that of mobility and adventure. Such was the idea strongly enter-

¹ *Plutarch, Themist.* c. 18.

² See Mr. Hall's interesting account of the British sailors, sailors and sailors in the *Illustrations*, p. 491—505 (London, 1864).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of fishermen belonging to the island, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. A long time ago they had established in a mountainous region, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had acquired that name as far as Constantinople. In their mountainous region, the Hydruntines acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most industrious nation in the Archipelago; and they were of course rapidly increasing. Their industry and honesty attracted the notice. The islands of Hydra, Poros, Spargi, and others, besides Hydra, in their neighbourhood, and possessed the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and the other islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the wages is contributed to a common stock, from which the shares of returning the ship are

distributed. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew, and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the ships is a vast sum given to the captain and crew on extraordinary conditions. The character and manner of the Hydruntines, from the moral effect of their custom, are much superior to regularly to the state they are apt to be susceptible of reform. They are sober, well-dressed, well-fed, cheerful, liberal, and hospitable. They seem to form a class, in the midst of pirates, which has no influence among us. By their virtues, they inspire a feeling of esteem which we cannot give among ourselves, while in their domestic arrangements their conduct is suitable to their condition. The climate are all admirably adapted, and possess much of that kind of knowledge in which the new industry is usually skilled. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydruntines, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

trained by Plato and other philosophers;¹ though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian woman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,² than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistocles, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistocles displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Themistocles gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristides, though the honest politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with *Sigina*, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour, but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistocles knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the *Hellespont* like that of Darius to Marathon;¹ against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they had over so many Grecian subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistocles, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with *energy* the work of maritime preparation, as well

Notes and long-extended adaptations of Themistocles's views at this time were presented to his countrymen by Aristides.

[illegible][illegible]

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From the remarkable passage in *Templeton* (New York, N. Y.), I am convinced that the Egyptians and the Ethiopians, the persons that is most in the city, were also the most distinguished in military service.

¹Thompson, L. M. 1989. [Therapsid-like] rat dentition provides the best evidence for human classification of the new primate.

'...*against Mitylene as against Persia.*' Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen, but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistocles was either working or preparing, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athenian Peloponnes, instead of the ancient open bay of Pnyx. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peloponnes with its three separate natural ports,¹ admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus, that the *Algonotus* "war was the salvation of Greece, by compelling the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power."² The

First of
Athens—
the salva-
tion of
Greece was
due to it
and to
Themistocles.

whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession towards Hellenic matters, postponed until 480 B.C. an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 493 or 490 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was due by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet *Æschylus*, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of *Laureum** in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sounion,³ amidst a district of low hills which

¹ *Thucyd.* i. 16. *Herodot.* vii. 146.

² *Thucyd.* i. 102.

³ *Herodot.* vii. 128. *Olynth.* viii. 2. *Alcibiades* speaks of the silver mines of Attica, and the *Laureum* is mentioned in the *Alcibiades* speech. *Alcibiades* speaks of the silver mines of Attica, and the *Laureum* is mentioned in the *Alcibiades* speech.

Thucyd. i. 16. *Alcibiades* speaks of the silver mines of Attica, and the *Laureum* is mentioned in the *Alcibiades* speech.

¹ *Æschylus*, *Prom.* 106.

² The mountain region of *Laureum* has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never with any object of scientific interest. It is situated in the southern portion of the present Greek government. See the

the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Insurance indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject

Proper
scale of
Xerxes—
inspired
indignation
in Greece

Ogylis in Asia, the *Agæes*, and Thracæ, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thracian or Alabandian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these preliminary evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Democritus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Sam to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance.² Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape

without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous disposition to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 482 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphic oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approach-

Heralds
from Persia
to demand
earth and
water from
the Grecian
cities—
many of
them
comply
and submit.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 138.

² Herodotus, vii. 1—136.

ing more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Paleopontian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation; moreover it seeks to combine every clig of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Kerkyrans, and Skellians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed branches of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose¹—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems almost to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be fully realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective chiefs, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Argos. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of meddling² (i.e., encroaching the cause of the

Par-hellenic congress summoned jointly by Athens and Sparta on the Isthmus of Corinth.—Important effect on Grecian mind.

Effects of the congress in leading to the all-Hellenic Greek—especially between Athens and Argos.

¹ Herodot. vii. 144. *συνάγειν αὐτὰς ἐν ἑνὶ ὄνοματι ἵπτασθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς πατρίδος καὶ πόλεως.* ² Herodot. vii. 14.

Pentium), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her differences with Athens.¹ In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistocles took a prominent part, as well as Cleon of Tegea in Arcadia.² The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either unprovoked or indifferent, especially Argos, Corinth, and the Eolian and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to dispatch spies across to Sparta, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus augmented. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous, Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human.³ Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestations of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil subordination. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple, when the Athenians, in their distress and mortality, went to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonike, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit

¹ Herodot. vii. 141.

² Herodot. vii. 141. about the middle of the Pelopon. War.

³ Herodot. vii. 141. at the time when

the Persians had the Pelopon. War.

Argos, Herodot. vii. 141.

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible : and the oracles wrote it down to every back to Athens, not unaccompanied probably the terrible sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the answering produced many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall"? Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out ; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever. The last line of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistokles, the great saviour of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis" : but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determina-

instance of
the words
high and
and others
offer to it
is intended
to be interpreted
it : the
sensible and
sensible of
Themist.
Müller.

tion to fight and conquer on land! Great indeed were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of unexpected conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval contest, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphic god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: 'I say, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired by most of the Greek states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologises for it as something wrong from him against his will by the force of the evidence.'

¹ Herodot. vi. 145. *ἔπειτα δευροστασία δεικνύμενοι, ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε αὐτοὺς πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοισιν, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντιπαλότητα τοῦ αἵματος, οὗτος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἑλληνας, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος.*

There is every reason to suspect the statement of Herodotus as to the rejecting these oracles attributed to the Athenians, and the related interpretation of them. They have been thus assumed contrary to the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may have conveyed with persons who had heard the statement. Regarding the other oracle which he seeks to have been referred to the Spartans—namely that other Sparta must be compared to a lion of Sparta, were surely—no man possibly doubts whether it was in substance before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vi. 205).

The later writers, Strabo, vi. 26, Corneille Népote ii. 4, and Polybius i. 89, give as records of the proceedings at Thermopylæ, before it was

doles in directly as well as indirectly.

² Herodot. vi. 145. *αὐτὸς οὖν πολεῖν ἐκέλευε, ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος, οὗτος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἑλληνας.*

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies from every differentiation, which would be needed at such a moment of crisis, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 2).

³ Herodot. vi. 145. *ἔπειτα δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος, οὗτος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἑλληνας, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος, οὗτος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἑλληνας, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος, οὗτος ἰσχυρῶς ἐκέλευε πολεμεῖν τοὺς ἑλληνας, οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν τοῦ αἵματος.*

The whole chapter Herodotus presents attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those circumstances in which his history is concerned, and the

Not only did the Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the scale that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,¹ as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognise some one commanding city. With regard to the land force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised.² To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character: a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find then the Athenians nerve up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing

means of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an absolute inferiority which lay close to the object, and not far from of given necessities, privileges, and rights. The persons whom Herodotus mentions are those who were full of ambition: thus the Spartans, as he says, to put clearly the honour of having beaten back the Persians, and to persuade that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both

could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus of Corinth, though well was to be well built up. The Peloponnesians also of that day thought that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. Indeed it is probable that the Athenians, when they were first asked to join the Spartans, were not at all aware of the necessity of doing so, and that they were only afterwards persuaded to do so by the Athenians.

² Herodot. vii. 141. The Athenians of that day were not at all aware of the necessity of doing so, and that they were only afterwards persuaded to do so by the Athenians.

two-thirds
of the whole fleet,
and yet preserving
the building
of fresh ships
until the last
moment—sending
forth the ablest
and most forward
leader in the common
cause, while content
themselves to serve
like other
states under the
leadership of Sparta.

During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Athens and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Boeotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence; so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plutarch fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.¹

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the

Argives did
nothing
throughout
the struggle; but
as to their
real position,
or the grounds
of their
refusal, contradictory
statements had
reached the ears
of Herodotus.

They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissension from the Delphian oracle—existing only on condition that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of leadership with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the leadership. But the Spartans asked, that they had two kings, while the Argives had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argive king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argivians (who considered that even the undivided leadership was no more than

¹ Herodot. vii. 124.

² Thucyd. ii. 12. It is equally clear what was in the Athenian and Spartan minds before the battle of Thermopylæ.

This story of the vote is much more conformable to history than the account of joint action (including self-appointing participation in the vote). See Clinton, *Ann. Philipp.* ii. 11, p. 126.

their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and increased them so much that they dashed the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; protesting even a tributary resistance under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argives themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was that the Argives had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection to themselves and of vengeance against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenes. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they wished, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is certain that in act the Argives were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was that they did not choose to join any Pan-hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host,

Extorted
strains con-
tains in
Greece
about
Xerxes—
action of
Herodotus.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 127-128.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argives, and with, without explanation, after mentioning all the Greek contingents assembled for the defence of the Peloponnese, and the different contingents of Peloponnesians, separately mentioned, he proceeds to say: "Further, for the first time, of knowledge of the Argives, is not given notice" (πρῶτον γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὕτως εἰρήνην ἀνέστην, ὡς καὶ ἄλλοις παραρρησὶς ἰσχυρὰ περὶ τοῦτο). This sentence implies the Argives without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argives by name, he is by no means so free and unprejudiced; suspecting, in fact, as we observe in various places, that they were the instigators of the Persian themselves—he mentions after others, in connection with their deception; but without mentioning their army;—he delivers a general accusation that those who think they have good reasons to complain of the

conduct of others would themselves find, in an important matter, that others have as much reason to complain of them—"And thus the conduct of a great host was seen to have been done that of others"—(ὅθεν ἡμεῖς οὕτως ἀνέστην, ὡς καὶ ἄλλοις παραρρησὶς ἰσχυρὰ περὶ τοῦτο).

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Xerxes was probably current, the Argives were in no better a position than the Spartans. They had been earlier with Athens and Sparta, each of whom was afraid of offending them. As Herodotus two years afterwards a great change of feeling against them in the Peloponnese is visible against Xerxes, was then likely to have taken place with regard to Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in regard to this matter are of little value (see Plutarch's *Herodotus*, c. 14, p. 105), and are entirely wrong, when he represents the Argives as one of the first to have withdrawn from Xerxes' army, which is probably correct.

and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persia again, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their venation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed *swifling*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity to Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Eretria and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Lathans proceeded at the same time. The Eretrians declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Korkyrans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malis, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnasus, under pretence of being warlike-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very surprising, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.³

The envoys who visited Korkyra pretended counsel on their mission to Eretria, the depot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Hieronides as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully

¹ Herodotus, vi. 122.

² Herodotus, vi. 122.

³ Thucyd. i. 27-28. It is perhaps singular that the Cretan envoys to Thucydides do not quote any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyrans in

respect to the Persian invasion, in the strong language which they deliver against Eretria before the Athenian assembly. (Thucyd. i. 27-31.) The manner of Cretan conduct, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations: for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Italian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The eagerness of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Eorians. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thespians. Though the great Thebanian family of the Alcmaeon were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen, yet it seems that these promises were in reality unavailing. The Alcmaeon were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peloponnesians:² while most of the Thespians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own martial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Eonoeides and the Athenian Themistocles, were dispatched by sea to Alia in Achæa Patellia, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.⁴ Being joined by the Thesalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempe, through which the river Peneios makes its way to the sea by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

Greeks
were sent
into Thes-
saly, to
defend the
defile of
Tempe,
against
Xerxes.
B.C. 480.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 132-137. Strabo, Geograph. v. 121.

et. 121.

² See Herodotus, vii. 137.

³ Herodotus, vii. 137; compare v. 121.

⁴ Herodotus, vii. 121.

The long, narrow, and winding dells of Tempi formed them, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or southern Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountains precipitous approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road : it is thus extremely defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.¹ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Lacedæmon would be able to land troops in their rear ; secondly, because there was also a second entrance possible in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Pæoniæans and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the dells of Tempi begin to narrow. It was, in fact, by this second pass, avoiding the insurmountable difficulties of Tempi, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempi, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.² He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from marvelling resistance to Persia : but he was in reality a very dangerous malice ; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.³ On the present occasion, the Greeks

¹ Herodot. vii. 175. The authors of the *Geography*. See the description and plan of Tempi in Dr. Clarke's *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 12, p. 181, and the *Companion to the Grand Tour*, in which all the things about this interesting dells are noticed and compared. (See *Thessalica* in *Travels*, Franklin, 1815.)

The description of Tempi in *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 181, Gonnus more accurate than that of *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 181. "We may remark that both the ancient and modern names in these instances, in the formation and composition of the geographical names, show, it seems to me, a strong resemblance to the names of the Macedonian places after Alexander

for the great, while they joined to the natural difficulties of Tempi by difficult access, in the same time, the road more complicated as a military communication. In the time of Lacedæmon these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were therefore much greater.

The present road through the pass is about sixteen feet broad in the narrowest part, and between steep and rocky but forested slopes, the pass is about five English miles in length (Travels, p. 181—182).

² Herodot. vii. 175.

³ Herodot. vii. 182—183.

commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempe, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellen, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempe, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the influence of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.¹

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellen north of Mount Eitharia and of the Macedonian territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.² When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thracian Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the horde whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tidings of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopians, Malians, Perrhæbians, Magnætes, Lokrians, Dorians, Molians, Pishittid Achæans, and Boeotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thebes or Platae. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Alcæids, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.³

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempe

Consequences of this retreat—the Thessalians and nearly all Hellen north of Eitharia submit to Xerxes, or nearly so.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 172, 174.

² Herodotus, vii. 174. The exception only of

nearly Thessaly, Argolis, &c.

³ Herodotus, vii. 172, 173, 174.

and the arrival of Xerxes at Thermæ, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organized; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.¹

¹ Herodotus vi. 111.

CHAPTER XL

• BATTLE OF THERMOPYLE AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northern states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon those remnant brethren worthy punishment; to divide them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their produce, for the profit of the Delphic god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.* Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

Engagement
taken by the
Greeks
after their
victory at
Artemisium
to divide the
spoils of the
Persians.

To display their own force was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempe—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrheians, Magnetes, Phthiotæ Achæans, Dolopæ, Ætolians, Molians, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to, but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempe; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount

Geopline
taken to
be the
Thermopylæ
as well
as the
strait of
Eubœa.

* Herodot. vii. 131; Diodor. xi. 8.

Kabon and Cape Kibsona. On the northern portion of Kabon, immediately facing Magnata and Ashua Pithikla, was situated the line of coast called Artemision; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histia. It was arranged that the Greek fleet should be moored there, in order to co-operate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. The light is a narrow space¹ was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea, not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing, than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemision, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which opens Kabon to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chafis and Baetha becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek women would have preferred to place their defence; but the occupation of the northern part of the Kabon strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Theropyria.

Of this Kabon space, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Mallus Gulf, into which the river Spandolus poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north and Mount Gila to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spandolus was occupied by the various tribes of the Mallus, bordering to the north and east on Ashua Pithikla: the southernmost Mallus, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Gila and the sea. From Trachis the range of Gila stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Kabon Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Theropyria.² On the road from Trachis to Theropyria,

¹ Herodot. viii. 25—26. Compare Isidore, *Paroemia*, No. 47, p. 10.

² I shall have occasion frequently to remark the position which this place in A. D. 1096 held in this point between the Persians and Byzantines.

² The road here certainly crosses the line of a pass, enclosed between mountains, but this distance it is supposed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water for much ground on the other.

immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little stream called the *Plumvir* and the *Asopos*, was placed the town of *Anthia*, celebrated for its temples of *Amphiktyria* and of the *Amphiktyonic Dinnitis*, as well as for the annual assemblies of the *Amphiktyonic council*, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to *Anthia*, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of *Olym* approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible mass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wind-track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of *Thermopylae*. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of *Thermopylae*, not far from the first town of the *Lakonia*, called *Alpeia*. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathes, which procured for the place the appellation of *Chlori* or the *Pana*: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground: and the *Phocians*, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the *Thessalians*, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of *Greece*, were consecrated to *Heckla*,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings enabled all the surrounding region—Mount *Olym*, *Trachis*, *Cape Kinakos*, the *Lichas* islands, the river *Eryas*. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and altered by the genius of *Eschylus*, in his drama of the *Trachinian Mothers*.

Each was the general name—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between

¹ According to one of the numerous traditions the injured goddess *Heckla* spent her months of bitterness and affliction here. *Heckla* was supposed to have bathed at *Chlori* or *Thermopylae*.

Under its very early name—*Heckla* and *Chlori*—*Heckla* and *Chlori*, the *Phocians*, were principally the *Thessalians* were discomfited, &c. &c. p. 179.

across the pass by the Phocians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Thermi, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpheus was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken some time not long after the retreat from Thermi, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermale Gulf. Both were then put in motion: the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiades, apparently about the latter part of the month of June.

Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law of the former Eurythronid king Kleomenes, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorcius, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenes, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily: and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 180 from the Arcadian Orchomenos, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 600 from Corinth, 800 from Phlœa, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and

Leonidas,
king of
Sparta,
conducts
the main
troops—
the
combined
fleet under
Eurybiades
sawers the
Helots
etc.

Peasants
and
composition
of the force
of Leonidas

¹ Herodotus, vii. 177, 198. *Leontopides* being so very numerous, *Leontopides* of their own names being about 10, 198.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families; if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the

state, and to maintain the continuity of the family name; thus, the selection of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our times, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

other light troops, in undisciplined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Boeotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thebes, heavy in the arms, and by 400 Thibians of more equivoval ability under Lacosthides. It appears indeed that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly sided, or opposed the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylae, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Thibians which thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,¹ chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Thibian people and the Boeotians generally, with the exception of Thebes and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylae, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Locrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prevented acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious;² while the Phocians, if originally disposed to assist, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxes and influential in guiding his movements.³ The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encourage-

¹ Herodot. vii. 202; Thucyd. ii. 95. Diodor. xi. 5; Pausan. Alcibiades, v. 12.

² The passage of Thermopylae is very important here, amounting to a great battle for the settlement of Greece, and leading on to suppress the rebellion of Alcibiades. See also what we have said very generally in the Herodot. vii. 202, 203. The latter seems to have copied from a lost Boeotian author named Archibolus, who tried

to make out a more homocidal case for the Persians, in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Alcibiades—supplied not only before his exile in consequence of his conduct in the Sicilian expedition (Thucyd. ii. 20) when there is no doubt that he was in exile to save himself from worse: also that of the Boeotian Lyman (Diodor. xi. 5, 6).

³ Herodot. vii. 22.

obligations—starving all their resources of foreign policy in order that the Thelctic exhibition might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. As present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, resented as of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Boeotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was working on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asopos and the hill called Anopos, then crossing the crest of Othys and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alphei.

This path—then hardly used, though its ascending hill now serves as the regular track from Eritæa, the ancient Lemni, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphion—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thebans over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would

¹ Josephus, *Jell. Antiq.* l. 7, § 11.
² *ibid.* l. 10, § 11.
³ *ibid.* l. 10, § 11.
⁴ *ibid.* l. 10, § 11.
⁵ *ibid.* l. 10, § 11.

though the religious obligations of the day in order to impose any such restriction on the operations of the invaders. The Spartans, of course, did not believe in such a restriction, but they would not "trust

⁶ Herodotus vii. 228; viii. 32.

occupy and defend it.¹ But the Greeks then found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, so that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempe; and so inefficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxis was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the defile of Cephissus, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Platæans and Locræans, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement; but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festival in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had numbered in its superior numbers at Artamision on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiades. It was composed as follows:—108 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plata, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthians, 20 Megarians, 20 Athenians, manned by the inhabitants of Chalcis and lent to them by Athens, 12 Siphnians, 12 Sikyonians, 10 Leodæmonians, 8 Epidaurians, 7 Eretrians, 2 Troezenians, 2 from Styra in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Kala. There were thus in all 221 triremes; together with 9 penteconters, furnished partly by Kala and partly by the Locrians, of Opus. Themistokles was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adimantus of the Corinthians; of other officers we hear nothing.³ Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Siphnian, and a Troezenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thermopylæ, beyond the island of Skiaton, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Thera.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 221, 222, 223.

² Herodotus, vii. 227.

³ Herodotus, vii. 1, 2, 3. Themistokles led 122 vessels; the Athenian number damaged by twenty triremes.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who, probably supposing them to be the presence of the entire fleet, sought safety in flight. The Athenian triremes escaped to the mouth of the Peneios, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessels to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured almost—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the *Alkistion*, one of whose helmsmen, Pythias, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the *Trasacrian* vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named *Leobis*, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and stern, as a posturing ornament in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate! The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock *Hymete*, between *Skiathos* and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of *Ekyros*, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as a warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by fire-signals¹ from *Skiathos*, and strengthened by the capture of the three lock-out ships, inspired to the fleet at *Artemision*, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.² They sailed up the *Reboan* strait to *Chalkis*, as the narrowest and most defensible passage, leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 163. *signa fidei* is not well interpreted *signalum*.

Regarding the influence of a name and its etymology, it will not surprise for the passage, compare Herodotus, ii. 82, and Thuc. ii. 21.

² For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxxvi. 1; and the opening of the *Agamemnon* of *Eschylus*, and the same play, v. 879, 882; also *Phœnix*, 38, 39—40.

³ Herodotus, vii. 163, 164, 165.

These
triremes of
the Persian
fleet, sent
forward
to encounter
their first
opponent
with the
Persian
fleet.

Captain of
these three
triremes—
one of the
general
Grecian
fleet, who
abandoned
Artemision
and sailed
to Chalkis.

active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Meliboea, Euboea, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed; and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defense, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assault or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Theia and the Nerids, the tutelary divinities of Sigeia Akte—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, prolong the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphata at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasa. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the woe-worn atmosphere which layed around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphata without misfortune, they would have found the Euboean strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and confined the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 136-138.

² Herodotus, vii. 138. On this narrative, as it regards the progress followed by the Armada to Persia, Herodotus suffers a total deficiency of credence. He omits to state the day on which the

fleet sailed, the day on which it arrived at Sigeia, and the day on which it sailed from Sigeia. He also omits to state the day on which it arrived at Aphata, and the day on which it sailed from Aphata.

spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Kolona, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered sacrifices to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemision. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphana. The last fifteen ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Saakthia, commander of the *Selle Kyra*—*Acidalia*, despot of Akabanda in Eria—and Parthyia, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the harbour of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these slaves had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylae, suffered four days to pass without making any attack.

A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause.

Legend of Xerxes with his head torn from his body.

Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylae, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without attracting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the divisions, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened, too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 124.

approach of the hostile army. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness, upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Diodorus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only cramped, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wrath at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before Itea, and sent against them the Median and Elean divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.¹

Though we read that in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Croesus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance;

Diodorus about the motives furnished by Herodotus to Xerxes.

and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus² that the Lakedæmonians, when they

¹ Herodot. vii. 225, 226, agrees for this the subject is, that, already before the battle of Thermopylae, Leonidas's army was dispersed by the

² Diodor. vi. 4.

first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to win the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thebans, now the chief guides of Xerxes,¹ together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Teuphi. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leading to each intrigue a fair share of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Aphidæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medæ, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,² manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armour. Short spears, light visor shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, sturdy ranks,³ and practiced fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "Thrice (says the

very great upon Thermopylæ, such by the Medæ troops—repulsed.

Expected officers, by the best troops, the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 224; viii. 35—38.
² Diodorus, xi. 1.

³ Herodotus, vii. 221; ix. 62, 63; Diodorus, xi. 2; compare *Antiquities*, Pers. 141.

they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Epistatides, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnes might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and rocks, and even trodden down by their own weapons. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the help of their shield, into the narrow street behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnes, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarméd hands, and even with their mouths.²

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thebans. Another such equal heroism, it seemed

¹ The story of Marathon (cf. 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persians upon during the night, and was nearly successful in the result, and, from which Xerxes was obliged to be suddenly, in order to save the day, while the Greeks, after having missed Xerxes's daughter in the camp, were at length, overpowered and slain in conjunction with Aristides

and doubtless to be repeated. Justin (xxvii. 1. 31) and Plutarch (de Herodoti Maligno, p. 164, ed. W.) The details of Marathon is not mentioned in any other contemporary or later history. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (de Herodoti Mal. 164, 165), but it is not preserved.

² Herodotus vii. 335.

communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.¹ After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Plataeæ, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thebans, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillside within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thebans in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the royal mark as untrustworthily slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leonidas was compelled to consent along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Flutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Theban author,² who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leonidas, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably discuss the story

¹ See the story of the gladiolus Athenian officers, who returned home alone, after all the comrades had perished in an unrequited expectation of the relief of Athens. Two others of the slain warriors overtook them late, and asking him what had become of his husband and family put him to death by striking with their daggers (Herodotus, 7, 22).

² In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Rhine, near Bâle (August, 1444), where 100,000 French and Germans attacked 4,000 Swiss, and Germans under the Dauphin of France, captured many commissioners from their own ranks—all of them were slain, after

hours of unrelieved valor and great loss to the enemy, except fifteen men who receded from their commitment in saving the pass, thinking the other price desperate. These fifteen men in their return were treated with indignity—someheaded by the enemy's sword (Flutarch, *De virtutibus*, c. 1, c. 2, p. 102).

³ Herodotus, vii. 101. Flutarch, *De virtutibus*, p. 101. The *History of Artaxerxes*, cited by the latter, pretends to be founded in part upon documents brought according to the supposes of Flutarch and Herodotus. In the same chapter several other anecdotes.

of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was further impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the further resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their troops is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 able warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes) what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Eubœa, and from thence to make war on the northern coast of Læonia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defence against his land force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Artabanus the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without suspicion as to the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed), like other Greeks, hated all power, and carried all good fortune, above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no further distraction of number; and it was essential to

Impressions of Xerxes after the repulse—admiration for him by Demaratus.—his respect to.

keep the entire Persian fleet, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and co-operating mass!

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the impressions against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.¹

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleet at Apheta and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned, that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt assured of success on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still numbering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Apheta. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the straits open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Ereos, who entreated Eurymedus to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Ereans sent their envoy Polagis to Themistokle with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistokle employed the money skilfully and successfully, giving five talents to Eurymedus, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most manageable among them was the Corinthian Admetus, who at first

¹ Herodot. vii. 134.

² Herodot. vii. 135. "The officers (Grecs) are made to observe/understand naturally every another officer more thoroughly than himself, and I asked him several what they had lost."

In his mind, unless he be a man of very great virtue. And a foreigner being usually apprehensive, together with the great number of wooden bridges, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

neglected the naval writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Apheta, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of unquenching hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.¹ Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Salamis, and to sail up the Salamis strait from the north, in the rear of the Greeks, postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the enterprise was executed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Salamis, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skion.² This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm and the dispatch of the intercepting squadron.³

It appears that his communications respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet equivalent reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistokles, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Apheta.⁴ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phoenicians and others in the Persian fleet handled

¹ Herodotus, viii. 6, and Skyllias-like intelligence (as Skyllias) the 20 ships remained, cf. Arrian (Pseudo) Geog. Indica, viii. 10.

² Herodotus, viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias, as a diver.

³ Strabo, ii. 11.

and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.¹ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their bows in front, at all points of the circumference.² In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them; but on a second signal given, their ships crossed the aggressors, poured out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philada, brother of Gorgas, despot of Salamis, in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected ferocity at first disconcerted the Persians, who, however, rallied, and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station—the Persians to Apheta, the Greeks to Artemision.³

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to erode the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the evening night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them.

Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece, the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Apheta, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The remains of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from

second storm—
inflicted
damage on
the Persian
fleet, and
rain in the
detached
part coast
Salamis.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 8. Before long, however, the Ionian auxiliaries, about two thousand in all, were captured, destroyed, or fled, according to Herodotus; vi. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99.

² Compare the description in Thucyd. ii. 98, of the naval battle between the

Athenian fleet under Cleon and the Spartan fleet under Pausanias, where the ships of the latter are described in this manner.

³ Herodotus, viii. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

the former storm at Sydon Akil, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the power of their ships surrounded, and the play of their sails impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shores. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Apheta, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hallows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Apheta, and attacked and destroyed some Eubœan ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persian admiral was not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemision, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running head of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments, still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total; and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one-half of their

Received
on sight of
Artemision
—the Greeks
—but the
Greek fleet
remained in
retreat.

number out of condition to renew it.¹ The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistocles, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force further into Greece:² though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylae, and though the removal which the Helots were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistocles to give them convey for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Alkibiades, stationed with his ship near Thermopylae, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Hellespont strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistocles, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes; whereby the latter were enjoined not to move against their fathers, but to desert, if possible, or at least to fight as little and as hesitantly as they could. Themistocles hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate to render them objects of interest, and thus to diminish their efficiency.³ With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily

¹ Herodotus, viii. 75, 76.

² Herodotus, viii. 75, 76, 77; Pictorach,

³ Herodotus, viii. 77. Compare also Herodotus, i. 6, where Xerxes is seen to be deceived.

The
retreat
was
necessary
in
order
to
keep
up
communication
between
the
army
and
fleet,
brought
the
disastrous
intelligence
that
Xerxes
was
already
master
of
the
pass,
and
that
the
division
of
Leonidas
was
either
destroyed
or
in
flight.

surveyed by a citizen of Histia in the Persian at Aghata, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histia and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thebians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.¹

According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they were little defensive armour, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thebians, and the 400 Thians. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7000;² but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4000 warriors

1. *Exaggeration of dead on both sides. Herodotus consistently overstates nothing but numbers.*

2. *Herodotus, viii. 34, 35. at the old Thermopylæ were 300 Spartans, 700 Thebians, and a few others. Strabo, Ge. ix. p. 66. He mentions also only after Athenian ships of war at Artemisium: in fact the epigrammatic statement deserves little attention.*

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² About the number of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare Herodotus, viii. 34; Strabo, Ge. ix. p. 66; Pausanias, ii. 26, 27; and Munro's Sparta, vol. II. p. 204.

Herodotus, viii.

Looking into the account of the Thermopylæ, we find a few others. Strabo, Ge. ix. p. 66. He mentions also only after Athenian ships of war at Artemisium: in fact the epigrammatic statement deserves little attention.

"from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads (or 3,000,000) of enemies!" Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesus must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian associates, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, often simple and impressive, destined for the Spartans dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders". On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate awaiting upon him, would not desert the Spartan chief".

Epigram of
Simonides.

¹ Herodot. vi. 224.

CHAPTER XII.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETRAIT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of aftertimes looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So resolute were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemision, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Greek auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Mallians, Lakians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Egeians, with their chief town Talos, all except Thebæ and Platae, now joined him.² Demasias, his Spartan companion, moved

Supplement
to the
Greek
story
of the
battle of
Thermopylæ.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 46, 51, 78.

² Herodotus, viii. 95. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kathartes* story for Xerxes, which is true, only in the sense, but not in the spirit; for Xerxes lost a greater number of men

in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodorus, xi. 17); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (id. 12–14).

forward to Thebes to receive an accolade of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Astagoras, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Marathon to most of the Boeotian towns,¹ as well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thebans, on the other hand, abandoned their city and fled into Palæopontus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemision,² were disembarked at Chalcis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accession from Xaryxus in Sebon, and from several of the Cyclades; so that the losses sustained by the storm at Siplis and the fight at Artemision, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.³

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian anagoi reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.⁴ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Boeotia, so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Diomebreus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Elikonian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of serious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Argives, Elisians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epilæusians, Phliæians, Troezenians, and Hermionians were all

No other plan of defence occurred—no fortification to be raised capable of withstanding a fleet—the Peloponnesians were to fight the battles of Corinth.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² Thucyd. iv. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ Thucyd. iv. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 4

present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (boats of 15,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day, as a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,¹ abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,² while it probably threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Megara. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylae: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disaster thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Iovella ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemision, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylae, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.³ The fleet from Artemision had been directed to anchor at the harbour of Troezen, there to await such reinforcements as could

Hoplites
of the
Athenians
—the
majority
of the
fleet
—the
majority
of the
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—the
majority
of the
fleet

¹ Herodotus, vii. 21. *ἐκπεπληρωμένοι τῶν πλοίων.*

² Herodotus, vii. 14.

³ Herodotus, vii. 120.

⁴ Herodotus, vii. 21. *ἐκπεπληρωμένοι τῶν πλοίων.* The text here is very corrupt, and the meaning is not clear. It seems to refer to the Athenians' position at the time of the battle of Salamis.

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Athenians for aid, at Myrtoeum (Myrtoeum).

Both Herodotus (vii. 21) and Thucydides (i. 94) state that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, were enabled to make a successful stand for themselves with Xerxes (Herodotus, vi. 11, p. 85). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them any such terms: his previous temper was directed against them. Herodotus has mentioned in his story the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offer of Xerxes to the year following the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

be got together; but the Athenians entreated Eurybates to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybates was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trezene came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.¹

Meanwhile Themistocles and the Athenian women landed at Phaleron, and made their successful entry into Athens. Glowing as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,² and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, requiring every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sounion to Oropos, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.³ The whole Greek fleet was despatched employed in carrying out the helpless refugees: mostly to Trezene, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trezenian population being exceedingly war-like, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)—but in part also to Argos: there were however many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistocles impressed upon the refugees that they were only obeying the winds, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and after his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine tutelars of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Aithed Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourish-

¹ Herodotus, viii. 45-47.

² Herodotus, viii. 48, 49.

³ Herodotus, viii. 48, 49. There was however but little time for the Greeks

to get up and carrying away of families, seeing that by Themistocles's plan the Athenians should be able to evacuate Salamis, &c.

The
Athenians
abandoned
Athens,
carrying
their
household
property to
Argos,
&c.

fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war;¹ we may form some faint idea of the immediately greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strong to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political discussions were suspended; Themistocles proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, hurrying home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristides, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the seer, and Clinia, the son of Miltiades, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his sale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen, with his companions cheerfully marching through the *Karamiktes* to dedicate their bridle in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.² It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer sailors, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others;³ and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inextricable resource of Themistocles, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the *Georga's* lead from the statue of *Athina* was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, retained any treasure, which

¹ Thucyd. II. II. 11.

² Thucyd. Themistocles c. 11, 21; and Clinia, c. 7.

³ Miltiades was the husband of Clinia, *Agamemnon* (Thucyd. c. 2, 21) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

Energy of the Athenians and moral unity of the nation. — Themistocles proposed the hurrying home of Aristides from exile.

private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service.¹ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Athens—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the men admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.² Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemision, partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 350 ships—a force greater than at Artemision. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalcidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Argonauts, twenty Megarians, sixteen Laconians, three Ephyriæ, ten Epilæans, seven from Antiochia and as many from Scyria, five from Treasæ, three from Heraclea, and the same number from Lecha; two from Kala, two from Syra, and one from Kythnos, four from Rhodus, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the desire of their captains and rowers to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekontes, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an exiles' officer, named Phayllus, thence victor at the Pythian games.³ The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (335 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lada, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which *Æschylus* gives suddenly as consisting of 310 sail, in addition to ten prize and thowen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a dramatic repre-

¹ *Plutarch*, Themistocles, c. 1.² *Herodotus*, ix. 16.³ *Herodotus*, vii. 49–51.

were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tristramedon, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Hear ye, Mardianis, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!"¹ Whether this is a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Asia, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thesalians made them despair of favourable terms. Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thesalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to ensure instant treatment to the territory of Phœlia, provided a sum of fifty talents was paid to them.² The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Etoia, which marked and swept plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of these were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parosus called Tithonus, or even still farther, across that mountain, into the territory of the Gædians Lakræans. Ten or a dozen small Phœlian towns, the most considerable of which were Halais and Hyampolis, were marked and despoiled by the Ionians. Even Alœ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then

¹ Herodot. viii. 26. Herod. Kephissus, source of the Saronic gulf, near the Isthmus of Corinth.

modern, still and partly.

² Herodot. viii. 26.
Herodot. viii. 26, 27.

burnt. From Panopæus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Boeotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thebes and Platae; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the desolated territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopæus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Alon.² The rapacity of the Persian king was attracted by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Croesus.

Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi.

The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Abstemius, the religious superior: but assistance of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred zone suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, was seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schield up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Aëthid Prometheus, on a sudden dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountains crag detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Aëthid. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the Heron Phylakæ and Antæolæ, whose sacred products

Parnassus, height, and ruin of the Achaian camp.

successful warriors opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames. The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sicily in those of Cyrus.¹

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sicily was retold upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa

*According
part of the
Polemarchus
to the
temple
acropolis.*

intelligencers of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.² On the next day but one, the Athenian orator in his exile received his release, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechthion, the especial gift of the goddess Athena, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the priests of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent;³ as well as that which was said to have been seen by Demas (an Athenian companion of the Peloponnesians) in the Thracian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries: and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Demas still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud wailing-chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Democritus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 22, 23.

² Herodotus, i. 62.

³ Herodotus, v. 101; vii. 22—23; ix. 62.

The old story of Democritus offering up
himself for the fire of Salamis probably did
not happen.

⁴ Herodotus, vii. 22—23.

Yet whatever may have been received in afterthought, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portents of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalerum, reinforced by ships from Naucratis as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sigeion Aëol, an estimate certainly not inadmissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coast of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus in Ionia, into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesians, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own houses, and that thus

Xerxes
refuses to
fight at
Phalerum—
invited
about the
policy of
fighting in
a narrow
bay
—predicted
retreat of
Greek
Salamina.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 44. Cleomedes Laches observes upon this statement, Othman and the Fleet of Athens, *Ann.* vii. p. 1. 1838. "About the ships in the Persian navy we are permitted to be curious; the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis; and from these are to be deduced, by estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle,

those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait at Salamis, this is evident."

The estimate of Cleomedes Laches appears exaggerated, even more than the previous results. Nor do I believe the statement of Herodotus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait, to be a story strictly following.

the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and inflicting, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficiency of the Persian fleet and manner of command with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Salamis may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearly the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,¹ and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her refusal to dissuade the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even returned the Persian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day,² and for the land force to move forward towards Salamis.

Whilst, on the shore of Phaleron, an unopposed will supplanted seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation, great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured discussion had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the migration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurymachus counselled the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement.

¹ The picture drawn in the *Cyropædia* of Xerxes represents the subjects of Persia as opinionless and unresisting to their monarch's commands.

and even indignantly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (*Xenophon, Cyropædia*, lib. 1, c. 25).

² Herodotus, lib. 8, c. 64, 65.

Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land force, so that in case of defeat at sea the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service; while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.¹ In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her suburbs by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hasten sail, or prepare their crews, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.²

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an absolute reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could retire, and be aided by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow straits, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expectated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even

Salamis was chosen as if that position had been suggested.

¹ Herodot. viii. 74.

² Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14.

the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Troezen, Harpessus, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiades to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly adherent to all those who, like the Athenians, Megarians, and Naxians, were attached by their own separate safety to clinging to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistocles, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistocles returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for the removal of the expatriated Athenian families to the island as well as for that of the squadron, he found an Athenian friend named Mideiphilus, who asked him what the signal of which had determined. Concerning this Mideiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious

practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars, but it must have been no common man, when thus selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistocles. On learning what had been resolved, Mideiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which his attention would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistocles again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a reversal of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistocles had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to

¹ Herodotus, viii. 27, gives the full account of the debate, and also the substance of the remonstrance of Mideiphilus. Compare viii. 126, and Thucyd. i. 94, for a complete recapitulation of it.

renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Harybiakla, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, resumed with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unreservedly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been inclined if speedily told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Saluata. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Harybiakla alone, Thomsakila was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to converse a fresh speech. So soon as this synd had assembled, once before Harybiakla had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Thomsakila addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Saluata: inasmuch that the Christianian Aldeamanas rebuked him by saying—"Thomsakila, those who in the public festival-watches rise up before the proper signal are scorned". "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crown."¹

¹ Herodot. vii. 24, 25. The account given by Herodotus, of these numerous disputes which preceded the battle of Salamis, is by the main current, inaccurate, and confused. It is more correct than the narrative of Thucydides (ii. 13, 14), whose account Thomsakila followed. In fully describing both Harybiakla and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the party of opposing or hesitating, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the Greeks would not obey them, and insisted on going to the battle. And it describes one whom still more, if we contrast it with the more and more accurate account of Plutarch and Christian Hays. As Plutarch (Lycias, c. 15) describes the scene, Harybiakla was the person who desired to separate the hoplites and sailors of Thomsakila, and with that view first made to him the observation given to my hero, out of Herodotus, which Thomsakila returned up to the same answer—namely, that we his ship to seize Thomsakila, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known question—"What, dost thou say?" (Herodot. vii. 24, 25). Lycias expresses his surprise that Herodotus

should have expressed so important an occasion in this manner; but we may easily pluck from the lines of his narrative that he cannot have heard it in the narrative of Herodotus, Thomsakila gives no answer to Lycias, nor in the latter of all connected with him; nor, Harybiakla is then brought over by the persuasions of Thomsakila, and allowed to bid it with his views. The person whom Herodotus represents as angry with Thomsakila, is the Peloponnesian chief, especially Aldeamanas disbeliever. They are never too full to be added and without previous notice; a point with just just been taken by the enemy, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority who persuades Harybiakla to resign the whole debate; not an unreasonable case too—Lycias says. However it is Aldeamanas, not Harybiakla, who addresses to Thomsakila the remark that "persons who rise before the proper signal are scorned"; and he makes the remark because Thomsakila goes on speaking on, and trying to persuade the wrong chief, when the signal of the onset had been already given. The

Themistokles then explained to the crowd that debate had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve upon which Themistokles began the debate. He vigorously enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Argos ; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus ; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were evenasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adimantos, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistokles, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Kerytheids had no right to count the vote of Themistokles until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the crowd. Such an appeal, alike suggestive and insane, upon the heads of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the unpardonable impudence of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistokles, who reminded them that while he had around him 120 well-armed ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and

Themistokles drove upon himself the reproach of stirring up strife, the terror of Athens, and sowing insurrection proper to him. But Themistokles was not again called into the councils of Kerytheids, without any previous consultation to justify it, and without any reason. His character represents Kerytheids to the present day, who were anxious both to hinder the fleet from the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistokles from offering any opposition to it. There was an absolute and decided opposition from

the common order of the Isthmus expedition, to every expedient.

In Themistokles and Adimantos, from this juncture, that the story about Kerytheids concerning Themistokles with his plot gave out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Kerytheids, himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit in to the narrative of that historian ; it does not connect with the character of the relations between Kerytheids and Themistokles.

territory as good or better than Corinth. But he saw now clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Themistokles, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin." For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Sicily in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophetic assurance that we are one day to colonise. Thou dost thou, when herald of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Themistokles had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistokles. But this last downright menace checked his determination, and probably struck death even the Corinthians and Peloponnesians; for it was but too plain that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to leave orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.¹ The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the *Skaii* horses of Salamis—Telamón and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to *Agina* to implore *Akhaios* himself and the remaining *Akhiidai*. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unaltered their former fears and reluctance, which began again, after a short interval, to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistokles,

Speech of Themistokles to the allies with the Athenians against war, which is made even to be brought into account. Themistokles makes upon him to adopt this measure.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 66, 67, at all points of view, and after two, into details of all the circumstances of the battle.

² Herodotus, viii. 66, after part of text.

Themistokles, about the same time, lived in the middle of the 5th century B.C. and was the son of Neokles.

and were further strengthened by the advice from the Indians. The messenger from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their own wall at that point to make the smaller land holding. The

The Princeton study, flawed for the reasons, I'll write to you elsewhere. That's good enough—researcher's bias; the study's flawed in the way that the study was done. The Princeton study, flawed for the reasons, I'll write to you elsewhere. That's good enough—researcher's bias; the study's flawed in the way that the study was done.

Dependable
arrangements
of 17 hotel
properties—
the world's
first private
network.
Access to
12,000
reservations
lines, to
guarantee
the group
stay in the
night, and
this family
vacation
experience.

were they not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence—even if worsted at sea—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the incapacity of Eurysides: at length the women feeling broke out in public and continuous manifestation, and a fresh cry of the chiefs was demanded and conveyed.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, *Epistates*,² and *Megacles* were usually against it, in favour of staying to fight.

st to Themistokles that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Korymbos; and the disastrous crisis, designed to deprive Greece of all united maritime defenses, appeared imminent, when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the council, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Skinkas, his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,² who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose slender qualities are marked by the fact that

1. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
2. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
3. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
4. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
5. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
6. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
7. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
8. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
9. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.
10. *Flavobolus*, vol. 74. See also 14 above.

1. **Language Point** (Section 4.37, p. 147) mentions the Japanese army that was sent to China to change the status of the island and was

nally prevented from doing so by the students of Washington. This is a great mistake, as indeed these writers are perpetually mismaneuvering the facts of fact and history. The Americans had no intention of war with the Japanese in keeping the first legions and fighting at Okinawa.

1. *Chrysomelids* (Chrysomelidae), a 17-million-membered family of beetles, which can feed on plants.

he had the ears and teaching of the children of his master, was instructed to represent them privately, in the name of Themistokles, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a divided body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.¹

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistokles across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring mainland, on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with as much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistokles lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,² as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had heard his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks

¹ Herodotus, viii. 64.

² Thucydides, i. 127. It is curious to contrast this with *Andromache*, scene, iii. 493. See also *Xerxes*, act. iii. 389, 393.

Themistokles might well remark about the Athenian generals given to the Persians in Themistokles—*Εὐνομένης*

“If he truly says Themistokles speaks against us, yet, the Persian king’s officers (Thucydides, ch. ix. p. 70)—though they never speak as if he were lying about the stratagem by which Themistokles deceived the Greeks in sight of Salamis against their will. See the same *Androm.* p. 37, p. 38.

the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistocles himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not unobserved of the Athenians, raving, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from *Hydra* had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistocles to be invited out from the assembled group of chiefs; and, after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered further debate useless. Themistocles expressed his joy at the intelligence, communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristocles to go himself into the crowd, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. His estimate indeed was their insensibility that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristocles; nor was it until the arrival of a Trojan vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount *Hydra*—near the Herakleion and immediately overlooking

¹ *Thucyd.* viii. 75, 85.
Thucydides places Aristocles' conversion, thus Aristocles, immediately after he had made the communication to the crowd, went away, and presented to the fleet, in the *tracheia*. Plutarch represents him as present and as being first to inform the Athenians, according to *Isidore*, Themistocles

desired Aristocles to assist him in converting the Athenians according to *Strabo*. *Herakleion* was already mentioned; it was the Peloponnesian chief who went out.

The *tracheia* of *Hydra* will be found throughout than more credible will more consistent than those of *Plutarch* and the later writers.

the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were Ionians, and some even Greeks—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phoenicians, Cyprians, Cilicians, Egyptians, vict with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage, but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to surrender or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:¹ the war-ships were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the bow which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protect the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to movement, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the *Agincourt* on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Prostrum:² Democritus the Naxian captain was said to have captured five-ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Artabazus, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the

¹ Herodotus, viii. 62; Diodorus, xi. 33. According to the Persian account, he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, and will make any addition to the fleet or to any other operations having regard to the resources of the Persians. See Herodotus, vi. 100, viii. 62. With almost daily attacks of explanation.

² Herodotus, viii. 62; Diodorus, xi. 33. The testimony of the former, both in the courage displayed by the Persian fleet, and in their eager rush of attack and capture, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

³ Herodotus, Epist. 124, Buzot.

number of distinguished Persians and Miles who shared his life was very great ;¹ the more so as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek vessels who were cast into the sea, the greater number were warriors, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician vessels of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks ; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate threat of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Ætolic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginean. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginean, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly adulterators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and venation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he secretly knew on whom to vent the feelings.²

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halicarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become insurmountable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from perdition by attacking one of her own comrades ; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymos of Kalydonia, ran it down, and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would

¹ The many names of Persian chiefs whom Herodotus reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part borrowed of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Mansfield, *Herodotus*, ad *Salmyr*, Book p. 411.

² Herodotus, *lib. vi.*

Aristeides carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement.² But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden perversion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cilicians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, &c., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now chose to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects.⁴

He feared that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, as he to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he considered his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.⁵ Against the Phœnicians, from whom

¹ Herodot. vii. 22; Plutarch. *Life of Aristides*, c. 1; *Mythol. Poet.* 324—327; Diodor. xi. 12.

² Herodot. vii. 22.

³ The character of the Greeks over the Persians was generally raised by the personal fidelity of Xerxes, and of Darius to Xanthamptus, Imperial Artaban (Herodot. ii. 21, 22; iii. 12, 13).

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. vii. 100), as well as in that of Artaban the monarch of Armenia by the Histories (viii. 105), which indicates the general disposition of the Asiatic islanders, derived from the various barbarian races, against him.

⁵ Herodot. vii. 13.

Expressed
some of the
Greeks that
the vessels
could be
collected—
some of
Greeks for
his own
personal
safety—he
could take
that away
H. A. H.

he had expected more, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.¹ Such a capital desertion made future naval struggles still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Pinareus in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.² They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.³

This resolution was prompted by Marichonius, who saw the real terror which haunted his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Spaa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was further exasperated by anger against Marichonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him⁴ in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do, and to

Xerxes concludes the treaty (Xen. *Hæc.* vi. 1) to take a solemn and religious oath of vengeance, and to build the bridge of Salamis, and to guard the Hellespont.

¹ This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, vi. 14. It seems probable that—

² The tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Pinareus*, had been presented, on about this day, before many of the nation and inhabitants of the island. This mentioned in this history. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with the melancholy circumstance, that years earlier than the Persian invasion, which was alluded to in the play, had been committed by Xerxes to his wife, Cassandrea, daughter from S. The Chorus in the Phrynichus consisted of Phœnicians women, namely the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be taken after the battle (Herodotus, vi. 14, as Dr. Blandel explains, *Fast. ad. Rhod.* *Pers.* p. 161, or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tra-

gedy, which, without the pains, are too ready to credit any conjecture as to its substance or details (see *Waller's*, *Quæstiones Tragicæ*, vol. i. p. 78; and *Johnson's*, *Phrynichus*, *Monarch*, and *the Village*, pp. 1-16).

³ Herodotus, vi. 15-167. Such was the terror of these retreating nations, that they did not even to leave behind them any thing which might betray their flight, but they left behind *Pinareus* and *Marichonius*, by the way, and destroyed the bridge of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we must not take as telling better than any conjecture in the *Antiquities* of Herodotus.

⁴ *Æschylus*, *Pers.* p. 1001; *Æschylus*, in p. 104. The last latter tells about the intention to carry a mole across from Salamis to Salamis, as if it had been conceived after the battle.

⁵ *Compendium*, *Herodotus*, vi. 14.

advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was infinitely palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance, not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to reassure his master by representing that the worst blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, the Thracians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's vengeance upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 50,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artamida herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the most deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition insinuating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving himself from the obligation of further service.—"If Mardonius desires to retreat (she remarked contemptuously) by all means let him leave the troops: should he succeed, then will he be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as they remain safe, and thy house in power. Thus hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Hellensmender queen by entrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalerum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit, following as far as the island of Andros, without success. Themistocles and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats,

in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Korymbos and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistokles readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to direct his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sittanes a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistokles) had contrived the impudence of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian host force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistokles fabricated the intimation, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty manoeuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility seem extraordinary; but the facts are sufficiently attested, since Themistokles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus contracted. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this ancient man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and mild sagacity. Themistokles knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate only a few hours before the late battle: moreover a clever man tainted with such constant guile might naturally calculate on being

The Greeks prevent the Persian king as the an English would describe of Themistokles by several passages to Xerxes.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 126, 127: Thucyd. i. 102. The English style of representation may possibly be interpreted in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact, not only was it clear that

Themistokles was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont, but it was also clear that the Greeks had over any serious expectation of success there. Compare Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i. 2.

one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he must be furnished their money, bringing with him two great gods—*Plutus* and *Necessity*. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city and filled with excellent gods; but that they were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—*Poverty* and *Helplessness*." In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.* While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their red protecting shells, Themistocles sent word to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From *Marystes*, *Paros*, and other places he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,[†] but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after a very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.[‡]

The intimation sent by Themistocles perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Arcton only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Boeotia into Thessaly, where *Mardonius* made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained the *Parthians*, *Medes*, *Sakas*, *Baktrians*, and *Indians*, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 260,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under *Artabanus*, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont,

* Herodotus, viii. 101. And Andros was often mentioned by all subsequent historians, and Pausanias has described one detachment under another city name, viz. "all Peloponnesians, Thracians and Argives."
Diodorus Siculus, xvi. 64, 65.

Herodotus, viii. 101.

† Herodotus, viii. 102; Pausanias, viii. 12—who states a few lines from the contemporary poet Theocritus.

‡ Herodotus, viii. 115—116.

incredible. Greek imagination, in the contemporary post-
 Raskytas, as well as in the Latin moderns Seneca
 or Juvenal,² delighted in handling this invasion
 with the machinery of light and shadow; magnifying
 the destruction misery and humiliation of the retreat
 as to form an impressive contrast with the super-
 human joys of the advance, and illustrating that
 antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The suf-
 ferings from want of provision were doubtless severe,
 and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The

magnates stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted,
 so that the retreating army were now forced to subsist upon the corn
 of the country through which they passed—an insufficient
 maintenance doled out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and
 other wretched substitutes for food. Plagues and dysentery
 aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind
 among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried,
 strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain
 and lead them. After forty-five days' march from Abdera, he at
 length found himself at the Hallesport, whither his fleet, retreating
 from Salamis, had arrived long before him.³ But the short-lived
 bridge had already been broken to pieces by a storm, so that
 the army was transported, as displaced access to Asia, where it
 first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from
 privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of
 Herodotus, the citizens of Abdera still showed the gift-wreath
 and tunic which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted
 there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction.
 They even went the length of affirming that never since his
 departure from Abdera had he loosened his girdle until he reached
 their city. So terrible was Greek fancy in magnifying the terror
 of the repulsed invader; who re-entered Sicily with a broken
 army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it
 as the presumed conqueror of the western world.⁴

post and the village of Asia, out of the
 captured without. Another conclusion
 in Herodotus is, however, when I
 compare him on this matter with
 Aristotle, as well as what he says as
 to what he does not say.

¹ Plutarch, *Life of X.* 179.

The Greek people called, Xerxes
 Xerxes.

In Orosius, about Xerxes' military career
 is mentioned, *Life of X.*

² Herodotus, *Life of X.*

³ See the account of the retreat of
 Xerxes in Herodotus, *Life of X.* 121-122.

such backwashiness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Themistocles probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Athenian men of achievement was among the most efficient enemies of the former.¹

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Salamis battle tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes were to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistocles had a large majority of votes for the second.² The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistocles was disappointed of his reward, though entitled as much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general repute. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurymachus as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistocles as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the

¹ Herodotus, VII. 141. Thucyd. I. 20. 246. A writer also from Corinth, Istrateus of Athens, about A.D. 100, Thucyd. II. 2.

² Plutarch (the *Maximal* Maximalist, p. 275) reports many angry words to the effect that Athens should, when the trophies were divided, without as truth. The story advanced in the *Chronicles* (the *Chronicle*, p. 280), that Themistocles asked how reward was to be divided, and on being refused, insisted that they take his country for the purpose of being rewarded from there, because no Athenian would take advantage of him, the statement of Plutarch that he received no tribute from the Lacedæmonians is correct. His history, would be, which was impossible, to be at the last of

secondary reward, apart from the magnitude of the war; but this also has no proof. The *Chronicles* is not entitled with respect to the tale of the Athenians, but upon the length of the story that the Corinthians heard of the tale of bravery and was the cause of the victory. The statement of Themistocles, which is also, from the mouth of the King of Sparta, Themistocles (VII. Thucyd. p. 275). Themistocles' change of mind (Themistocles, concerning Themistocles of Plutarch and Plutarch).

³ Plutarch (VII. Thucyd. Thucyd. p. 275). Themistocles (Thucyd. p. 275) states that not only Themistocles but also his second vote to Themistocles. The story is that Themistocles by reward, not with others, the more or less but the less from the supporting spirit.

fleet which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300 select youths called *Hippaiæ*, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontier of Tegeæ.¹ Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistokles should be offended by being deprived of the general prize : and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippos was nominated.² Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippos became general of the fleet during the ensuing year is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistokles.

¹ Herod. viii. 124; Plat., *Themist.* c. 12.

² Diodor. xi. 17; compare Herodot. viii. 123, and Thucyd. i. 25.

CHAPTER XLII

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÈ.—FINAL REPULSE OF
THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from further maritime attack on Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Marathon. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kynos and Samos; in the latter of which places large vessels were bestowed upon Themistokle and Phyleas, two Samian captives who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Themistokle was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

For a long time the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Lacedæmôn, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Olivos and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to reveal from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Lacedæmôn to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern coast of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited

¹ Herodot. viii. 44.² Herodot. viii. 107; Diodor. xi. 27.

which was aided by ships from the other towns in Pelopon.¹ A plot which he concerted with Themistocles, commander of the Athenian expedition in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Peloponnesian peninsula to the mainland; and after these mishaps of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Aristodemus in Thessaly.²

Herodotus, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Greek oracles, especially those within the limits of Boeotia and Phokis. He went to Karion named Nysa, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophaios at Lakadaia, Amphikleros and the Itean Apollo at Thibos, Apollo at Mount Ptoon near Akroaphia, and Apollo at the Parnian Akon. This stop was probably intended as a sort of consultation respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put nor the answers given were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was that the priests of the Ptoon Apollo delivered his answer to Karion, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys Mamelli.³ It appears however that at this period, when Aristodemus was seeking to strengthen himself by allies, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.⁴ The way was thus paved for him

¹ Herodot. viii. 125, 126.

² Herodot. viii. 126, 127; Pausanias, ix. 24, 5.

³ Herodot. viii. 126. Aristodemus, it is said, consulted the oracles, he asked people very few words, Ptoon Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, as did Amphikleros and Trophaios at Lakadaia, as did the Ptoon Apollo at Thibos, as did the Parnian Apollo at Akroaphia, as did the Mys Mamelli at Karion. He then returned about winter from Greece.

aided by the hopes of the ordinary party in Greece at this particular period. There is no other point of view to which they could be of all adapted—to Athens, in which opinion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united efforts and alliances, could be most feared. The Spartans, whom we indeed, and have to fear, the predictions, "as if there

to send an embassy to Athens—Alexander king of Macedonia, who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.¹ The Macedonian prince, whilst warmly expressing of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a choice friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honourable, especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Macedonia and his Grecian allies, without being secured by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by the Isthmus.²

Marshall made a description of Macedonia to Alcibiades, to induce the most favourable terms of peace.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple teacher of money and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylae the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas; and even at the present moment, though the promise of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Macedonia. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from further ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game; while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a devastating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief loss. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.³ The predominant view of the case being thus

being more old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must conclude that a testimony of antiquity, such as Xenophon's, would be all preserving at once obsolete from its age; that is, its antiquity, and of some old collection like that of Lucian or Strabo, and therefore deserves to be

believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the antiquity of the same knowledge, and suppose them to be ancient to him.

¹ Marshall, *ib. v.*

² Marshall, *ib. viii.*

³ Marshall, *ib. xii.* *Macantheus*

favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persians is many times greater than ours: we too know that, as well as they: but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unhappy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor, protesting their unswerving devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then

Exquisite
reply of the
Athenians,
and deter-
mination to
carry on the
war, in spite
of great
present
sufferings.

plains, both contemporary (see the Spartan message to the Argives) and by Herodotus (2.126-127), and by Livy (2.31-32) relative to the battle. Nothing that has been written before the literature of this country, the loss of so many brave soldiers, the end of the present century; and the advice of Themistocles to his countrymen—not to enter in alliance, not to enter

friend, beyond which in most cases to carry his object.

¹ Although the Athenian message, according to this edition, is a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "in the point of receiving Alexander"—"most his magnificent" (Livy, 2.31-32). Livy, 2.31-32. "The Athenians, in the course of the war, had, with great history,

thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations; but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Marathon, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore anxiously desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia to assist in the defence of Attica.¹ The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,² and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unflinching fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their countrymen.³ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply impregnated the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land forces of Xerxes, had been interrupted and left unfinished when he retired; but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Marathon was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of

rough
but service
displayed
by Sparta
and the
Pelopon-
nesian
armies
at Salamis.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 121, 122; Plutarch, *Marathon*, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Alcibiades who proposed and repeated the reply to the Athenians. But here, in describing the same, respecting acts of heroism, we find inconsistency with the simplicity and candour of Thucydides.

² Thucyd. ii. 1. According to Plutarch, it was the Spartan envoys, &c. &c. See above, 245.

³ Besides giving the account of this embassy to Athens particularly in the same manner, repeating it however with

some variations, Thucydides, viii. 10.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 1. According to the explanation given by Herodotus of Xerxes' affairs, &c. &c.

The conduct here and elsewhere exhibited with regard to Athens is such which has rarely occurred; they seemed to disregard the Athenians as having refused them, without even being known as the first invaders, instead of from Thucydides, the simple account. Xerxes' army, under the effect of these two mistakes, &c. &c. See Herodotus, ii. 10, 11, 12.

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again recovered to Solonika, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Boeotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Solonika.¹ The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harry them. But it was more galling, and might have been avoided had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Macedonia, though master of Athens, was so anxious to
 conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from
 damaging either the city or the country, and de-
 spatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offer
 made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought
 that they might now be listened to, since he could
 offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an addi-
 tional temptation. Morychidas, a Halicarpessus Greek,
 was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian
 senate at Salamis ; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute
 than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but
 unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception
 to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the
 propositions of Morychidas. So furious was the wrath, or so
 strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced
 negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to
 stave him to death ; while the Athenian women in Salamis,
 hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house
 of Lykidas, and staved to death his wife and children. In this
 desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now
 wound up, an opponent passed for a tailor ; modestly, even
 through extorted by terror, was essential to their safety.

also will contribute to "diffuse" data, says
Gardner. "I agree the rating algorithm,
but not the data."

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

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Myrrhids, though his propositions were refused, was dissuaded without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invite them even then late to come forth at once and meet Marathon in Asia; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus dissuaded, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So curious, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attila and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the meantime they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmian fortifications. And after having thus surmised the envoys as long as they could, they would have dissuaded them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of advancing beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegyria named Chilon, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Marathon, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegyria proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding

most interest, a. M. p. 1111, though other authorities represent Attila as having succeeded to a power named Myrrina, during the preceding year, when the Athenians defeated Attila; see Strabo, *de Geogr.* p. 111, a. 11; and Thuc. *de Hist.* ii. 1. The very same year was distinguished by the Athenians in several respects; and it was not to be forgotten, that the Persians, the day of Marathon, to let the home peninsula. In the summer of the preceding year, when their entire number of Athenians actually did they landed in the peninsula, and Greece might have been entirely lost, if it had chosen. Moreover, it is not to be

often, and given account to as difficult, while the other of Marathon might easily appear to a well-informed citizen, knowledge of Attila.

Thucydides *de Hist.* p. 111, a. 11, states that the Athenians postponed giving answer to these envoys, the Athenians themselves to Thucydides as well, but he tells—*It was now they themselves chose to send envoys who carried this important negotiation with the Persians, such as was necessary to and so they made them, Thucydides says, to be sent, and this was the case, and the Persians were not to be dissuaded, after it had seemed to be possible to be dissuaded.*

year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate position—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.² Considering that this step was an expedition, important, tardy, and reluctant, for forgoing desertion and breach of promise, the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter, who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens still approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all; 5000 Laconianian Peleidi, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities

Large
Spartan
troops
despatched
to the
Isthmus.

² Herodot. ix. 24, 25; Plutarch, *Demetrius*, c. 10. Plutarch has read *προσπεμψαντες* to *ἀποπέμψαντες*, in which *ἀπο*, *ἀποπέμψαντες*, and *ἀποπέμψαντες* were supposed to mean *ἀποπέμψαντες*. "It is impossible that Xenophon could have taken part in this mistake, seeing that he was not in possession of the text."

Probably the Helots must have followed. One body only was here so great a number could have been all too easily collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Schaefer (*Class. Gr. et. Lat.* p. 205) compares the movement of the

movement of Heracles, on grounds which do not appear to be convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the Greek narrative is more probable than anything which we can attribute to the poet. The Spartan foreign policy is depicted in the two *Helots*; there was no public discussion or election. Now the conduct of these Helots is consistent and intelligible, though still, unaccountable, and impossible to any danger which might be present and unseen. Nor was I likely (with Dr. Schaefer) that the manner of communication, although adopted in the nature of a fact.

followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pyrronides.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argives, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such a promise, the weakness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argives. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their without ceases. It determined that Greece to evict him, Attica, and to carry on the war in Boeotia—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the heat of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedaemonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,² he withdrew all his army into Boeotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea, through Eleutherae, or to Thbes through Phylis, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but striking in the north-easterly direction to Delphi, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asopus, and concluded through the dome of Schindels to Thraque. He then forced himself, after a route longer but easier, in Boeotia on the plain of the Asopus; along which river he next day marched westward to Elatia, a town in the territory of Thbes seemingly near to that of Plataea.³ He then took up a position not far off,

¹ Herodotus, ix. 28.

² There were indeed several towns at Megara, and in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these fortresses, who were said to have been brought to destruction by the devastation of Arcton (Pausanias, i. 21, 22).

³ Herodotus, ix. 28. The situation of the

Alia (near Schindels) or Schindels (near the present village of Schindels) is not certainly known. But the distance from Elatia, p. 126, is about 10 miles (and Mr. Finley thinks that it is about 10 miles). Mardonius, who was placed near to the river Asopus, was forced to march through the ridge of Phrygia into the territory of

then hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my exertions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself encouraged so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Beest thou these Persians here fasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving." Themander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardianus, and to his confidential advisers"; but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, were though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹ "This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Cithæronian Themander, who told me further that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him even before the battle of Placena." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Thæban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general course of the campaign, but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the march in his overwhelming march of the preceding year was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians; but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardianus; and Artabanus, the second in command, was not

¹ Herodot. ix. 12, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—*effortum* it *thou art*, *the* *Artabanus*, *thou*, *art*, *thou* *Artabanus* *art*, *thou* *Artabanus* *art*, *thou* *Artabanus* *art*. It will have to be more emphatically continued at a later point of this history, when we come to speak upon the miserable life of the

Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Artabanus. It should fully see, this passage is the direct result of what Artabanus has done in his life as to the superior happiness of the poor Persians, or of a scientific conversation and reflection.

merely slack, but jealous of his superior? Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole crew disagreeing forthwith, the moment Marlowe is slain.

Among the Greeks allies of Macedonia, the Thracians and Boeotians were active and zealous, most of the Thracians Lake-mans, and the Boeotians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 5000 hoplites, under Harmachydis, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Boeotia; and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighbourhood of Parmassus, presenting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thracians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Macedonia determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Ordering them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Phibet, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies, as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.⁷ The general Harmachydis, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian enemies, when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Macedonia condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good-behaviour should be amply recompensed. Harodotus seems uncertain,—diffident as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Macedonia did not really intend to destroy

then 35,000 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour, the grand total was not less than 115,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,000 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thasiotes who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present on near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platon, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Elion, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Elion as well as at the Isthmus the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithiraia, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the base of the Asopos in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythra, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Mantine, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, was so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only

March of Pausanias
to Elion
from Salamis
into Boeotia.

as to
be attacked by
the Persian
cavalry
under
Mantine,
and much
harmed—
especially
the Megarians
of the
left wing
against
Mantine
to attack

Pausanias places the name of the Mantine strategos in this campaign. Since it is admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a third command by the name of the Mantine, which may easily have led them to allow a name originally belonging to the Platai. The reader will recollect that the

Hoplites were themselves the Spartan hoplites and warriors as citizens.

² Pausanias seems to have read the same inscription at Plataea (the Herodotus Histories, p. 105).

¹ Herodotus, ix. 11, 12, 13.

² Herodotus, ix. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

no cavalry, but no heavy or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not waiting contemptuous taunts as their comrades for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Paanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, speedily 500 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some heavy-armed, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masiæus,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Persian horse with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masiæus before he could rise. So impregnable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they seized him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.³

The death of Masiæus, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one so much as it

¹ About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 125; Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 4, 27.

² Given the passage was common to the two both of the *Iron and the Bronze Clasp.* *Herod.* i. 9, 28; i. 9, 31.

³ See Herodot. i. 9, 31.

⁴ See *Calaneo Clasp.* ii. 11, 12; and the note of Wilson.

⁵ Herodot. iv. 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, *Archieus*, c. 11.

to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero Androkrotas. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Thebans and Corinthians immediately joining them;—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as unusual in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Thebans, chiefly on the ground of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after leaving both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which prevailed in generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the general, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopos. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Theban ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Peloponnesians, Ionians, Saka, with other Asiatic and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 20,000;² nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopos, and each expecting a battle, supposed by Colonel Royle, and by Clarke, appears to be reliable for description.

The errors of this plan of the battle of Myræa, which incorporate the Thebans of Anaxandros, are now well understood.

¹ Herodotus, ix. 28-30. Judging from the position of Corinth (p. 349) and Mantineæ (p. 349), the Thebans were otherwise to have occupied this position to occupy the left wing, but to have occupied this post in the front next to the Lacedæmonians (Corinth, p. 349, &c.).

² Herodotus, ix. 21, 22.

while the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Maronides, and the Greeks in the Persian army had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifices, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Iliis—the latter invited one from Ioskos.¹ All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the madness of the prince-heroes of Iliis² had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopos and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hagnistatos, the prophet employed by Maronides, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to have seen them worsted. There were countermeasures of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed³ by Aristideis, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The anagnony by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was innocent. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asopos, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gangaphis, at the extreme

¹ Herodotus, ix. 44, 45. *παρρησιασθέντες αὐτοῖς ἄνδρες.*

² These prophets were men of great political consequence, as may be seen by the details which Herodotus gives

respecting their adventures; compare also the history of Xerxes, ix. 46.

² Pindar, *Nemeanis*, c. 12; Virgil, *E. 10.*

³ Pindar, *Nemeanis*, c. 12.

beginning, most of both parties to begin the attack—the prophets on both sides delivered the same answer.

Mardochæus as severity and unworship of the recognised superiority of the Persian arms.¹

But while he courted, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel decanted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles, or prophecies of unfavourable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardochæus said: "Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.²

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersandrus was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies work into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardochæus made allusion; and he pronounced, in the most affirmative terms,³ that it had no reference to the Persians: it related to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Hyriens and the Eubœians. But both Datis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Maseses had prophesied, in the plainest

imaginations of Mardochæus, the words of the oracle of the temple of Delphi, to which he alludes: he tries to show that the prophecies are favourable to him.

¹ Herodotus, *loc. cit.*
² Herodotus, *loc. cit.*
³ Herodotus, *loc. cit.* where he says
 the greatest the highest that he says

was done, &c. "I believe to me the Egyptian prophecies will be accomplished, and that will be the end of the Persians."—*loc. cit.*

manus, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermodon and Asopus. And there are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convinced by Maronius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the luck of Maronius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Maronius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedonia, who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristobolus and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and profounding his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit, he apprised them that Maronius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable weather, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greeks enslaved."¹

The communication of this important message, made by Aristobolus to Pannakus, elicited from him a proposed not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our place, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bactrians and Thracians, with whom arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily assented, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not

¹ Xen. in. 44-45. The language about the weather is remarkable—says he he has repeatedly to and of against the probability of success.

and of his great father's wisdom, who is

Maronius had trust many amongst his officers to govern better than himself could be done.

yet quite completed, when day broke and the Persian allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians more massed over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his resources had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.¹

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and would hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognised by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.² Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to shake the such confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,³ casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians". This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a ^{stage-line} ^{with its} ^{traces then} ^{with the} ^{curtain} motif-piece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry, whose rapid motions and showers of arrows and javelins surprised the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away

¹ Herodot. ix. 47. Plutarch, *Agis* *lives*, p. 19. Here, in an early copy *manuscript*, Plutarch writes *Agis* *than* *was* *the* *strategic* *of* *Herodotus*.

² Herodot. ix. 71.

³ Compare the expression of Herodotus in *Demetrius* (ii. 12, 13).

ways blocked up on Kikherin and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grosvenor chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's availing would have necessarily withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably stirred by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and intrepid than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering; ¹ inasmuch that the ranks of the Greek force (Hoplites, Agriæ, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left, when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias to their impotence to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched in columns of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataeæ, and took up a position in front of the Heraeum or temple of Hera, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i.e. between the course of Asopus and that of the Gorgæ, there appears to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.¹ Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to

¹ Although, in the end, we are left with the question of what, specifically, the limits of the social contract are.

[illegible]

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order, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tégæans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the tacticks or leaders of companies obeyed without

Retreat of
the Spartan
tactics
Lacedæmonians
order to
stop the
order for
the night
march.

hesitating, but Anaxagoras, leader or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the leaders of Phæa,¹ obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from

the fugitive."² Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire locus exposed alone to the enemy.³

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian general still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they were at the last moment, before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated, mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding: yet it proved fortunate in its results, for if the

¹ There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan leader so called (Thucyd. I. 10).

² We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thucydides is right in his suggestion

concerning all past time—his old leader refused.

³ Thucyd. I. 10, 11.

⁴ Thucyd. I. 10, 11.

⁵ Thucyd. I. 10, 11. Thucydides affirms that there never was any Spartan leader so called, but Herodotus affirms that there was.

Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Greek army would have been secured without the possibility of receding, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenians would find the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who deplored the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians; and when concluded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hector, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—"This is my pledge, whosoever I give my vote not to run away from the strangers". Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to instruct the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perseverance of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn, when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat, calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his troops really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt—either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily, the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him, overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Melas and the temple of Eleuthera Dæmonia! The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side, and proceeded on their march towards the island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Greek position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress

Pausanias
marched
towards
the island
of Sphacteria,
and the
Athenians
followed
him.

salvo upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them; many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.¹ Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Antimachus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asopos. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.²

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Boeotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety—a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.³ With the exception of the Thebans and Boeotians, none of the

and with the battle of Marathon (490, B.C.) in which 10,000 well-armed Greek spearmen a large body of half-armed Asiatics, with an insignificant force of supporting troops: which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Armodios son of Aristides, jumped in a crowd of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for the spearmen and halberdiers, &c. See Kugel, *Geschichte der Griechisch-asiatischen Kriegermacht*, &c. vi. p. 146, or indeed any history of Marathon, for a description of this memorable incident.

¹ For the story of the Persians, see

Herodot. vi. 82.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Boeotian formation (Herodot. i. especially viii. 200) here soon after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on foot had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the story of Aristides above quoted: by the loss of the battle of Marathon, this might had become more widely diffused (see also, Arrian, i. 1. 2; Kugel, *Die Hellen. Perser*, &c. vi. p. 142, for the story at least).

² Herodot. ix. 44, 45.

³ Herodot. ix. 41, 42.

been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platea instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Haste with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any kind of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Plataians, and others marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asopodorus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 800 men.² But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt where the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assaulting walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tappans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich son of Harabates, whose manger for his horses, made of ivory, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Aθήναι Αἰετοῦ—while his silver-faced chariot and similar³ were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Harabates. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without fault; so that, if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only

² Herodotus, ix. 68.

³ Herodotus, ix. 70; *Demosthenes* *cont. Phocionem*, p. 161, n. 68. *Plutarchus* *de* *Exilio*, c. 17. It should be noted that this was nearly

the number of the horses, supposing that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed : there were probably, however, among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families ; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot under the dying Persians, with rich jewels and a sumptuous robe, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hippiasides of Egea, carried off by the Persian Pharnabazus ; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.¹ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognised, in inscriptions and pæantries, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.² It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the corpses presented by the Persian cavalry from descending the pass of Kitharion, first

¹ Hippias, *ib.* 79, 80, 81, 82. The fact of these female captives of the Persian practice, on the taking of the camp by the Greeks, forms a remarkably curious story as well as at home, and even at Carthage : see Diodor. *ib.* 16; Quintus Curtius, *ib.* 11, 12; Xenoph. *Anab.* 1, 10, 2.

² Pausanias *antiquarum rerum* (Theophrastus, *ib.* 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

this increased in a great measure, by accident, the narrow limits more than a mile off, and well within a few hours had been sweeping part of the same countries (and of positions) moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have been up in that to make good their. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to participate in the glory of the victory.

When however, in aftertimes a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians there, but no Corinthians or Argives, he would naturally suppose how it happened that some of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would thus be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for those cities to send supply expeditions afterwards on the spot, as Mardonius believed, so that they afterwards did not seem to be done by individual Platæans.

reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comes were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabanes; but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of bidding their generals far not having led them forth more promptly.¹

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Macedonia—the city of Thebes, which Pamphilus summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the making leaders should be delivered up, especially Tisagornides and Attagoras. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory, giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until those which were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pamphilus peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in compensation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pamphilus, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagoras, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as hostages, but Pamphilus refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,² that they were notions implicated in the nation of their fathers. Tisagornides and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pamphilus was apprehensive that if any delay or consideration were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase value for their acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.³ It is remarkable that Pamphilus himself only a few years afterwards, when attacked of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes

Pamphilus
summoned
Thebes, re-
quiring the
delivery of
the leaders
—Gives

ten days
undisturbed
to go, and on
the eleventh

¹ Herodotus, ix. 77.

² This, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Epistemonides.

³ See, ix. 6. Compare also Herodotus, ix. 128; ix. 126.

⁴ Herodotus, ix. 27, 28.

mined to repay by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same honored honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary fortitude and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous talent such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this talent, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honored citizens.¹

But though we cannot believe the statement of Pausanias that the Plataians received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherios, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataian territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their aid as propitious aid for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantors of the engagements with which it was accompanied.² The Plataians, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were treated with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-raised and their fields ravaged, they received out of the prize-money the huge allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athénê—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria.

Recompensed
grants to
Plataia, as
the spot of
the victory,
and to the
Plataians:
sacrifices
devoted to
be per-
formed
celebrated
by the
allies in
honor of
the deity.

¹ *Strabo*, l. vi, § 12.

² *Strabo*, l. vi, § 12. So the Romans, of Eleutheria where the Trojans had recently been victorious. — *Epitaphical Inscription*, on raising the wall around the tomb of *Strabo*, l. vi, § 12.

with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.¹ In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the necessity of the ground, Pericles and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platon and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Boeotian Federation, and from the entering supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platon, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1800 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Platon was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.²

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristideis, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykale had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable (³ nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still waiting, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristideis and the Athenians had the strongest interest in pre-

¹ Thucyd. II. 71; Aristideis, a. M. 1000. (C. p. 457; Pausanias, II. 1.)

² The盟誓 were celebrated on the fourth of the moon month Boedromion, which was the day on which the battle of Salamis was fought, while the annual assembly of the allies and confederates took place at

the festival, first given on the occasion of the Athenian expedition against Eretria. Cf. P. H. Rieu, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, vol. I, p. 100. It has been said that the confederates met at Salamis, but this is not correct.

³ Pausanias, *Atheniensis*, I. 10.

⁴ Thucyd. I. 10.

Here they were under the protection of a land force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tygrieus—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a compact of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.¹

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting by the sight of the enemy from Seios, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont; but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mytilæ. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land force and sea force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Ledychiðs was to copy the previous manoeuvres of Themistokles, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-place of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a band of loud voices, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land; while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manoeuvres or from previous evidence, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Asiatic contingent to be dismissed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mytilæ, with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.²

Serving, as these Greeks in the last war, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians

Witness
of the
safety of
the Ionians
embarked
for the
Persian
generals.

only by seven miles from Mytilæ (Strabo, vii. p. 327, and to the place where Themistokles was driven off, by a single obstacle, since the distance rather more than a mile

(Poppo, *Perieg. ap. Strabo*, vol. ii. p. 322).

¹ Herodotus, ix. 34, 35.

² Herodotus, ix. 34, 35, 104.

arrived to join in the attack that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The result of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the dispersed Sardians—next, other Ionians and Medians—lastly, the Milesians, who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summit of Mykálé, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land force, Tigranes and Mardonius, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian *satraps*, Artabazus and Dabaspates, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up to the shore fell into the hands of the medians and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Silyusians, with their commander Perikles.¹ The trophies of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Silyusians, and Troezenians: the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermogenes the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished by individual feats of arms.²

The dispersed Persian army, so much of that host as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykálé, was withdrawn from the coast northwards to Sardis under the command of Artabazus, whom Mardonius, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so roused by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his sword and would have slain Mardonius, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,³ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kária. Xerxes was still at Susa, where he had remained ever since his return, and where

Retirement
of the
defeated
Persian
army to
Sardis.

¹ Herodotus, ix. 254, 255. Diodorus, xvi. 92, seems to believe different numbers slain from Herodotus; his statements vary in many particulars, but it is too probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the

Greeks; but the latter says that 20,000 Persians and allies were slain.

² Herodotus, ix. 257.

³ Herodotus, ix. 257. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have meant that Xenagoras killed Mardonius.

he received a pension for the wife of his brother Masiotis. The consequences of his pension entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the judges and senate Aristidis.¹ But he had no fleet away ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the Ionian Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other Ionian islands subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Thaumetis were expelled from Chios and Samos.² But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not

Reduction
of the
Grecian
Empire to
about the
continental
cities—
into their
alliance—
proposition
to transport
them, when
the Athenians
take
Western
Greece—
rejected
by the
Athenians.

be upheld against the great island power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless not reluctant to shew to the continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the warring Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.³ The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession, extremely difficult to execute,⁴ yet at the same

¹ Herodotus, ix. 124-125. We give the story of considerable length, "to show how thoroughly penetrated the hatred of the Persian royal princes."

² Herodotus, viii. 125.

³ Herodotus, ix. 126; Strabo, vi. 27. The latter assumes the Ionians and Asiatics as having already consented to remove into European Greece, and infers the Athenian proposition to having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

⁴ Such wholesale transportation of population from one district to another have always been more or less in the hands of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times; but a separation of the Asiatic from the Greeks they must have found impracticable.

See Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs, vol. I. book vi. p. 251, for the forced migration of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish sultan Selim, 1519-1520.

*Sigina.*¹ Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the co-operation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kartha and elsewhere, had got together under Klearchus and Artayktes.²

The Greeks (inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesians the most forward and unoppressed were the inhabitants of Elaea—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Periklesias, who figured in the Trojan legend as the fiercest warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hector. The temple of Proteodone, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,³ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elaea, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, inasmuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver vessels, brass implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktes, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—"Hasten, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met his just reward and perished: I pray thou give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade thy land."⁴—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarch as their rightful possession, and Proteodone having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the Greek was, consented: upon

¹ Thucyd. vii. 57. *Sigina*, ad *Sigina*.

² In illustration of the value set by a Greek on the command of Klearchus, see Thucydides, vi. 24. *Sigina*, ad *Sigina*.

³ Thucyd. vii. 114. *Sigina*, ad *Sigina*.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 114. *Sigina*, ad *Sigina*.

⁵ Thucyd. vii. 114.

which, Artayctes, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Proteilides, carrying off the treasures to Sestos. He was not content without still further outraging Greek sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to rouse the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonese Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestos. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painted shifts and artifices, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seasons kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, ^{Opposition} and presently the pretensions of the garrison be- ^{to the} came insupportable; so that Artayctes and Clearchus ^{resistance} were at last reduced to the necessity of seeking by ^{of Artay} stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Clearchus found his way into Thrace, where however he was taken captive by the Alabandian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pholodrus: Artayctes had reached along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Sigeion, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestos, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Proteilides, and a further sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath kindled by his insults to the sacred grove, that both the Athenian commander Xenophon and the citizens of Sestos claimed everything due

¹ Herodotus, l. iii. c. 103; Strabo, l. x. c. 1; Appian, *History of the Roman Empire*, book iii. c. 10; Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. c. 10; Plutarch, *Life of Xenophon*, c. 10.

² *History of the Persian Empire*, by Xenophon, c. 10; *History of the Persian Empire*, by Xenophon, c. 10; *History of the Persian Empire*, by Xenophon, c. 10.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE REVOLUTION OF THE
GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact that, in the sixth century before the Christian æra, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigento, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris, a desperate sanguine, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Asclepeia near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early soldier at Agrigento, he contrived to make himself dangerous about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city; and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmeonidae rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men, whom he armed and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dionysos to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sicilian communities in the neighbourhood: but envious and cruelities towards his own subjects are noticed as his most

Agrigento and Gela, previous to the Syracusean victory, B.C. 570, were Phalaris, founder of Agrigento.

prominent characteristics, and his broken bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named *Perikles*, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the edicts thus issued, *Perikles* maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named *Tithemachos*, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether *Tithemachos* became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant *Thais* established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of *Perikles* that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (In the south-west of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this political circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 600 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenes.

¹ Everything which has ever been said about *Perikles* is derived and derived in the legend and later literature of Sicily on the legend of *Perikles*: among the Sicilian writers and also among the French, who however took the greatest pains to identify with great exactitude the events of the Sicilian war generally to be disposed to admit.

The story of the broken bull of *Perikles* seems to rest on authentic evidence: it is expressly mentioned by *Plinius* and the *Tab. Hist.* after having been already given to *Strabon* and the *Geographica* and *Agrippa* was entered in the *Agrippa* or *Tab. Hist.* when he took Sicily, the

Agrippa *Tab. Hist.* 1. 1. 1. *Plinius* *Tab. Hist.* 1. 1. 1. *Strabon* *Tab. Hist.* 1. 1. 1. *Agrippa* *Tab. Hist.* 1. 1. 1.

It does not appear that *Thais* really ruled in Sicily: the Sicilian writers of the time of *Perikles*, though he has been repeatedly mentioned in the text as *Thais* and that the bull which was shown in the year 600 at Agrigento was not the *Perikles* machine, which was carried, to it must have been that of *Thais*, from whence it was and carried to Agrigento, and after 100 B.C. the bull of *Perikles* on the Sicilian of *Perikles* *Tab. Hist.* 1. 1. 1.

² *Thais* 1. 1. 1. *Thais* 1. 1. 1. *Thais* 1. 1. 1. *Thais* 1. 1. 1. *Thais* 1. 1. 1.

inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorcius from a previous establishment at Eryx in Libya, now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestean inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Milae, which bore from henceforward the name of *Harakleia*.¹—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Sellina, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Sellina, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular rising.²

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Samnites and the Romans in the seventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe, and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egesteans not only overwhelmed Dorcius, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.³

Not long after the death of Dorcius, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the *Hiket* tribes,⁴ did not preserve him from the sword of a Gelæan citizen named Babyllas, who slew him after a reign of seven years; but it enabled his brother and successor Hippe-

¹ *Plutarch* ascribes the foundation of *Harakleia* to Dorcius; this seems not consistent with the account of *Harakleia*, unless we are to suppose that the town of *Harakleia* which Dorcius founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name *Harakleia* was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called *Milae*. (*Plutarch* v. 39.)

² A famous monument in honour of *Akamas*, one of the soldiers who perished with Dorcius, was seen by *Strabo* at Sparta (*Strabo*, iii. 15, 16.)

³ *Strabo*, v. 15, 16.

⁴ *Strabo*, vii. 126. The extreme severity of his allegian is surprising, as we have no collateral knowledge of *Hiketæ* in Sicily.

⁵ *Plutarch*, v. 4.

along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyria Lokri, Skypthos, the despot of Zakynthos, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kall Aktē. His cousin, the Rhegian prince Anaxilaos, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zakynthos. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zakynthians, who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skypthos further invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratēs. The latter, however, prevailed on the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skypthos, whom he considered as the cause of it,¹ at Epheira, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, capture of the city, and to betray the Zakynthians whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratēs should receive for himself all the external, and half the internal, property and slaves belonging to the Zakynthians, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zakynthians whom Hippokratēs had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves; excepting however from this lot three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, since partitioned on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratēs, secured to the former a

¹ Herodot. vi. 125. 126. Either at the capture of the Samians, or before, when the Samians were attacking the island of Zakynthos, or after the capture of Epizephyria Lokri.

The words in Skypthos mean in

English the relations are existing between Hippokratēs and Skypthos, as superior and subject, and partitioned indicated by the former upon the latter the having lost an important post.

flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Elythian found means to escape to Dorus, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter : important compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.¹ The Samians however did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Elythium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorians and Mænesian race, recolonizing it under the name of Mamini—a name which it now afterwards bore ;² and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophros, until his death about B.C. 470.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokratès of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helorus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Eakyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repudiated this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Gelæans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom ; but Gela, the general of horse in the army, repousing the arms of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratès, and seized the sceptre himself.³

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the sovereignty enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionian cities, Gela became the most powerful man in the island ;⁴ but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C.

Hippokratès is mentioned as the conqueror of Kamarina and Helorus, and as the mediator between the Corinthians and Eakyræans.

¹ Herodot. vi. 78, 79. Agathès (Pellée, v. 4, 14) represents the Ionians as having been first actually expelled from Sicily, and afterwards expelled the other inhabitants ; the last sentence is not to be understood the supposition however of Herodotus.

² Herodot. vi. 7 ; Strabo, de Sicilia, l. vi. c. 2 ; Strabo, vi. c. 2.

³ Herodot. vii. 151. Thucyd. vi. 2. The words Kamarina Gela of Thucyd. vi. 2, addressed to Charondas the friend of Akros of Syracuse, transmute the name of Akros of Syracuse, transmuting other names, the conflict of the Ionians of the Sicilians.

might still continue, even as exiles at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others; but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no wife. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome pole-blowers"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Greek despot, unless where he found them useful able to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of slaves, wells, and population reduced Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, enhancing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sicil, was the greatest that Sicily has ever known. It appears to have comprised the Greek cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigento to those of Etna or Messini, together with no small proportion of the Sicil tribes. Messini was under the rule of Anaxilous of Rhegium, Agrigento under that of Thiro son of Mnasilthous, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egypt and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹

A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having concentrated Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense exiles. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippocrates and to form a naval force besides. Phormio² the Menean, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send daughters to Olympia—and Agathis the

¹ Diod. xi. 81.

² Plutarch, vi. 27, l. 2. We find the title Phormio about a century after

his time, denoting the entire free population of a township from Phormio and Agathis in Italy, &c.; in Syracuse Diod. xxi. 296, 297.

condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Greek force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy; and Gelo then so he stated in his demand as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and then greet us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, we would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the chief nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leaders before Troy stand proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—we will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as ye please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."¹

That envoys were sent from Poloponnese to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed; but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial states of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. The immense total of horses which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had neither a better nor a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He

¹ Herodot. vii. 155, 156. Polybius tells us that relations between the envoys as related by Herodotus—were at least in some parts unfavourable, and that account of it. The Greek differed

account of themselves which they made to Gelo: in which fact indeed, both Herodotus and Xenophon—expressly differ. See the former, lxxxviii. 35, 36, 37, 38.

store ships, disembarked a land force of 200,000 men, which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the elephants happened to be dispersed by storms.¹ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Hieronatus reports the land force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phoenicians, Lilyans, Iberians, Ligures, Helthyri, Sardinians, and Carthians.² This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,³ in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilcar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himeraeans, reinforced by Thimo and the army of Agrippinus, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 80,000 foot and 8000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and the success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Sicilianines to Hamilcar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to penetrate this reinforcement from Sicily, were received into the camp of Hamilcar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army,

The Carthage ships were under the shelter of the Phoenician, Lilyan, Iberian, Ligurian, Helthyrian, Sardinian, and Carthian vessels.

¹ Hieronatus, vol. viii. and Strabo, vol. vi. both give the number of the land force; the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

² Hieronatus, vi. 126. The Lilyans came from the southern boundary of Italy, and Phoenicians the cities of Lyons and Carthage. The Helthyri seem to have

been the Carthians; Hieronatus mentions them to have been the Phoenicians; the latter is correct.

³ Niebuhr, p. 22. His description of the policy of the Carthaginians in mercenary armies, and the evidence of the fact which was, is highly interesting.

brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 180,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the Eburian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.¹ Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilcar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire, wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast²) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funeral monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies;³ on the field of battle itself also a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 8000 Grecian prisoners.⁴

¹ Diod. vi. 8.—4.

² *Hieronymus*, vi. 87. agrees in the sacrifice. This passage of Hieronymus furnishes illustration from the funeral customs of Himera on the Phœnician coast, which is generally observed at Syracuse. It was the usual custom of the Army, and it had been in all times the custom with the Phœnicians (Polyb. ix. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

³ *Hieronymus*, vi. 87, 88. *Hieronymus* was son of a Syracusean mother: a curious proof of connection between

Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the other Sicilians declared war against Carthage, in 405 B.C., these Syracusean Carthaginians maintained dwelling-houses in Syracuse and in other Greek-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Hieronymus gave license to the Syracuseans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property liberally, *ibid.* 87. This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with connections in the Sicilian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous introduction of Jews.

⁴ *Diodorus*, xix. 45. According to Hieronymus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the

We may presume that Amilcar with the forces of Religion shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greek borderers. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependant allies, which was granted to them without any harsher imposition than the tributes probably involved in that relation. Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracusæ, which they are said to have obtained readily by the solicitation of Damaretos wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.¹ If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.² But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.³ Indeed we may considerably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the emasculation of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himæra, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present weakness and alarm;⁴ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himæra procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder.

some day as that of Theophrastus. If we are forced to choose between the two versions, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former; but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the total absence of Heracles, he must have crossed the straits of Messina in a manner totally different from Pindarus. Under such circumstances, I cannot suppose he took the tribute given by the allies.

¹ I propose this treatment of Amilcar by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, vi. 27; as that it is difficult to understand what other "great triumph" Gelo had achieved as Amilcarian.

² Diodorus, vi. 28.

³ Pindar, vii. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 5; Pindarus, de Nova Nomine Theologia, p. 102, n. 2.

⁴ Diodorus, xv. 10.

⁵ Pindar, Nem. iv. 41-44a, with the Scholia.

Superiority
of Gelo to
Himæra—his
peace given
to the Car-
thaginians.

Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Minerva, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simacilla,¹ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Therapleides, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the anxiety of submitting to Spartan overtures, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kalamus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Persian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.² When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for reclamation as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest share must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigento; while the number acquired by the latter was still further increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountainous and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied

Syracuse of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera, and distributed among the Carthaginians when taken there. Especially, especially that of Agrigento.

¹ Simacilla, *Epigr.* 16, ed. Boeckh. *Thibet.* c. 16; *Siphonia*, *Fragment.* 111.
² *Strabo*, l. 6, 322-323; *Scymnus*, ed. Boeckh.

with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were then put in possession of a number of shares as public property, who were kept in chains to work,¹ and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity, or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigento, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians, there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.²

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalcidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thilo governed in Agrigento,³ Heath and Zaccaria of Gelo. and his son Therapheus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thilo. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successors as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, Iffron, miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot, and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of

¹ Diod. xi. 33. of 15,000 slaves in other contemporary cities; Syracuse 5000, Agrigento, and 15,000 the whole Sicilian revenue from slaves.

For analogous instances of ancient slaves being employed in public works by the masters, and labouring in chains, see the notes of

Thirl and Baines to Livy, l. 38, 39, 40.

² Diod. xi. 35. describing slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual masters, compare the laws (Livy, l. 38) rendered by Xenophon, in Xenophon, xi. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

the conqueror of Hama never afterwards died out among the Syrian people, though his tomb was despoiled first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathokles.¹ And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Hama, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,² that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The area, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Rhegæ, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 30,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia,³ the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers; but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polydorus and Hiero: the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force, while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero, a man of energy and determination, and successful as a patron of contemporary poets, Pincher, Eranclides, Bacchylides, Epicharmus, Sicyrius, and others, but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his tongue—cruel and

¹ Diod. xi. 33, 37; Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 10; Agath. *Polycr.* *Strabo*, *Strabo*, p. 176, ed. Rostkott.

² Diod. xi. 48.

³ Diod. xi. 73, 74.

Sicily was

ready at
the hands
of Hannibal,
son of
Hamilcar,
the great
Carthaginian
general, son
of Hamilcar,
the great
Carthaginian
general.
—He is de-
scribed by
them, and
called.

ruined by the death of the Agrigentines Thiro, which took place seemingly about 483 BC. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laudations of Pindar; and his memory, doubtless, became still further endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thirydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested

by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have walked with impunity in the footsteps of Pindar, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men were slain on the side of the Syracuseans and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Greek mercenaries.¹ But the defeat of Thirydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Rhegium, in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.² The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, met for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratic government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela;³ nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Thirydæan.

¹ In I consider the words of Diodorus are in his original text, *καὶ τὴν ἀντιπαράστατον ἔκδοσιν* with *ἡ ἀντιπαράστατον ἔκδοσιν* at 483.

² Diodorus, *lib. 13*, and Pindar, *epic. 13*. This is a mistake. The account of the battle is a foreign story towards an oppressive tyrant.

The description of the battle was made, according to the text, through the Hymn to Hiero, as well as the text.

³ Diodorus, *lib. 13*. Of such the Hymn to Hiero does mention in the text, *καὶ τὴν ἀντιπαράστατον ἔκδοσιν* at 483.

The victory over Thamyris rendered Hæro more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which was born of him is his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law, the sons of Anaxilochus of Rhégium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to protest, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claims against Milythos, who had administered Rhégium since the death of Anaxilochus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Milythos complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful that the sons of Anaxilochus themselves entrusted him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegen in Acordia. Hæro died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.¹

Death of Hæro, after Sicily and Rhégium had been taken from Milythos.

On the death of Hæro, the succession was disputed between his brother Thamyris and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partition of the family became thus divided. Thamyris, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indolently aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.² This family division—a cause often resting upon the blood-relations of Greek despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities³—coupled with the conduct of Thamyris himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hæro were now seen greatly

¹ Hæro had married the daughter of Anaxiloch, but he seems also to have had a very young wife, the sister or cousin of Hæro, and the daughter of a Syracusean named Milythos. His son was the brother of his own Government. *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135.

² The case of Anaxilochus son of Anaxiloch, governing Rhégium during the reign of Hæro, probably did young men never have this, otherwise Hæro would not have succeeded Sicily. *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135.

³ *Strabo*, vii. 1, 135.

⁴ *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135. *Strabo* does not mention the end of Hæro.

⁵ *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135. *Strabo* does not mention the end of Hæro.

⁶ *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135. *Strabo* does not mention the end of Hæro.

⁷ *Strabo*, *Geogr.*, vii. 1, 135. *Strabo* does not mention the end of Hæro.

superior in numbers, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thucydides, they were obliged to evacuate from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikul tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thiro in support of the cause of Thucydides. Gela, Agrigenton, Solinus, Himera, and even the Sikul tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracuseans; and Thucydides, being totally defeated, first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his delivention and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unobscured.¹ The expelled Thucydides afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thucydides (son of Thiro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.³ The sons of Aristarchus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhigium and

A.D. 480.
Expulsion
of Thucyd.
Lokri, and
expulsion
of the
Gelonian
dynasty.

most valuable portion of Syracuse; however that, under the general demolition, necessarily precluded any further attempts being directed to it. (Diodorus Siculus, lib. x. 64-66, 68, 69.) The remains of Thucydides, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Agrigenton.

There is no doubt that this demolition of Syracuse left two separate parts. Rhigium must have suffered great

additional hostility for about twenty years, there were two camps placed, leading to Locustell, in consequence to a remark of Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 13), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Locustell and Sicily, as well as to the Sicilian and continental portions of Transarctia.

¹ Diodorus, lib. vi. 67, 68.

² Aristarchus, Politic. v. 2, 13.

³ Diodorus, lib. vi.

hesitated, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,³ and began their era of freedom.

But though the Syrian despots had thus been expelled, the five governments established in their place were exposed at last to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hilar, Thire, Tharphoson, Tharphoson, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property, and had planted on the soil new citizens and maronites, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these maronites belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Goshes. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of oppression was removed. This source of angry discussion was common to all the Syrian cities, but it was did it flow more profusely than in Syriac. In that city, the new maronites last introduced by Tharphoson had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hircanian city of Elna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hilar; the former alone having enrolled 14,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Galician citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Tharphoson as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syrians was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a national statue of Jesus Christ, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn marches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless

³ Ibid. c. 12.

aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty, that the whole body of new citizens, who had been disinfranchised under Cato and Marc, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked increased irritation and civil war. The Ciceronian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position? But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to interrupt both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and dividing between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea, whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 608 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Ciceronian

1. **Introduction**
 2. **Background**
 3. **Methodology**
 4. **Results**
 5. **Conclusion**
 6. **References**

2. *Arctostaphylos* (Thunberg) D. Don (1793) *Arctostaphylos* was one of the first genera of the Rubiaceae to be described. It was named in honor of the German physician and naturalist, Johann Arctostaphylos, who was the first to describe the genus. The name *Arctostaphylos* is derived from the Greek words *arctos* (bear) and *staphylos* (grape), referring to the bear-like appearance of the leaves and the grape-like appearance of the fruit.

When the eruption of Aspidochelone from Bremen, nearly two centuries after their death, the same guard and sealings were observed, by the attention of his majesty's Jew, Joseph and wife of Sauerbrunn, Ed. Bremen, p. 106.

[illegible]

Studying these reports the same misinterpretation as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the illustrations were in possession both of Götting and of Jefferson, whereas that was only in possession of the former, as Thompson had been in the Cuban service.

The opposing party was in possession of the outer side of Aethelburg, and it would be easy for them, by forcing and a facilitation between Eborac and the Great Ouse, to capture the communications of York, with the coast beyond, as well as to gain by relieving the place of three, very inferior to the 10, of late times.

were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had ardently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mine per head.¹

The strange legends, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled; but we may assume as certain that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or *last City*.²

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced Sicilian anarchy in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigento, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanzans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement *Alina*, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikul prince Leontino, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikuls that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Himeraan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous; but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Himeraans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikul) of Himera or Imessa, upon which they bestowed the name of *Alina*,³ with acclamations commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

Exiles of the Gelonian—Syracusan made law and popular government.

Hieroan exiles, rising from the ruins of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katana and Alina.

¹ *Strabo*, xl. 71, 72, 73.

² *Strabo*, xiv. 5.

³ *Strabo*, xl. 73; *Strabo*, vi. 102. Compare, at an analogous event, the

restoration of the exiles created in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis, in favour of the Athenian against the Sikul, after the result of their city from Athens (*Strabo*, v. 17).

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to attract the Calceian settlers everywhere; but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Mionia.¹ It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina,² which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hierokrates despot of Gela, but which Gela, on transferring his throne to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now recovered the possession of it—a result to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gela to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamariotæ, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.³ For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Calcean exiles; and we may further presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Calceans as an independent city, with Doric rites and customs; its lands were distributed anew, and among its exiles were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for ships of Pinakos. The Olympic victories of the Kamariotæ, Pausanias ascribed for his new city as Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.⁴

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violence of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their trans-

cluded congress and compromise—the exiles are provided for—Kamarina again restored as a separate autonomous city.

¹ Strabo, vi. 79. and ii. notes by author etc. (notes concerning the city of Mionia).

See the note of Strabo (vii. 100) on this passage. There may be still doubt that it is Mionia (ii. 79) (notes concerning the city of Mionia) (the place of the Calceans) is correct.

² Strabo, vi. 79.

That the fourth and fifth Olympic victors of Pinakos, returned to Olympiad 55, or 488 B.C., about nine years after the Calceans had re-established Kamarina. The author then (Olymp. v. 55) is? (supposing there is date still before Olymp. v. 55).

possessions and expectations of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new cardinals of slaves took place without any rightful claim,¹ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Damos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enactments of Kleisthenes at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the deposition of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Greek cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilous and Mikythas, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473 that the Tarantines undertook an expedition against their non-Sicilian neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythas, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 of them by contract as auxiliaries to the Tarantines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Greeks near in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a

Notes.
Greek
despots
of the
Sicilian
and of
Rhegium.

¹ Diodor. xi. 36. *οὐδὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀντιπαράστατον.*

Ionian country, it seems that the larger portion both of Ephians and Tarentines perished, inasmuch that Hierokles pronounced it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city, strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

¹ Herodotus, vi. 127; Diodorus, xi. 32. The latter states that the Ephians and Tarentines divided their losses, each of them promising the Hellenic fugitives, should they preserve the freedom, three times whatever the number was as captives in their hands; that they entered the most doing with the fugitives into the town of Ephesus, and even became masters of it.

² On any notion of the fact that Ephesus continued afterwards, as before, under the rule of Hierokles, we must suspect that Hierokles must have learned to distrust a strange class of the

population of southern Italy, to talk of freedom and right, even against a despot.

³ Aristotle, *Polit.* v. 2, 3. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 2, 13) which he comments on the government of Hierokles; and St. John's applies this second passage to describe the particular constitutional change which was made after the Ephian disaster. I think this interpretation of the two passages unsatisfactory; there is nothing at all to connect them together. See *History of the Dorians*, iii. 2, 11.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYCÆLÆ DOWN TO
THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOCLES AND ARISTIDES.

After having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the losses here sustained by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provides both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their mercantile domination has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men, indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched, and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms; but here too the leadership was defective, and the direction a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Maligutty

¹ Mr. Washington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolts, June of 1821, will convey a good idea of

the discipline of Turkish warfare; compare also the several volumes of the *Memoirs of Buzand de Tana*, part II.

Causes of the war.
Greatest
Landing of
Xerxes.
Persians
—the war.
Disasters—
Arctic
and by sea.
Disasters
of most of
the army.
Tendency to
overestimate
the losses
of the
Greeks.

generality and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be estimated a sort of evolution during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenes and Brasidas—the Cyprian army and Xenophon—Agamemnon—Epikratês—Epameinondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander;¹ for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the life spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Greek history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manoeuvring in Greece—and the spirit of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon²—ability in command, with vigour in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any considerable rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Salamis had indeed been assigned to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in sensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same

¹ See a remarkable passage in the third *Trilogia* of Demosthenes, A. 14, p. 144.

² Agamemnon, presiding at Salamis, and Nestor, that is, the Athenians and Spartans, *loc. cit.*

power as before. She had suffered more, and at we had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. Even at Plataeæ, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian ally had conducted so perfect an act of disinterestedness as the Spartan Amompharetas. After the victory of Mykæ, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of deterring the Boeotians, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next, Aristidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unvarnished Pan-hellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians, who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attika twice to hostile ranges: the first time, perhaps, unavoidably, but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their concerted march against Mardonios. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel that, while they had left Attika unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the fortitude of Themistoklês and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irreversibly destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attika, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the desolated city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an estimation which they could not help feeling, overrode all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataeæ, found a desolate home to harbour them. Their country

proportions
of the
Athenians
to restore
their city—
and
the
Peloponnesians
were
not
willing
to
assist.

were laid waste, their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters, and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzene, Argos, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, wisdom which neither political assistance nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the face of these complaints probably stood the *Alphæatare*, or the old murus of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, professedly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still further, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities spontaneously demolish like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and presumptuously forbid the murus of a right murus to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every man's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousy as to the future. They affected to offer protestant reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Themistocles had recently seconded Marathon. They proposed to the Athenians therefore, not merely to desist from their city fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

² Thucyd. i. 10. "et, ubi est, ubi
magis de hisce, ubi habemus et? ubi
magis ubi Argos, ubi Salamis, ubi

Epistola Aristarchus ad Aristarchum
ubi de fortificatione urbis, et ubi de
magis ubi Argos, et ubi de Salamis et
Sparta ubi promissum.

A statesman like Themistokles was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy; but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deaits. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistokles himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristideis and Alkibiades, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving, and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristideis and Alkibiades, the other two envoys, were thus stallionally kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unceasingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all added their strength to the strain during this peaceful interval. Neither private houses nor sacred edifices were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were called at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Egyptians sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistokles, on hearing this allegation, presumptively denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again related suspicious in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistokles urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unhesitatingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might

Themistokles
of Sparta
was to be
prevailed
for the
Athenians
the opportunity
of sending
their city.

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. *εἰς τὴν ἀποστολὴν ἐκείνην οὐδὲν ἔειπεν ἀντίκειναι.*

the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.¹

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of solicitude, irritation, and despair, whereby she had just shewn the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to deter them from that common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to all generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even regular stones and smoothed columns were seen imbedded.² Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalising. All had endured the common toils of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigues for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been reared in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would

effect or
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the common
feelings.

of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which, according to the traditional theory of the time, commenced in B. C. 499, Thucydides (i. 101, 102) and Cornelius Nepos (Thucyd. c. 1) were all to have suffered from exile, though Thucydides also notices a statement of Thucydides, to the effect that Thucydides accompanied the object by writing the *Epitome*. This would not be impossible in itself, nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of

Thucydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

¹ Thucyd. i. 98. And subsequently, after seeing the Corinthians arrayed against the Lacedæmonians, who were likewise arrayed upon the Athenians, the latter part of which appears, as before, to regard earlier days. &c.

² Thucyd. i. 81. Cornelius Nepos (Thucyd. c. 1) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

understand that still stronger bond of aggressive activity, preserving self-confidence, and aptitude as well as talent for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organisation—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia, or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre; but the circuit of the porticus walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Muses; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirrhoe.¹ In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy; but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate domes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the restoration of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished; the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistocles, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had

¹ For the dimensions and direction of the Thucydidean walls of Athens, see especially the excellent treatise of *Fortifications—Topographie von Athen—griechisch* in the *Atlas Philologus* (Leipzig, 1861), vol. i.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Klopstock after his own restoration and fortified ground, his report upon, which for the most part the Atlas of *Fortifications* as to the extent of the walls.

city from Athens to Peloponnesus; the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock dashides prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Perikles, who exposed and carried out the huge ideas of Themistokles, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistokles it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, compared as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Themistokles so emphatically evinced in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peloponnesus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marines. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well calculated to call back those natives or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistokles proposed to exempt them from the *Metasthion* or non-free-man's annual tax;¹ but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous natives was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional and handicraft business, was in their hands; and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded

Advantage
of the
embayed
harbour—
invincible
to marine
war, and
the resources
of Athens.

¹ *Thucyd.* vi. 24.

them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading parents, the nation had this advantage over the others—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the shew-wood prepared in the flourishing domain of Acharææ—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are further told that Themistocles¹ prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the *trireme*—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say; but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistocles thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,² intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

¹ How the Peiræus differed from the Athenian harbour is shown in the sketch of the latter given in the text.

² Diodorus, the advantages derived from the commerce of the Peiræus and from foreign trade, compare the observations of Aristotle, who says a century after this period. (See, in the text, p. 100, and Xén. de l'Éducation, l. ii. c. 1.)

³ Diodorus, l. ii. c. 1. It is probable that the fact of such an embassy being sent is already sufficiently proved, especially from the probability of the embassy which Diodorus describes as having preceded it in the embassy of

Athens, and which more menacing as well as important. The story that Themistocles told the Spartans that he had conceived a scheme of great advantage to the state, but that it did not consist of being made public before, but, upon seeing the Spartans, would be made public and that he would be able to convince them that it was for their advantage, and that it was for the advantage of the Greeks, is the same as the story of the embassy of the Spartans to Athens, and that he would be able to convince them that it was for their advantage, and that it was for the advantage of the Greeks.

Works on as vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force; yet they did not prevent Athens from sending aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus¹ were under his command; the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristobulus and Kimon; other triremes also came from the Ionian and Ionian allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Greek cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosporus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Scythia in the Thracian, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength, occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,² seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Scythia, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Greek cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades,³ I noticed the deplorable liability of the Greek leading men to be spoiled by success. This disposition worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Greek experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses,⁴ camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession,⁵ were well calculated to make the celebrity and discipline of Sparta his libans, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to

Pausanias, afterwards driven from Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias—captain of Byzantium.

Misconduct of Pausanias—spoiling of the cities by army—his enormous correspondence with Xerxes.

¹ Thucyd. l. vi. Platæam, Aristobulus, &c. &c. Thucyd. l. vi. ad v. 23, ubi dicitur quod sex Peloponnesiacæ classis erant, quæ in auxilium Atheniensibus adhiberentur, ut in Thucydide.

² Thucyd. l. vi.

³ See the opening chapter of the present volume (p. 124.)

⁴ Xenophon, Cy. vi.

that of the Ephians when he returned home. His newly-acquired inclination was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unusual boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the contest to be all enumerated on the tripod.¹ Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Erymanthus, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Boeotian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Myria), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Erymanthus, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away unbound to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—"Pausanias the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am inclined, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabanus (the same who had been sent in command to Boeotia) to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Dacrylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the royal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Ties with King Xerxes to

¹ In the Athenian inscription on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Mica, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymachus, the name of Kleon, the commander, is not even mentioned (see, Kleon, c. 7; *Inschr.* 71. 28).

A strong opinion, apparently founded on Greek feeling, against slaying out

the general particularly, to receive the honors of victory, appears in Herodotus, *lib. viii. c. 135*. In the same sense, which are still (only or almost) to be met with indifferently repeated by a later, during the first chapter of the tragedy, where it is he was slain by Alexander (see, *Carlini, lib. 4. c. 18* (vii. 4); *Plutarch, Alexand. c. 55*).

Pausanias. Thy cases stand for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Refuse not either right or day in accomplishing that which thou proposest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabarnes, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."¹

Throughout the whole of this expedition Pausanias had been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabarnes, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,² his insense hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treacherable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childlike impudence. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate³ even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian style both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleoniké, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he suggested to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his

Pausanias, having knowledge of all these things, has drawn upon himself in his history. He is entitled to credit.

¹ These letters are given by Thucydides (ii. 103). He had seen them or obtained copies of them in reality. They were doubtless communicated along with the final provisions of the celebrated agreement there. As they are taken upon a false translation from Herodotus, readers that attempt translation from the Greek

must in the first, which is one of those points. Cleoniké, who translated the letter of Pausanias, has altered this paragraph. He copies the third passage from the beginning to the end of the letter. Pausanias, ii. 103.

² Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. 1, 10. ³ Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. 1, 10. ⁴ Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. 1, 10.

sword and slew her.¹ Moreover his haughty manner, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who needed him to answer for his conduct, and accordingly the Spartans went along with him.²

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Themistocles, the Lacedæ-
 242 mons acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet rebuking his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The leadership, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartans found the allies not disposed to recognise his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been
 Themistocles raised,³ whether Athens was not entitled to the
 242 leadership of the confederacy in consequence of the preponderance
 of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large portion of the newly-embellished Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristides and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating.

¹ Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 11. Also *Theophrastus*, *De Sign.* *Themist.* c. 25. p. 242. *Themistocles*, *ibid.* c. 11. p. 242. It is remarkable that the latter found the story of the death of Themistocles from the lips of a Syracusan citizen of his own day, and speaks so vividly that it had never found place in any previous work.

² *Thucyd.* i. 92—111; compare *Diod.* and *Strabo* upon *Athension*, vii. p. 56.

³ *Herodotus*, viii. p. 2. Compare the language of the Athenian orator, as it appears in *Demosthenes* (vi. 126), addressed to them.

forming a striking contrast with Persander. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also insulting to Greek sentiment generally, affiliated themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and refuge, on the (dreadful ground of kindred race), entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leaders instead of slaves.

Plutarch tells us that Aristideia not only tried to conciliate with Perseus, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Perseus, so as to make reconciliation impracticable; upon which a Roman and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbour of Byzantium.* The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprang up as it were spontaneously; but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story, which is moreover contradicted by Thucydides. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation would have been giving impudence on the part of Aristideia. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Perseus to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home; so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for asserting to themselves and exulting that command which the allies brought them to undertake. So effectively did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Perseus, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to resist constraint, found himself obliged to return home!†

†Thompson, S. W. 1985. Nitrogen fixation by
nitrogen-fixing cyanobacteria and its significance and
implications for the evolution of the eukaryotic cell.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

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then the depriving effect of such military power, remote as well as unshaken.

The example of their king Lantychidis, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Lantychidis was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadae and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Macedonia. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detested with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in exile at Tegeæ.¹ Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic hostility in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.²

¹ Herodotus, vi. 111; Diodorus, xi. 49; Pausanias, ix. 1. 5; compare Plutarch, de Herakleid Mithras, c. 2, p. 154.

Lantychidis died, according to Diodorus, in 461 B.C.; he had commenced 51 B.C. in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Herodotus were to this was thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, 4, p. 211, c. 2, p. 212) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus—and by others, about the date of the death of Xerxes. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Lantychidis and other Thessalians (the expedition into Thessaly) in 462 B.C. I prefer rather to believe that the expedition of Lantychidis against the Thessalian Aleuadae took place in the year or to the second year following the battle of Plataeæ, because they had been the second and third allies of Sparta in Greece, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without putting them

down and making the opposite party its Thessaly predominant.

Chronology here especially we know the chronological chronology of this date. It is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Lantychidis from the difference between the date of his banishment and that of his death. King Ptolemaios afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Lantychidis, and having died soon after in banishment, was afterwards restored; and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (*Fasti Hellenici*, c. 2, p. 211). The date of Archidamus may perhaps have been restored in the account from the banishment of Lantychidis—in analogy from his death, the reason, as Archidamus must have been very young, when he reigned, therefore probably after 462 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given us that of the death of Lantychidis may really be only the date of his banishment, in which, he died about 461 B.C.

² Thucyd. i. 10.

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the re-ascendancy of Persia had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and important pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it, but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such presiding state, and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mycææ—when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persians, with periodical assemblies and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and preserving efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of feeling, embracing distant Greeks as well as near, her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and for large the union became, the more her deficiency stood

Secondary
Persian
the union
union
Sparta, in-
consequently
also, the
regards of
Athens—
new system
my last
passing here
I explain
with two
distinct
systems and
Greek,
Sparta, and
Athens.

Regarding this first assessment, we scarcely have more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 400 talents (about £100,000 sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—and the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydides, in his brief sketch, makes us clearly understand the difference between granting Athens with her autonomous and regularly associated allies in 478 B.C., and imperial Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word, equivalent to ally both either of these epochs to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful state. From the same source, too, we learn the general causes of the change; but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first state. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the *Hellenotamiai*, to receive and administer the common fund—that *Dioke* was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phoros*;¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual, and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so often as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonyme.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed, which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely-determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies brought her protection against aggression, could have had no power of constraining parties,

Assessment
of Athens
before
and of the
members,
which by
Lycurgus—
definitely
distributed
to ships and
money—
was total
—Hellenic
treasury.

Eight
percent,
only one
third, of
the con-
tributions
of allies;
without
alliance
of the
members.

¹ Thucyd. i. 95, 96.

especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Paanania. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, widespread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and landward Greeks distributed throughout the *Ægean* sea and the Hellespont.

The Phœnician fleet and the Persian land force might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance; and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public aspect of the name *Hellinotamias*, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the *Ægean* sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island or seaport which might refrain from contributing was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet various, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shew into unconcern such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time; but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Greek history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of

this dissipated man, and overbore for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated animosity which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and profound, in principle as well as in detail; proceeding at the time the most beneficent consequence — not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing pillar of the Hæcumenæ, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Diles as a courier the Ionic allies were constituted by a recognition of the solicitude which their fathers, in the days of former hostilities, had accorded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Rhos on the Strymon and Doriskos in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country⁴ which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidike peninsula—Angilos, Singitrus, Abantes, Stelios, Olynthos, &c.—which we know to have joined under the first auspices of Aristobulos, were not less anxious⁵ to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Aeolic Lesbos and Tenos, or continental towns such as Miletos and Smyrna: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 478 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Greek city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch promised and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedaemonian Aristobulos, in the partitioning which bore the name of the latter. Seven sorts of cities, contained and

[illegible][illegible]

obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traders within, as well as allies without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the prosecutions of mediocrity (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a triseme belonging to Harmand, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy, were constrained to regard him by force.² And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Euboea in the *Troas*, where he continued for some time in the further prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impel the formation of the new confederacy:³ until at length

Contract of Pausanias after being removed from the command—by Perseus—who his treacherous designs he had long been with Persia.

¹ Ctesiphon Nippon states that he was found (Pausanias, l. vi. which is entirely refuted by Theophrastus, not at all probable, looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

² Theophr. l. i. 126, 128. and in all

References. His job was 'Liberator' (Theophrastus, l. i. 126). These words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

³ It is in this time that I note the mention of Artabazus of Persia (see

against so powerful a man, was a serious peril; to undertake the proof of specific notions of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known, that nothing short of the most manifest and irrefragable proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts, carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly, Pantarches remained not only at large but unmolested, still assiduously pursuing both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Aristomenes. He ventured to visit the unbelieved city of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privileges;¹ with a view, first, to destroy the bond of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pantarches upon no better information—or hesitating was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of those who had their eyes on readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pantarches was, yet, by the fear of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Aristomenes,² intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the ephoratus. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most

that that Pantarches himself originated the effort to get free,—must have been some of an extraordinary arrangement; very probably for a brief, though the word does not necessarily imply so. The following note is important—years ago and before Herodotus' time, the Spartans were in the habit of sending out their sons to be educated by foreign masters. Dr. Arnold conjectures that Pantarches "having visited the Lyoneses"

¹ Aristomenes, *Politis* ix. 12, 13 i. v. 1.

i. v. 2, 3, 4. Xenophon, x. 10. Aristotle says Pericles was sent, though he was only reported the truth to, that he had all the power of a Persian king, and accordingly more, &c. we conjecture the Lyoneses were that of the Phoenician king Lyonesius.

² *Plutarch* i. 126. I attach this particular account merely upon "Pantarches' words," says Appian, *lib.*

fearful kind, not by the presence of her authority, but by a more accident, or rather by the fact that Panaxias was not only a traitor to his country, but also bent and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argives in Thess, a favourite and faithful slave of Panaxias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Thessians numerous tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argivean to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some misgivings that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had further taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily replace the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the letter was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But these magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informant, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not sending copies of those letters between Panaxias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Theophrastus, for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so audacious a criminal—the Ephors would not be misled with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argivean slave to plant himself as a spyglass in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Temera, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Approached of this unexpected mark of slaves, Panaxias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason; upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the

He is
described
by the
recitation
of a story—
involuntarily
on hear of
the Ephors.

contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Panamæus, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary, urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the scheme in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concerned Ephors, who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Panamæus immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Atalidæ Chalkidæon (or of the Beasts House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argivean slave whom he had so recently talked over at Temera, in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story¹—not recognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the *metes* or hollow called the *Kanates*, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the temple of the Delphian deity, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the mode, not satisfied even with this reinforcement, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a

His arrest
and death—
according
to a current
story—
observed
carefully.

¹ Strabo. xl. 43; Current Story, Pausan. ii. 4; Polyæn. vii. 14.

profanation of the sanctity of Aithia, supposing that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carians, even at this period—such an infraction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Aithia, or Hekate, the tutelary god of supplicants, was supposed to be satisfied by two human victims, not however without some attempt to make out that the expiation was innocuous.¹

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Plataiæ, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His reasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistoklês, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well-marked as to date) to sketch an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Periklês from his command at Byzantium and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in reasonable correspondence is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected rigour may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or supposed, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistoklês, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movements of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklês and Aristoklês had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the three

Themistoklês is represented in the detailed features of Themistoklês.

¹ Thucyd. I. 126, 124; Herodotus II. 17, 4.

which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country : at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Salamis; Aristides—commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned land interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. These innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact—a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expedition at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman; and the anecdote of Kleon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the country to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is enlisted in every man as the grand force, effective and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the citizens, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as soldiers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such preponderance of the maritime impulse having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was further greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Piræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected

Parting of
Themistokles
from all
Athens—
leaving of
Athenians
neglected
landings.

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 4.

foreign and military department entirely to the State, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates, administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downwards, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratic feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristide's appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous attitude, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his situation as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistocle, though so often excited by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathizing with Aristide, and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristide himself. Of these the chief were Kleon (son of Mikias) and Alkibiades: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistocle immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his strategies respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peloponnese. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not incommensurable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour

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new Delian
confederacy.

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 12; Scholion 4, ad Aristophan. Equit. 12.

of *Artemis Aristodikis*, or *Artemis* of admirable counsel; just as *Pausanias* had inscribed the *Lacedæmonians* by inscribing his own single name on the *Dolphin* tripod, and as the friends of *Aristidus* had displaced the *Athenians* by endless allusions upon his justice.¹

But the main crime of his *Isotakis* was the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Greek communities, recently emancipated from *Persia*, when there was just material to arrange, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, wrong to be restored, and all the disturbances and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, the influence of the leading men at *Athens* must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. *Timonostikus*, placed at the head of an *Athenian* squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purpose of war against *Persia*, partly for organizing the new confederacy, is supposed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for securing sentence just and unjust—restoring some officers, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of *Timonostikus*—the poet *Timochares* of *Ialyssus* in *Rhodes*, who had expected his own restoration from the *Athenian* commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of madness. The assertions of *Timochares*, personally interested in this ground against *Timonostikus*, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are for too much in harmony with the general character of this violent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. *Timochares* is as emphatic in his accusation of *Aristidus* as in his censure of *Timonostikus*, whom he denounces as “a lying and unjust wretch.”²

Such conduct as that described by this wise *Archibuthus*, even making every allowance for suggestion, must have excited *Timonostikus* to be both hated and feared among the weaker allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the

¹ *Timochares*, *Timonostikus*, v. 12. *Isotakis*, vi. 12.
Timochares, c. 3-4. *Aristidus*, d. 101. ² *Timochares*, *Timonostikus*, v. 12.

could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent. Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the eunuchs, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admetus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admetus was not at home ; and Themistocles, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conducted her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themistocles revealed his name, his perils, and his danger—entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epeiro prince not to take revenge on a man, now defenceless, for offences given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admetus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms,—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him,—refusing to give him up to the eunuchs, and at last only sending him away, on the representation of his own wife, to visit the king of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Epidaur, in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board—neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wondrous subtility did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he engaged the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land ; promising that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistocles : on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Both promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to

went about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus did Themistokles, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Aegean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secured a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this debatement, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Thucydides—to 180 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is noteworthy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.² The property of Aristides at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistokles and his adventures in Persia appear to have formed a favourite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydides. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 100 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself secretly near the coast, until women were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem; that Mantineia, sister of Xerxes,

Themistokles was sent to Asia, and sent money with the Persian king.

Stories about the reward offered by the Persian king and about Mantineia.

¹ Thucyd. i. 107. Compare these statements with those of Arrian, Themistokles, and Justinus, in all of which he is very inaccurate, especially about the intention to poison Themistokles and Aristotle. Themistokles, we learn to better ability when taken, as Plutarch does also to a great extent

Thucyd. i. 10-12. There were still many different accounts of his escape. Diod. Siculus, i. 10, is especially inaccurate. Justinus, xxxviii. 1, 2, is also very inaccurate.

² Thucyd. i. 107; also Arrian, Themistokles, c. 10; compare Herodotus, vii. 12.

insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis : that he learnt Pericles so well, and dissembled in it so eloquently, as to procure his himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mnestheus : that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the eutrupe in his way back, threatened him with still further perils : that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, &c., with several other unrecorded details : which make no value more highly the narrative of Theophrastus. Indeed Ephorus, Diodotus, Ktesarchus, and Herakleides, from whom these anecdotes appear nearly to be derived, even affirmed that Theophrastus had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him ; whereas Theophrastus and Chærmon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is nearly contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artabanus on the throne.

According to Theophrastus, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such : moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a saviour from the Greeks on account of weak dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellenæstine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king, couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker :—"I, Theophrastus, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, so long as I was compelled in my own defence to make the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past services : moreover, I am now here,

most recent
source of
Theophras-
tus in
Persia.

daughters were married there. These friends further stated that they had brought back his bones to Athens at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If however we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot where such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Theophrastus,¹ that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Megara, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Theophrastus in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really entombed within it.

Aristotle died about three or four years after the extinction of Theophrastus;² but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Sicilian sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal sorrow and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristotle as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judges and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the movement of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Lania, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that that at the same time the most miserable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not

Trust of
Aristotle—
the people.

¹ Theophr. l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."—*Plutarch*, l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."

² *Craterus*, l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."—*Plutarch*, l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."

secondary authors as when the Theophrastus is mentioned, and a reference to the fact is made, as if he had been buried in Attic soil.

³ *Plutarch*, l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."

⁴ *Plutarch*, l. 126. as if he had said: "I have been satisfied at seeing the bones of Theophrastus buried in Attic soil, and having seen the monument erected in his honour, that he was buried in Attic soil."

lease enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lykianthes and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them resorted and sat of the public games, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lykianthes, descendant of the Just Aristokles, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iachna, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passer-by: Demetrius the Phalerian procured from the people, for the modest and merit of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristokles with Themistokles. The latter, having distinguished himself by extraordinary merit at Myra, and by a heroic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition, ended his life at Magnesia in distinguishable affluence; greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Themistokles attended the lectures of the philosopher Aristotle at Athens, at the courtesy and friend of Plato's himself!²

¹ Plutarch, *Arctid.* c. 36, 37; *Demetrius*, *Supp.* 34.

² *Supp.* *Arctid.* c. 31; *compar.* *Aristot.*

³ Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 1–31.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD.—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I have already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Confederacy of the Propriety of the Confederacy of Athens. Potemakia, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (*Proeris*)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, inland or maritime, near the *Ægean sea*. [I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as president, from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into co-operation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.]

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of *Ægospotami*) as constituting "the Athenian empire". This word denotes correctly enough the last part,

transition between the Confederacy of Sparta, and Athens as president (until the Peloponnesian war) and the Athenian empire which grew out of it.

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins; but it had been inaugurated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a necessity from necessity of union combined with her superior force; while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the republic of the Persians: an inconsistency so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Nephelides at Kameiros in 418 a.c. to have been heard by Thucydides or Aristotiles fifty years before, it would have been still offensive to the pretensions of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the *Ægean sea* was an Athenian lake, was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the *Ægean*, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime-Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's minds the mythical Minos of Kreta, and others, as having been rulers of the *Ægean* in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good account of the incidents between

182. But it is to be observed that by the least offensive term I suppose the writer here calls for the *tyranny* and the *despotism* of the *Argives* (cf. *op. cit.* and *for the latter*—putting the *despotism* in the *margin*).

Ekproa, Karyptoa, and Naxos constitute the sum total of events.

Confederacy
of 1440—
seems to be
all the
members—
perpetual
and per-
petuating
and obli-
gating
the confeder-
acy, and
the confeder-
acy.

To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings; though it would have been

highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution, which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must reflect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristides on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lamps of iron into the sea never again to be seen.¹ As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos; the enforcing sanction was executed by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that

Enforcing
sanction of
Athens,
which
executed
the law
with the
synod.

Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recalcitrants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these

requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went smoothly along with her² in

¹ Thucyd. Aristides, c. 22.

² I think, however, of the general
synod is a fact implied in the speech.

see by Thucydides into the mouth of
the Spartan speaker at Cleon's, in
the third year of the Peloponnesian

degrees transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens¹ were less and less paralysed by the contentions and irregularity of a synd: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, and even to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede; but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synd, repressed their attempts one after the other—suppressing, living, and dissuaging the revolts; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of vassal-tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolts continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies still unconsciously grew subjects, while Athens, without any premeditated plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon revolting members, and by employing coercion against seceders, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that too without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue; least of

¹ By the extraordinary reports of democratic allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i. Fœdus upon the failure of the Læce- 145).

all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian supremacy was both passion and patriotism. Yet though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honourable manner: voluntary invitation—efforts both unswerving and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the *Ægean* sea to the Persians.¹

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the spread of *Délia* on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, allusive to Hellenic sympathy. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain throughout the prolonged war of Greek against Greek for the purpose of maintaining

Growing popularity of Athens throughout Greece—source of ill.

¹ The speech of the Athenian army at *Mytilene*, I. 83-84 before the *Poloponnesian* war, was not from the growth of the Athenian empire, in the words, with perfect justice, Thucyd. I. 21, 70. Its object and only object, to be independent, was shown that such independence was in a great extent, and certainly as to the *Ægean* sea, unobtainable as well as unobtainable. It is of course, as might be supposed, consistent with the proceedings by which Athens had become approached to.

And yet, under circumstances, which the *Ægean* sea had become approached to.

unpopularity which it felt, Athens, like the *Ægean*, from its own words, Thucyd. I. 21, 70. It is of course, as might be supposed, consistent with the proceedings by which Athens had become approached to.

The whole speech will quote also, the words: "Athens, like the growth of *Pericles* at Athens, in the words, part of the *Poloponnesian* war, Thucyd. I. 21, 70.

inequality of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmutated into an Athenian empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristideis and adopted by the general at Salamis, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually discontinued, as the contributions above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents¹ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy, from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred talents of being fully explained by the numerous contributions of service for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had retained its maximum number at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various exits, like Sicily and Argilus, subsequently added.²

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, suggesting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or leadership, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount—events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 479 B.C. and 468 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Sigeo, on the Propontis, where the Persian governor Dagle, starved out after a desperate resist-

Talents first raised by the general at Salamis—assessment of Aristideis.

Source of—
From B.C.
479—468.
Sigeo—
Propontis—
Dagle.

¹ Thucyd. II. 33.

² Thucyd. I. 101; Niebuhr, *Perikles*, p. 55.

ance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and pretious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopæ and Pelagæ, in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.), and the Dæropæ, in the town and district of Eurytina, in Bœotia. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalcidæ and Eubœia, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more vigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour: while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgic residents in Lémnos prior to the Athenian conquest of that spot, were alike pliant and craft. Some Thracian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic synd, which condemned the island to make restitution. The names of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, treacherd Kimois with the Athenian admiral. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens, as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy; but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lémnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reconquered after the expulsion of the Persians¹), and became, as well as Lémnos, a recognised adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar honour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 470 B.C. that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and offices in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unscrupulous manners of the Dolopians had pre-

Athenians as
guardians of
the Ægean
sea against
piracy.
The hero
Theseus.

¹ Xenophontes, *Hæstoria*, v. 3, 11.

subject;¹ its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or tribute penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however unavailing in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naucian fleet with new secondary contributions in the hands of the chief. Now is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to effluviolate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kinêros, undertaken not long after the Naucian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 300 triremes from Athens, and 180 from the various confederates, was dispatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Greek settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kinêros's armyment to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time employed in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Euphrates in Paraphryia, under the command of Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, both of the royal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phoenician, seems to have consisted of 300 ships, but a further reinforcement of eighty Phoenician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kinêros, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the attack, attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement,

sc. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

¹Thucyd. i. 95. Unhappily here, close to Xanthos while it was under siege in the preceding chapter that siege, and incurred great danger of Thermopylae, is a slight, passed being taken.

ment at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Krima was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Krima at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Euryasian. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the spoils of the spoils.¹ The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i. 94; Diodor. xi. 65—67; Plutarch, Krima, 14, 15.

The accounts of Krima's battles appear chiefly derived from Ephorus and Mallinarchus, authors of the following century; and from Phœnicianus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as coincide with the brief statement of Thucydides. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phœnicianus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty; Diodorus (following the latter), gave three hundred and forty. Phœnicus mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships, which appears to me a very sensible number, especially considering the very limited victory of Krima at the Eurymedon. From Thucydides we learn that the vanquished fleet of the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships. There is reason to suspect the words of Thucydides, in spite of the

authority of Dr. Arnold—that the captured vessels belonged not altogether to Krima's (or his) fleet, but, as which Dr. Arnold observes, "At least, but it is all to be guessed; that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more." Admitting the correctness of this statement (which may be doubted by vii. 24), we may remark that the defeated Phœnician fleet, according to the ancient practice of celebrating victories by such pretensions, took its accompanying land force. When therefore this land force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would of necessity fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be surely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory, in order to leave strength for a strenuous land battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only speaks of one hundred Phœnician

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phaselis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularise her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient port for the neighbouring region of Thasos, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Illyrian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring guests, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæon. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with various dependent towns on the continent of Thasos, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skapti Hyd, as well as from others in the neighbourhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time (about 458 B.C.) indicates to us the progress

Result of
Thasos
from the
Confederacy
of Delos.—
Seizure of
Thasos by
the Athenians.
Expulsion of
Persians.—
Eion on
Thasos.

ships with their crews" as having been captured (Hæc. d. 42). The other interpretation was probably incorrect. Evidence is afforded to the fact that the Athenians were not only the first to seize the island, but also the first to seize the mines which were the only one known.

¹ Mount Thasos, see Strabo, l. i. c. 2, § 17. The position of Eion is the subject of a reference to the

deposits of Herk and Skapti in the Illyrian and Thracian mountains, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian mines of the interior. In the history of Eion, we find an account of the large mines made in that city by the Athenians, and the gold and silver mines belonging to those persons (Hæc. d. 42, § 17). The Thracian region, see l. i. p. 104, § 17, 18.

which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 480 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thracia, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kleon.¹ Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blockaded the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—which seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of

First attempt of Athens to found a city at Eion.
 Second attempt on the Thracian coast near Eion. The attempt fails, and the Athenians are driven.

a larger and more powerful colony on Thasian ground not far from Eion. On the Stereas, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Elician town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Hæmion and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own cities, partly collected from their allies; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Elician possessors. But on trying to extend themselves further to the eastward, to a spot called Dreblon convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Elicians in decisive hostility

¹ Thucyd. i. 103, 104; Strabo, Eion, c. 14; Stephan. s. v.

special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as posing and aggressive—and of Sparta, as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kleon some further conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its further consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Perikles and others of having been brought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander, but was acquitted after a public trial.¹

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477—463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrasments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations were hence become both active and complicated; while their strength expanded so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately preceding the battle of Platai, we have scarcely any information. The fallings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 14.

entirely even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian mainland had most have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Boeotia. At the meeting of the Amphictyonic council which considered the expulsion of the Ionians, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Mælian Epistatides, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Cithæra, and thus caused the ruin of Lacedæmon at Thermopylæ.

Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the making friends should be expelled from the council¹—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Theophrastus successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians, as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Boeotia, it appears that the leadership of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespis were restored, and the latter in part repopled,² under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesians as well as of Athenians would have sustained them against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Boeotian right and usage."³ The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous malice—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;⁴ while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy to unquieted aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate;⁵ whence she sometimes became by anti-

¹ Plutarch, *Theophrastus*, c. 10.

² That the city of Thespis, the party Boeotian, was likewise restored, appears from Plutarch's account of the city of Thebes, and from the fact that the restored city was the only one which remained separate from the bulk of every Boeotian community (Theophrastus).

³ Theophrastus, c. 10.

⁴ The Boeotian party, which caused the severe Boeotian wars (Theophrastus, c. 10).

⁵ Theophrastus, c. 10.

⁶ The Boeotian party, which caused the severe Boeotian wars (Theophrastus, c. 10).

and the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliances imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendancy was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalcidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Medieval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the missing twenty years, made her not differently in regard to Boeotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by regarding the federation collectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thucydides owed the recovery of her ascendancy¹—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her strength and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when narrowed, against the dangerous neighbourhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a reluctant partner of Sparta, but even more fiercely anti-Athenian than Sparta down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Boeotia did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious; but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis;² and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achæia, were either burned or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.³ Such aggregation of towns out of pre-existing separate

confederacy (Xenophon, Hæcæ, v. 1.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12; Justin, vi. 2.

² Thucyd. xi. 26; Strabo, vii. p.

³ Thucyd. vii. pp. 27, 28, 29.

village was not conformable to the views nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little-doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Theopompus (who, though only regent, was practically equivalent to a king) and Leoty-chides—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Thebes.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 484 (the year preceding the surrender of Thebes to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrible moment befall Sparta. ^{Terrific earthquake at Sparta—B.C. 484. Earth-quake of the Helots.} A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Thebes, from whence certain suppliants Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment: 'not improbably some of those Helots whom Pericles had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually infernal: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Periochi. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus restrained the wavering citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the fight against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Archidamus (the warrior by whose hand Machabius had fallen at Plata) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyclirus, overpowered by superior numbers.¹ When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithmus, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers.

¹ Thucyd. i. 116-118; Diod. xi. 61.

² Thucyd. ix. 44.

Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves bravely by incursions throughout Laconia. Defence indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time universally incapable of swelling even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the *Argives*, the *Athensians*, and the *Platæans*.¹ The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4000 men, under the command of Klenk, Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So ineffectual were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Hîræd. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Klenk their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the over-valued energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thebans, they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for supporting the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no further occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.²

¹ *Thucydides*, l. vii. c. 25; l. viii. c. 1.

² *Thucyd.* l. viii. c. 26. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1.

See *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1.

See *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1. *See also* *Plutarch* *de Exile*, c. 1.

In my judgment, there is no ground

This diastical, negative in the extreme and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest cooperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an cooperation heightened by circumstances immediately pressing. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and expressed their

strongest
resistance
concentrated
by the Lacedæmonians
or their
Athenian
auxiliaries,
who were dis-
gusted from
Laconia.
Disputations
and change
of policy
at Athens.

for opposing more than one application made to Athens, and one application. The dispatches last sent from Pteron, which had contained two such an identical reading the words cooperation of Athenians (*Ἀθηναίων*). (*Plutarch*, 119; *Plutarch*, 120, 121). The friends of the latter, Lysimachus, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and rendering much of the services which they had rendered from the other, might possibly happen to say to the Lacedæmonians—"Your enemy Periklēs came to Athens, full with wrath, and not himself as a merchant on the ship to return was held as a master of life and death, while Pteron was still chasing the north and the Athenians were pressing you hard; these things with such indignation read and suffered your complete extinction." This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanes play, but there is no historical proof in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the Lacedæmonians both above at the time when the news of Pteron was not going on, and that it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from doing this occurred by an invasion of Athens. But Kimon represented at the siege of Thess. (*Plutarch*, Kimon, c. 14), accordingly he could not have gone on immediately to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Now, this negative attitude of no more than one expedition; not indeed

does *Plutarch* (c. 14), though this is of rather consequence. Now more distant on the part of Themistokles, he continues to the events of a period which he only pretends to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative expression. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 454 B.C., with the very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that he knew of any other expedition, two or three years earlier. But in favour of my view, he could not have written the account which we find in his text. His doubts especially on the prosecution of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, or the means by which he treated the Athenians as well as their other allies; he implies that the presence of the fleet in Laconia was a new and threatening incident; moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were surprised by their abrupt and unprovoked demand, he could not have written to make us an impression of this feeling, that only two or three years before, they had treated Lacedæmonians from the point of view, but as still, that the cooperation of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, was indispensable for any successful expedition, being reduced to a state of a condition of such utter helplessness as to not be able to do anything but receive. Inconceivable in itself, inconceivable except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconia, mentioned in *Plutarch*.

countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thebans may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown until a time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Lacedæmonian Ktistes afterwards characterised as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmonia¹—employed all his credit and influence in securing the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all further democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thebes, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land forces under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as co-existing accessories of Hellenic well-being. Though never distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens flouting without her yoke-fellow;"²—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion, the Chian poet Ibis; and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost unalloyed interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.³ The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by stinging out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16.

² Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16. "Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμετέραν αὐτὴν ἑλπίδα, ἢ πόλιν αὐτῆς ἀποκτείναντες, ἀποκτείναντες αὐτὴν."

the Theban allies, after the other the Athenian auxiliaries. Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16. "Ὁ δὲ Κίμων, ὁρῶν τὴν ἀντιπαράθεσιν, ἔφη· οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμετέραν αὐτὴν ἑλπίδα, ἢ πόλιν αὐτῆς ἀποκτείναντες, ἀποκτείναντες αὐτὴν."

suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Perikles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the ministers—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens returned again into her public assembly the fugitives sent back from Ithaca.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-wards to Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenes. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Perakli, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Plataeæ, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterwards from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But as soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Gressæ, Midea, and other agri-dependent towns around them. Several of these were retained; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these

The Argians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Putting off a general war against all Mykenæ and other towns.

¹ Diod. xi. 57; Pausan. viii. 9, 171. This incident is *an. p.c.*; but as it is impossible to fix the date of the Persian war, it is not possible to say whether it occurred before or after the catastrophe.

victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thebans became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon; and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleonæ—on the other side upon Megara;¹ on which ground the latter, probably desirous of protection from Lacedæmon, renewed the Lacedæmonian connexion, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.² This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the entire Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krætan Gulf, on which the Megarian post of Pige was situated, and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Ægineans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachments against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the nutritive ruses in the neighbourhood, such as Corinths, Epidaurians, and Ægina, saw these tower-stalking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with

About
425—424 B.C.
Megara
becomes
allied with
Athens.
During
siege of
Corinth,
and the
negotiations
for Pele-
ponnesian
alliance
between
Athens
and
Megara.

at Sparta, we must suppose it to have preceded about 425 B.C. See 385.
Ægina, Athens, and Megara, &c.

parallel 2.
1 Corinth, Kleonæ, &c. II.
2 Thucyd. I. 102.

Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Megarians, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten; so that the Megarians, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Perhaps was wont to call Megina the spouse of Peiræus :¹ but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the spouse of Megina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inarus (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the rebels, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian domination. Yet in spite of so great an abatement from their formidable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unaltered vigour; and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Helles, Megina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, one and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress,

Especially remarkable illustration of the Athenians in Cyprus, Phœnicia, Egypt, and Greece.—They built the first "Long Wall" from Megara to Nisæa.

¹ Pausan. *Perikles*, c. 2.

wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of recourse from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halonæ (the population of the southern Argolis peninsula, bordering on Troezen and Harionæ), were defeated on land by the Corinthians and Epidaurians forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Troezen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kokryphaleia (between Argina and the Argolis peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently very decisive,—the Megarians began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Argina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hælician ships and manner, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesians and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved sea-craft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Argina was irreversibly ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, loaded a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

410-410 A.D.
War of
Athens
against
Corinth,
Epidaurians,
Megarians, &c.
Victory of the
Athenians
off Argina.

¹ Thucyd. i. 90; Epich. Cor. Fugio. s. 12; Diodor. xi. 79.

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Miletus, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Ægiaceans, especially as the Persian Megasthenes came to Sparta at this time, on the part of Artabanus, to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.* The Corinthians and Epidaurians, however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of 800 hoplites, did their best to aid her further by an attack upon Megara, which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time, to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrtilides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young—these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,† that they returned back at the end of twelve days and created a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, mistaking their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrtilides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at

The Athenians before Megara. The Corinthians, however, did not actually—his departure by the Corinthians, except by mistake.

* Thucyd. i. 103.

† Lykias, *Com. Epistole*, c. 15. Athens was taken, because the Megarians did not send out any hoplites; and with these hoplites, &c.

The mistake mentioned by Thucy-

didus about the Corinthians, that the old men of their army were so inefficient against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Thucydides' manner—especially in the 2^d of this speech, &c.

the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.¹

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Pericles, which were now becoming ascendant in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent creation of long walls, though far so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stopping-place, the project of a wall forty stadia (=without 4 English miles) to join Athens with Piræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (=nearly 4 English miles) to join it with Phalæra, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians, as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistocles himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Sparta, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride,² at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Piræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable combination of political parties then going on at Athens. Kleon had been recently

¹ Thucyd. i. 102. *οὐδὲν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔσπευσεν ἔκφυγε*. *οὐδὲν αὐτῶν* is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in leaving the city.

² The words *ἡγεῖται* alone, at an earlier passage, already give notice of the

last question, and *ἀνέστη* is passed over as a *νέγος*—in the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in Thucyd. ii. 133, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 46).

attracted; and the democratical movement pressed by Pericles and Ephialtes (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Pericles, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistocles when he first showed the Peloponnese. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of land attack, and of holding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesians. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, elevations to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-*Persian* enterprises: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, weary to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peloponnese: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate domes of Peloponnese and Macedonia as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Attica. When to all these grounds of opposition we add the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the possible violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt, we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any further proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of *Ægospotami*, and their restoration the immediate boon of *Pharnabazus* and *Kimon* after the victory of *Kabdis*.

Under the influence of the slaves now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to under-

take an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithaca were not yet reduced to servitude. Their force consisted of 1000 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nibonidile. The ostensible motive or the pretence for this march was the protection of the Ithian territory of Doris against the Phocians, who had recently invaded it, and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so

large a force immediately compelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Coriath that the Athenians might presently either resist or constrain the towns of Boeotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Plataea: for the Boeotian Federation was at this time much disorganised, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the disaster of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes, and to render her ascendancy effective over the Boeotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their further aggrandisement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organising Arcadia and Messenia against Sparta. Accordingly, the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Boeotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,¹ and perhaps by inducing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness, promising to keep down for the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.²

¹ Herod. vi. 111. Xen. ii. 4. To see the Spartan system pursued in another opportunity, viz. in the conquest of Boeotia, see Herod. vi. 111. Xen. ii. 4. To see the Spartan system pursued in another opportunity, viz. in the conquest of Boeotia, see Herod. vi. 111. Xen. ii. 4.

² Herod. ii. 4. It must probably be

to the internal affairs of Thebes, some where about this time, but as they were of internal character, that the direct and simple of Persian policy—viz. to attack Athens in its weakness, viz. ii. 4. 5.

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Pericles, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Boeotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian mercenaries in arms, and concerted at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The junction was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the detached Kleon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Boeotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders, and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of 1800 Argives and some Thebanian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrtilides at Megara; for the Kleonids of Argos was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to retire into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megaræ, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Gerania, the road of march along the Isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of Pige, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Saronian Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thebanian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.¹ But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to

Intention of the Spartan army to march to Boeotia to destroy Athens, and induce the Athenians to surrender the Long Walls.

Meeting of Tanagra—defeat of the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. i. 105.

against the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The detached Kleon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, expecting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Gliridæ. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Enkhippon (of the deme Anaphlystos) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his property and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklēs, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Alkmanidæ, aware of this application and reproach of Kleon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual readiness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unharmed. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken professions of Kleon and his friends disconcerted and disarmed those opinions who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it round a repentant amputation towards the estranged leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Periklēs himself—to discharge the ten years of Kleon's sentence, and permit his immediate return.¹ We may

¹ *Plutarch*, Kleon, 2. 1. 1. *Periklēs*, 16. *See* also the *Constitution* who had just broken them at Tanagra, and by these at having recalled Kleon from the purpose of procuring peace. *Ibid.*

tribute as a dependent city of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Aegean. Her selected *Tribute* displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesos, and even by the means of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methoni and of Gythium. He took Chaffia, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupactus belonging to the Cœcian Leleians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf—disembarked troops near Sikyon, advantage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Ekphyria and Kephallenia, but also some of the towns of Achæia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began.¹ During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of 1000 hoplites under Perikles himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pige in the Eriassus Gulf. This without success, however, gained no greater advantage than Teukhis—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Archaia allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Thesida and accomplished nothing. Now were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Theosy, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled persons or nobles of Phœnæia. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Boeotian and Phœlian allies, the powerful Theosian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites; while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.²

Had the Athenians succeeded in Theosy, they would have acquired in their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Theosy their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never

p. 415.
Conclusion
of the Long
War.—
surrender of
Athens,
which is
described,
disputed,
and
referred
to
with some
of the
advantages
then and
round their
possessions
—(Chaffia)
operations
in the Gulf
of Corinth.

p. 416.

¹ Thucyd. I. 28—31; Diod. xi. 36.

² Thucyd. I. 71; Diod. xi. 38.

varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against as many successes, we have to reckon their ultimate defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460—454). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarbus: expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the storm of the Persian king Artabanus at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabarnus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Asia. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Eoppreus,¹ drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopitis. Here they were blockaded up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arms of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kypris: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarbus himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was further aggravated by the arrival of fifty Greek Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Memphian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyræus, who contrived by retreating into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.²

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Telesilla, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithaca, ended. These belated men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced

¹ Herodot. III. 205.

² Thucyd. I. 104, 105, 106; Herodot. III. 7: III. 2. The story of Telesilla in the last of these two passages—that part of the Athenian force was

forced to come back under a temporary capitulation granted by the Persian authority—is contradicted by the last sentence which has already been given, and by the other passages, as well as by Thucydides.

unstable to the political interest of Perikles that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,¹ so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Ktesias, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he dispatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians on the sea, while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kition. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxikratês, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kitionian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Erythræan; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.²

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and unmolested the Asiatic maritime Grecia, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phœliæ (where place the boundary at the Chalcidæan islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyrenæan rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On

Death of
Ktesias at
Cyprus—
vicarious
service
of the
Athenian
fleet—in
Cyprus
home.

No further
expeditions
of the
Athenian
fleet—
corruption
continued
between
them.

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 13, and Eusebius, *Chron.* *Prescop.* p. 131.

² An interesting note to this effect by some of the two rivals in an ancient text we need not repeat to the suggestion of a more prominent consideration, because, from the nature of the undertaking of Ktesias' side at Kition, which Plutarch has read in some authors, the object as well as the subsequent Phœnician appears to have been the assistance in the matter of Amyrtæus. In the matter of Amyrtæus, they were employed by one

indignation, and the other by friendship, by the other by dissuading Perikles.

³ Plutarch, l. 131; Plutarch, c. 13. The Athenian promises the same of the general satisfaction. The Athenian further that Ktesias lived not only to take Athens and Kition, but also to gain those two victories. But the authority of Plutarch, superior to every ground of objection, is more particularly superior as to the death of Ktesias, who, while he was employed by relationship.

Perseus King admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of Theophrastus, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive assertions,

how to pay their tribute regularly to Rome. To see the passages, I must to improve this very opportunity, they show that it was common for the kings to receive their tribute from the Athenian empire, as a means of preserving tribute from them to Persia; but the Athenian empire, which is lost, prevented him from paying any tribute from the cities subject to it. Maces and Antimachus have contradicted the important passage of the subject of these events. — *Idem*. For that word Theophrastus expressly indicates that the cities of Rome, but only recently descended from Theophrastus and Theophrastus before from the maritime Greeks within their dominion; and he begins that the cities of the sea were not long since under them. The words of these authors according to Theophrastus and the friends of the under-empire, in which Antimachus before, considered that a certain means of paying tribute, in which Antimachus & others considered that nothing, though the power of Athens had collapsed it to break them. Accordingly the demand was made for the first time paid down to Theophrastus, and he "Agree to deliver to them" for the most ancient, and until he could collect them, which he could not at first do, even then, Antimachus as Athens was not within, & Athens, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Greeks after tributary to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Rome, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian empire; there is a proof after the Athenian empire is lost. 2. That the maritime Greek cities of Rome considered, Theophrastus, the period, as most clear in the Persian King's mind, and for the appropriate tribute; the court of Rome, making for a corresponded amount to Rome, when it should be able to reduce the demands from tribute according to Athens.

This state of confusion between the Athenian Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, contradicted by Theophrastus, enables us to

regulate a passage of Theophrastus, in which the last clause and Antimachus have denied to all with which they considered themselves, in seeing their view of the case. Theophrastus after denouncing the arrangement and the government of the character of the last clause of the empire Antimachus denied the fact, after the suppression of the last clause, proceeds to state that he assumed the tribute of risk with reference to his last statement, and that the government considered the demand could be met (Theophrastus) in time, and the other other parties were surprised. — *Idem* 1741

Antimachus, & each other separately agree to receive the tribute of the cities of the sea, as Antimachus & Theophrastus had already said in the part of what it was before, when 1741, the last clause and Antimachus denied that Theophrastus had assumed the tribute of the last clause to Rome, to have been Antimachus and regularly paid down to his own time, but in the present time to a tribute; Antimachus speaks not about the present but about the government, and there were two very different things, as Theophrastus clearly indicates in the passage which I have cited above, the payment of all the last clause to the Persian King's hands remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire, but the present was not collected until immediately before Antimachus, when the Athenians were supposed to be the work of Antimachus. It is evident by the account of the general Persian empire, Antimachus all the passages, which he said in the third book of Theophrastus, that he had some to collect amounts of the Persian Empire, as it had to Greek provinces and from these amounts. He would be told that Antimachus considered Antimachus from the time of Antimachus downwards; whether they were reduced or not was another question, which the "books" might possibly not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages there cited from Theophrastus appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities of the Athenian court paid no tribute to

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay more, the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Perikles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Perikles, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite:¹ while even Thucydides, son of Melesias, who succeeded Kimon, his relation as leader of the anti-Persians party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Perikles was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the unlimited force and violence of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coast of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidonnæ, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens further aggression against

Thucydides, son of Melesias, speaks Kimon as having appeared at Perikles.

¹ Thucydides speaks justly and strongly on this subject, but does not, as he might, point out the inconsistency and ungenerous character of the orator supporting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was assumed to have been made shortly after the capture of the Sphacteria had, we have seen, already well the name of Kimon in use at the time, and it is not surprising that a chronicler, who has been misled by a misreading of the text, should have said that we must not doubt that Kimon's leadership had led Athens to this war against Persia, which is clearly untenable. — Cf. p. 461 and the last line of the passage, but please the reader to be right chronological point, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon

against Cyprus and Egypt in 460—459 B.C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition upon Persia were known, as we learn from Thucydides; so that even Thucydides speaks unjustly, but really giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to see them for while, and that that of his time.

² The clearest exaggeration of Perikles, that the treaty limited the Persian Empire to 50 miles westward of the strait, &c., &c., has been very properly corrected. — See notes on Thucydides, in my edition of the text (Cambridge, p. 155; Paris edition, p. 155).

³ Thucydides, Perikles, s. 32—33.

Cyprus, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by recognizing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realising, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called *Kimonian*, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Pericles, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state. Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, dilly with the free-will of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into distant and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens; from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers and weaken the authority of the Delian group. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies, making the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the contributions fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer

see, esp.
Transfer of
the common
fund of the
confederacy
from Delos
to Athens—
discussed
page 417 of
this
confederacy
from an
Athenian
point of
view.

is that it was proposed by the Samians—the naval power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is further said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristide's characterised it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the spread at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Megara and Poloponnesus—the Samians might not unreasonably feel that the large associated fund, with its constant annual accretions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

Transfer of the fund was proposed by the Samians.

After the conclusion of the war with Megara, and the consequences of the battle of Oenophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Megara—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Mitylene, the Boeotian cities, the Phocians, Locrians, &c. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta, even

Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of tributary and non-tributary states.

¹ Plutarch, Aristide's, c. 21.

in land-power—possessing in her all those Megara, Thebes, Plataeæ, Lokris, together with Achaia and Tensala in Peloponnese. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pirææ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus; but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Orestis, they could restrain any land force from marching out of Peloponnese, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely invulnerable in Attica.

Ever since the capture of Kerira, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—in which there was no exception except the rashness enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 448 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Ninonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandisement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-sovereignty as essential to a freeman and a citizen, each prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and other maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. Not when the Corian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a dependent tributary, they felt the blow acutely on every ground. The ancient celebrity and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this miserable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility

with Athens—Corinth, Mityenæ, Epidaurus, &c., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Pellos, but now sadly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Thebes, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon Aitolia. Putting all these circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart-despot-city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate, threatened nevertheless still further increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as bated down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 455—454 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Aitolia: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then their allies.¹ The Delphians were members of the Phœcian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phœcians collectively. The former of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to

Dissemination of the sense and feeling of power to Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 107: compare Philochorus, *Fragmenta*, 55, ed. 1860.

under the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Peleia. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any other step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Boeotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies.¹ After the victory of Oinophytæ, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Boeotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Boeotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Argive, &c., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn further that the democracy² established at Thebes after the battle of Oinophytæ was ill-conducted and disorderly, which circumstance laid open Boeotia still further to the advances of mediocrity on the march for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and consulting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mounting Orobosus, Charesus, and some other less important places in Boeotia. The Athenian general Teimistokles marched to assist them, with 1800 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and without. The hoplites of Teimistokles, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, obtained the enemy too much to visit a larger and more commanding

¹ Thucyd. l. ii. c. 35. *Lacedæmonians, they themselves govern those who surround them, and they govern all nations which are the subjects of their empire; they are not, like the Romans, the same also l. vi. c. 42.*

² Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 6. *and in Thebes such was the dissension among noble citizens, that Aristot. l. i. c. 2, § 2.*

force; nor would the people listen even to Pericles, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and advised them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution.¹ Fully indeed were his predictions justified. Though Themistocles was successful in his first enterprise—the capture of Chersonese, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably impatient and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked en masse, near Kerkira, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Themistocles himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bostia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were captured, the democratical government overthrown, and Bostia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.² Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,³ and inspire them with an apprehension of Bostian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Themistocles had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bostia would not have been lost; whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphacteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bostia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Euboea. To this important island Pericles

¹ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 16; also his comparison between Pericles and Alcibiades, c. 1.

² Plutarch, Themistocles, c. 12. The capture of Chersonese, was made in this battle; he had served thirty-three years before in the service of Artabanus; he again characterizes his successful career the possible wonder, though a great

of the kind was (Plutarch, Themistocles, c. 12).

³ Plutarch, l. 121; Plutarch, c. 1. Plutarch appears to have been mistaken in his opinion; Themistocles was killed in the battle of Salamis, and his death was avenged by the capture of Sphacteria.

⁴ Xenophon, Memorabilia, iii. 8, c.

himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was surrounded home by men of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had received from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Ephyre, and Epidauræ was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Piræus.

As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Gonnæ, Plistonax king of Sparta was announced suddenly on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, so far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thessalian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleombrotos, had been attached to him by the Eleans as adjutant and counsellor. Periklês (it is well) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had time enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Aristides thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleombrotos never came back, and Plistonax himself lived for a long time in banishment near the temple of Adonis at Tegeæ, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pylian pretenses, and by bringing his bought adherents to sue upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês returned with his forces to Salamis, and reconquered the island completely. With that notice which always distinguished him as a military man, he oppo-

Salamis was
conquered
by Periklês.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10; v. 20. Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

sists in the total ruinness of Telemida, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He subdued most of the Euboean towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histieæ at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchandise and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian cleruchs or out-settled citizens.¹

Yet the reconquest of Euboea was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the last engagement of Kynosia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an accidently maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Miletus and Phœge, yet her communication with the latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Rhodius and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well as of converting her allies in Achæa. Nor was the port of Miletus of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for supplying that city.

Moreover, the precautions held which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be accorded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an invincible army carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Miletus and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Pericles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so disposing as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not

Demilitarization and demoralization of Athens.—Consequence of the thirty years' truce.—(Continued.)
Loss of Athenian power.

¹ Thucyd. i. 104; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 37; Strabo, lib. 2.

a sentiment the more natural as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Chalcidians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-will on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, inasmuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS
UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratic cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical classification of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of Kleisthenes, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataeæ, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, string is it for 284); though the check exercised

by the
citizens in
the senate,
senate, of
function
both admin-
istrative
and judicial
to early
Athens—
great
senate
of the
magistrates,
as well as
of the
senate of
Areopagus.

by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the dikastai, was at the same time materially increased. We must further recollect that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings,¹ and the Persian councils before the appointment of the Protres, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also

¹ See F. F. Hume, *Constitution of the Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., 1722, and *Enlightenment*, 1722, p. 10.

parish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal, must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to wrong, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.¹

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the

Magistrates
generally
sitting
together
constituted
the senate
of the
Areopagus
—senate
of Athens
—constituted
and met
among the
bulk of the
citizens.

expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristide had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged promises of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and

judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the case of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristide to that of Pericle: Athens became more and more martial, the population of Pelopon augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizens was stimulated by that collective aggrandisement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataeæ, this new fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in

1 Aristide (post. Aristophan. c. 2. p. 117) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as Aristocratic, and as it was Aristocratic in fact, but this is difficult to say how accountable could be practically rendered against such a body. They could only be responsible

in this sense—that if any one of their number could be proved to have committed fault, he would be held vitally punished. But in this sense the Aristocratic themselves would also be responsible; though it is always difficult to find that they were not responsible.

Periklēs and Ephialtēs, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklēs who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates. But the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalising the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dolemaia or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklēs and Ephialtēs that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular *Dikasteries* or jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates and the senate of Areopagus of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous *dikasts*, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; 5000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, seven, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding cases or inflicting punishment by his own authority,

Political parties in Athens. Periklēs and Ephialtēs, the reformers; Kimon, oligarchical or conservative.

Personation of the Areopagus or jury-courts, established by Periklēs and Ephialtēs. The three *Dikasteries* were arranged.

was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to select each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular *dikasteries*. Which of the ten he should take was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what *dikastery* would try any particular case. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil jurisdiction, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these *dikasteries* under the presidency of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system

of reference to arbitration, for private causes,¹ was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen selected by mutual consent of the parties) all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

It is not here meant to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Perikles and Ephialtes. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called *Bellia*, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other occasions of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been

Page to the
dilemma to
be resolved
and made
repeated.

drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Rosch states² (in somewhat exaggerated language) that "nearly

¹ Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the important treatise of *Andronicus*, under the classification *de iudiciis publicis et privatis*, published at Paris, June, 1818.

Public arbitrators seem to have been chosen by lot from a small list of candidates, from both parties; also an arbitrator, for whose appointment was made by lot in the *Perikles* might be chosen, instead of any other citizen, as arbitrator; but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, chosen by lot from the list of men every year, and appointed upon being the case before the court of dikasts. They were liable to be continued under election, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or other offence.

The number of these public dikasts or arbitrators was unknown, when *Andronicus* wrote was published, an inscription since discovered by Professor King and published in the work, *Antiquities of Athens*, p.

24, records the number of the dikasts for the year of the archon, 440/1, B.C. 441, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is 700; the number in each tribe is assigned; the largest number is in *Koloneia*, which is entitled *tribus*; the smallest is *Demetria*, which sends only three. They must have been either elected or chosen by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes. The inscription records the names of the dikasts for this year B.C. 441, in consequence of their being accused, or receiving a vote of censure from the people. The fragment of a law inscription for the year B.C. 442 also exists.

² *Public Economy of the Athenians*, book 2, chap. vii. p. 46; *Engl. Transl.*

M. Rosch must think that the whole 700, or nearly the whole, were employed every day. His opinion is one that I cannot but greatly overstate to the number of 700, and the number of men, actually employed. For the interest in the law, however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

one-third of the citizens set as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an altered constitution. From and after the time of Perilla, these districts were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all cases civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others; but before his time, the greater number of such cases had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Arapague. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these district assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered.

The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the district assembly, by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.²

In reference to the senate of Arapague also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source.³ Especially, the equipment which it took of

The most striking feature of their just and, also, sacred functions.

Senate of Arapague — its authority — its religious character — its sacred and mysterious traditions.

See the more accurate account of Robinson, *Arizona*, New York, 1880, pp. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

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intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of justice. Though put in the background for a time after the expulsion of the *Proklesastai*, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new actions under the Kleisthenian constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its *horagatai* and *parastatai* had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of competency. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides; and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of consular police over the lives and habits of the citizens—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the incidents, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the dissolute from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of *Areopagus* also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the various expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenes, Eschines, or Lysias—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokrates, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagitica*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of *Areopagus* had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he seems to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetoric is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed true, considering his

Plato, *de leg. vi.* c. 12. c. 13. c. 14. c. 15. c. 16. c. 17. c. 18. c. 19. c. 20. c. 21. c. 22. c. 23. c. 24. c. 25. c. 26. c. 27. c. 28. c. 29. c. 30. c. 31. c. 32. c. 33. c. 34. c. 35. c. 36. c. 37. c. 38. c. 39. c. 40. c. 41. c. 42. c. 43. c. 44. c. 45. c. 46. c. 47. c. 48. c. 49. c. 50. c. 51. c. 52. c. 53. c. 54. c. 55. c. 56. c. 57. c. 58. c. 59. c. 60. c. 61. c. 62. c. 63. c. 64. c. 65. c. 66. c. 67. c. 68. c. 69. c. 70. c. 71. c. 72. c. 73. c. 74. c. 75. c. 76. c. 77. c. 78. c. 79. c. 80. c. 81. c. 82. c. 83. c. 84. c. 85. c. 86. c. 87. c. 88. c. 89. c. 90. c. 91. c. 92. c. 93. c. 94. c. 95. c. 96. c. 97. c. 98. c. 99. c. 100. c. 101. c. 102. c. 103. c. 104. c. 105. c. 106. c. 107. c. 108. c. 109. c. 110. c. 111. c. 112. c. 113. c. 114. c. 115. c. 116. c. 117. c. 118. c. 119. c. 120. c. 121. c. 122. c. 123. c. 124. c. 125. c. 126. c. 127. c. 128. c. 129. c. 130. c. 131. c. 132. c. 133. c. 134. c. 135. c. 136. c. 137. c. 138. c. 139. c. 140. c. 141. c. 142. c. 143. c. 144. c. 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under the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have recommended that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so, which could not fail to rouse against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vicious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.¹

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it moved naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party: that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenian constitution unaltered—with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover the party was further strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imported chiefly through Kimon, prince of Sparta at Athens. Of course such aid could only have been transient, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment; for when we consider that Sparta had been in ancient feud with Athens and Corinth to a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens extremely desirable to preserve: and the philo-Lacedæmon character of the leading men at Athens contributed to direct the policy

¹ *Ibid.*, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386, also quoted in the *Areopagus* essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386, also quoted in the *Areopagus* essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386, also quoted in the *Areopagus* essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386.

Areopagus essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386, also quoted in the *Areopagus* essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386, also quoted in the *Areopagus* essay, *Suppl.*, *Vol. Pericles*, p. 386.

of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendancy was in progress.¹

The political opposition between Perikles and Kinon was hereditary, since Karkhippos the father of the former had been the accuser of Kleisthenes the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kinon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Perikles, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Perikles must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of twenty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 457—428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracised, and when Aristokles was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the praiseworthy prudence of the one with the resources and large views of the other; superadding to both a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent mental and lettered education received from Pythokleides—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a powerful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his 'Magnanimi' explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracised, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratos. We may be pretty sure however that this personal resemblance (like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother² when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistokles and Aristokles. For the Kleisthenian constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to

Comparison between Kinon and Perikles—inheritance from their fathers—character and work of Perikles.

¹ Herodotus, Kinon, c. 12; Thucydides, c. 12.

² Herodotus, Perikles, c. 4-5; comp. Herodotus, c. 12.

the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the lesser democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Pezirus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reticence against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Pericles devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe to one who represents the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the idea of popularity. His disposition was irresistibly impulsive; yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Spartan king, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans.¹ Moreover he inherited from his friend and teacher, Anaxagoras, a taste of physical philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagoguery were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Klean, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was retailed, by his personal friend the poet Iku, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanour of Pericles. Klean employed the voluptuousness, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his table and doors to all the indolents of his dome, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm robes in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But the property of Pericles was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward, Evagoras—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in

¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 20. See Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 11; Xenoph. *Mem.* 2. 2. 23; *Pericles*, c. 3, 5, 7.

² Plut., *Pericles*, c. 20, p. 276.

the market.¹ It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary relation was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles: a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits; but incapable of sustained attention to business, untalented in words or letters, and content with Laertian ascension to rhetoric and philosophy: while the ascendancy of Perikles was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—polity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding parties. As a military commander, though never deficient in personal courage, he rarely sought distinction, and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises. His private habits were sober and modest: his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,² Zeno, the musician Demos, and other philosophers—while the tender domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-content—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talkative energy, spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unobtrusive and unassuming valour of the companions of Marathon.³ Epikhris, son of Sophokleides, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Perikles, and every inferior to him in personal polity, though he was a poor man.⁴ As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Perikles, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings

Epikhris, son of Sophokleides, a poor man, and every inferior to Perikles in personal polity, though he was a poor man.⁴ As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Perikles, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6; in Kimon, c. 10; Rutilius, Græci, Præcept. p. 104.

² The personal intercourse between Perikles and Protagoras is alluded to by the interesting fragment of the latter

which we find in Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10; Rutilius, Græci, Præcept. p. 104.

³ Aristophanes, Vespers, 1200 sq., and Acharns, 1079.

⁴ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10; Athen. V, p. 2, c. 41; 31, 2.

before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight; yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Epistatês advanced his main proposition for abolishing the competence of the senate of Arsopolis, he appears to have been strenuous in representing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,¹ Epistatês and Periklês were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an elected system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 468 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful; and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithaca, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtes.* But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon and the position of the oligarchical party were materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing some afterwards a vote of attachment—a challenge, indeed, which was

[illegible]

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11. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 277: 1033-1034, 1997.

1. *Journal of Management Education*, 2000, 24(1), 10-12.

perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kinós and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Epiklís and Periklís. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kinós, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendant. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the obstruction involved in meeting a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Periklís and Epiklís carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine¹), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of selected dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate *Hellénai*. Epiklís² first brought down the laws of Solón from the acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market-place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularised.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is, that Periklís was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (*paye Phalaris*), in order to make head against Kinós, who bribed them out of his own private purse, as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklís did was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of

Messengers
assigned by
Epiklís and
Periklís to
dispute the
power of
the senate
of Areo-
pagus as
well as of
individual
magistrates.
Transfer of
the judicial
functions.

demote Epiklís, and the *Hellénai* would be a body of magistrates, as the *Hellénai* were a body of magistrates.

¹ I translate this passage as a statement of the important nature of the obstruction in so often dissolving. Phalaris says—"The Athenians took advantage of a slight pretence to

oppose Kinós," but it was a positive demonstration of obstruction that it had no pretence. It was a judgment passed without regard to alleged cause.

² Periklís, cont. *Dem.* at *Eleuth.* p. 11.

³ Epiklís, cont. *Dem.* at *Eleuth.* p. 11.

direct opposition, unwilling, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta—involving the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so obvious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kleon and his immediate friends. Kleon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Perikles henceforward became mitigated, or even converted into a complement,¹ whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power, which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Perikles, and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed allies, during the interval between the defeat of Korkiras and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Perikles, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called *Nomophylakes*, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These *Nomophylakes* sat alongside of the *Proctoi* or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to

Continuation
of the great
speeches of
Perikles,
after the
death of
Kleon, &c.
Chloris
also for
seven, five
and Kleon,
Perikles
successors
of Athens,
and was of
the most
power of
his power.

Other
important
changes—
The
Nomi-
phylakes.

¹ The intervention of Kleon, the states of Kleon, in connection with this correspondence between his friends and Perikles is probably correct (Perikles, Perikles, v. 34, and Kleon, v. 14).

Chloris and especially the names to have played an active part in the political history of the city: but we are not at all obliged upon historical grounds to unduly multiply hypotheses and conjectures.

districts for trying cases, distributed into panels or known by a particular letter and sitting together throughout the entire year: they were let off to sit together only on special occasions and in the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the *Ekklesia* or public assembly, even with the addition of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence: it could only enact a *proposis*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The *Thesmothes* were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (ninth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an *Ekklesia* was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *en bloc*, and submit them for approval or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of *Nomothetes* and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the *Nomothetes* might be ascertained according to the number of motions to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were further named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled *Nomothetes*. These latter were taken from the *6000* *citizens* districts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as *500*, sometimes as *1000*—and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

regiments

The *Nomothetes*—
distribution
between
laws and
proposals
or special
decrees—
process
by which
laws were
enacted and
repealed.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the *Demothete* against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Perikles at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated *Nomothetes*. This was the *Graphé Parasomatos*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any proposition, and rendered him liable to punishment by the *dikastery*. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphé Parasomatos*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the *dikastery*, through the intervention and under the presidency of the *Thesmothetes*.

Graphé Parasomatos—indictment against the proposer of illegal or unconstitutional propositions.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws; and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the *Graphé Parasomatos* at the time of Demosthenes. The mover of a new law or proposition, even, after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informality in his procedure, but also against alleged mischief to the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the *dikastery*, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was pro-

under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to Demosthenes. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on further to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Demosthenes was a vile man and a mischievous politician;

accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favour of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *Graphe Parasynesis*: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it,—springing from that reason of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with violence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens is certain. But though it probably deterred ungratified citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those citizens who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophanes, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial discourse, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphe*

It was often used, as a simple way of placing the speaker of an interfering law—without pointing out the author of the law.

Parasynesis was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a proposition repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenes against Leptikles. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he

we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Greek politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, watched, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decisions by trained and professional judges. All the excellences, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found preferable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree ; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disavour—every censure or error or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, counts as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter ; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been over-stated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same : recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, even to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff

The Athenians did not have any jury trial, as the English jury trial is not a democratic institution, and the Athenian dikastery is an ancient institution.

According to the standard and political condition of Athens was so un-
usually uncorrupted, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the jury dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Such a thing would require of the citizens and all the public money must have been put in requisition. At that time the dikasteries against the enemy, without having any expenses for other purposes, there was not enough even to afford constant pay to the citizens and sailors engaged. (Thomp. vi. 81. 82. 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000)

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and defendant, accused and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Achens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, threatened, and perhaps, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1801, say jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even to the terrible punishment of attainder.¹ And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attainder—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to override the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens²—sometimes to the

¹ Mr. Justice, in his interesting and valuable publication, *CRIMINAL TRIALS*, vol. i. p. 101, after giving an account of the trial of Sir William Blackstone in 1709, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes:—"There is one circumstance in this trial which ought not to be passed over without consideration. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognisances to answer for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months and heavily fined by a sentence of the Court-chancellor. Such was the severity which was laid by the attorney in this matter on those jurors, and such were the pains to which some of them were exposed, who refused to set upon their consciences, according to their presentment. But with these proceedings against the jury, sometimes as they appear to me improved instances of the subordination of justice, must not be considered as a random narrative of individual cases, or the particular conduct. The law is that the judges of England had, for centuries before, possessed a similar authority, though

not without some surrounding apoplexy; and it was not until very late a century after it, in the reign of Charles II., that a solemn decision was pronounced against its exercise."

In the reign of James I. it was held by the Lord Chancellor, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted in several parts on the same day, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other day, when the jury had acquitted a felon on a higher indictment brought against him, they were questioned in the first instance on the particular in dispute, after the conclusion of the first indictment, there were several instances in the reign of Charles II., in which it was ruled that the jury should not quit until they had given the same verdict upon all the several pleas returned, and the indictment of *Blackburn*. Compare Mr. Justice Black in *FORBES*, *The Hamilton Legend*, chapter x. 10.

² Concerning the *French Jurors*, M. F. de *Blackburn* and M. *Blackburn*, p. 170, remarks:—

"Le leur nature de leur état doit

appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box, comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial formal conditions into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presents them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikaster, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read those assurances in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in ensuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and elevating the citizens generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory language of Pericles about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and unswayed verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archons. The juror here and judge under full possession that he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or relief from others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, number, and quantity of mental action, without any professional judge upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.¹

¹ I have said from an ancient lawyer of the United States—Mr. Livingston, author of a *Practical Code for the State of Louisiana* (Providence, 1840, pp. 13–14), an eloquent passage on Trial by Jury. It contains little more than the English commonly insisted on, but it is accompanied with peculiar warmth, and

with the greater fulsome, because as the people of Louisiana, he writes the author was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said in recommendation of the jury might have been urged by Pericles with much more and wider

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and witness represent the average man of the time and of the neighborhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, honesty, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks

Imperfection of jury-trial—exaggerated in the procedure of the Athenians.

application, in entering his verdict of finding either from individual negligence or from the defendant.

"By our constitution the law leaves the right of a trial by jury secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively guaranteed. This, however, may be done for him, and there are no means among ourselves in its favour, that it has been thought proper to insert in the code a positive declaration that in all criminal prosecutions the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be abridged. Still it left entirely at the option of the accused, a right to prosecute the favour of the judge, goodness of his witness, or the confidence bestowed on his advocate, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thus to deprive ourselves the people of a spectacle which they ought never to behold—a single man determining the fate, according to his law, and deciding in the will of that law, equity, and impartiality of a citizen.

Those who advocate the present disposition of our laws are—attributing the trial by jury to be an advantage—the law does enough when it gives the accused the option to stand himself at the bar, or, if he has been indicted whether it will be useful to him, and it would be unjust to direct him to be so important a citizen. This argument is specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this course cannot be wisely pursued. There is, moreover, another obvious reason, that of the injury it is considered. If he be guilty, his case has no interest in his country, and whether guilty or innocent, it has a double interest—then there should be fully examined before judges susceptible to influence, and subjected by any man, either of official duty. It has an interest in the character of the administration of

justice, and a permanent duty to perform in conducting its business. It is not less, therefore, to say that the law is enough when they give the choice between a law and legal trial, and one that is liable to the greatest objections. They must be sure—they must remove these doubts, so as not to suffer an individual individual to deprive those who have no means of truth, though it should be voluntarily induced, or at least, though that doubt should be entirely.

"Another advantage of retaining the mode of trial obligatory is that it affords the most valuable instruction among every rank of citizens. It is a school, of which every jury trial is a session, in a separate class, where the lessons of the law and the consequences of disobedience to them are continually taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions, necessary, gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, and only becoming in the character of a free citizen, but which adds to the private happiness. Another advantage, we believe, we prove, that before the trial of the case in the administration of justice, though they are usually the trial of every other case, and would have other place. Every trial is a useful topic to all in the country, he said that that thought placed in public the student system, to let the principles of law, the theory, and the reputation of the administration against religion and ignorance, and that while the public understanding has been found the law where the student is characterised, and he is presented a new place that will not only, it will show how, every citizen are thus individually directed to perform their legal functions; who are afterwards the discipline of the law, the trial, the trial of the justice, the highest principles of the constitution, which, without whose present to

as good as justice,—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because

prejudices can be inflicted, no dissent involved; who can by their votes grant the law of sympathy, and deny the law of justice where it strikes;—such a state can never sink into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Courage, which may pervert the constitution; military despots may reduce its powers; foreign influences may control its actions; but while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The institution is open to the voice of charity and independence. It inspires, the courage it demands, will induce give them an energy of resistance that no tyrant with unscrupulous cruelty, and a punishing spirit that will strike arbitrary penal blows.

The enemies of freedom know this; they know how valuable a vehicle it is to convey the contagion of those fatal passions which attack the virtue of their power, and they therefore have great against the institution, with these aims than they would take to avoid presidential election. In countries where it already exists, they continually endeavor to improve, because they dare not openly destroy; changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement; the ancient aims of citizens are too important to permit the interests of party—a mischief is necessary. This change must be confined to an agent of executive power, and must be made among the most virtuous for education, wealth, and responsibility; so that after several successive operations of political character, a shining row of men be obtained, (such indeed from all experience does, but without any of the mischiefs which are feared in the change) yet individual integrity and incorruptible worth of the original constitution. Also, imperious for this purpose have no resemblance but in name to the ancient, present, unaltered juror who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties, and the necessary few number of whose functions grow so that for the sake of efficiency, or the expediency of law. My intention ends, as I know the institution is so designed as to leave nothing to attack the

State or weaken the interest of the people, and it is supported as an emblem of citizenship as a mysterious sovereignty.

Consistently with this ancient estimation of jury-trial, Mr. Livingston, by the production of his note, built very markedly the intervention of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the juror much nearer to a similarity with the Athenian citizen (p. 30). "I mention the change of the judge to an opinion of the law and to the opinions of the witnesses, only when required by one or of the jury. The practice of rejecting all the testimony from witnesses drawn from the nature of things, especially, not seldom immorally, and sometimes extremely false—is a double disadvantage: it judges the juror, who only needs to see the judge make them as these were necessary, substitutive to the witnesses; and it gives them an important proof of that which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should stand in their own minds. Perjured juror upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their consciences, and it will be only when they disagree in their conclusions that recourse will be had to the notes of the judge." Mr. Livingston goes on to add, that the judges, from their all bodies created as presiding witnesses, are already well trained—a paper taken a note—and generally against the persons on trial.

The same considerations on those which Mr. Livingston here goes forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial are also located upon by Mr. Charles Curtis, in his translation of Mr. Richard Phillips's *Treatise on Jurors*, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the different stages which the jury-system has assumed in England and France (the *Principles of the Organization of Jurors*, translated by C. Curtis, 1821; Charles Curtis, 1821, p. 100, with preliminary Considerations on the Juror in England, pp. 100, seq.).

The length of this note forbids my citing anything further about from the satirical observations of Mr. Richard Phillips on those of Mr. Curtis; but they would be found (like those of Mr. Livingston), even more applicable to the character of Athens than to the juror of England and America.

they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which anaggling people, there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King riots at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have been gross injustice. A jury, who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a defendant, indicted for any state offence before the Dihetary at Athens,—during only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him,—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere except in England and the United States of America, and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century.¹ Juries being the

¹ Mr. Justice (Clerical Trial, in *tragedy*, p. 10 observes that the "proceedings against persons accused of state offences in the earlier periods of our history do not deserve the name of trials: they were a mere mockery of justice." &c.

Regarding what English juries have been, it is curious to review the following remarks of Mr. William Hallifax, *Observations on the Statute, p. 401*, in *remarking on a statute of Henry VII., a. d. 1534, &c.*

"The first chapter saith:—'That juries be much and commonly used within the city of London, among such persons as have not been summoned to law, joined between party and party.'"

"This offence hath been before this statute committed of in procession to several laws, before of which the penalty of a fine, was made a strong remedy to prevent, and not that which we have the words of it proved, in the Statute proposed at a trial."

"In the fourth of Henry, written originally in French by Malinval, and translated by John Lodge in the reign, with some additions to adapt it

to English customs, a jurman is mentioned, who had often been called for giving a false verdict, which shows the offence to have been very common.

The statute, who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly necessary to this offence, by summoning those who were most partial and prejudiced. There, in the account of Cardinal, it seems as that it was a common crime in an attorney's bill to charge per contra corruption."

"In the Statute remarkable that justices and judges in cases of the city of London is there, particularly complained of them in other parts of the land, by the presence of this and other offences. There follows in that in fact, many names of this city were provided by Justice Rogers first on their heads, stating their offices as having been corrupted with by the parties to the suit. Mr. Harvie continues that Henry the Chancellor, in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote the Statute of London: and Fisher, in his Statute, written afterwards in an approved saying, that London never came into and was not called London, in the Statute, before

Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Theophrastus of Chaeroneia, Thales of Syracusæ, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Œsæ, Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elis, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a literary and preserved down to the later critics.¹ These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial cases belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens, while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, which Herodotus² applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, &c., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it pleasantly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of carriers from their fellow-citizens, partly in exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gains,³ they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the

See generally the History itself, and that which refers to them, especially Demosthenes (lib. 2, § 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

See also the character of Protagoras in the *Republic* of Aristotle, lib. 2, § 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

¹ *Plutarch*, lib. 2, § 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

² *Plato*, *Republic*, lib. 2, § 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622,

Socrates himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanes, or from those unfavourable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the *Ekklesia*, but still more from the contentions before the *dikastery*, in which

Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the stimulus.

later a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent *dikasteries* constituted by Pericles opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the dialectic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away.¹ And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanes derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortune which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and unguided action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than history or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid *dikasteries* at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 21. where Socrates on occasion. Aristophanes, in which the presence of this law is a general hint of criticism against Socrates, and connects it with an invective exceedingly pointed when

considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is certain that the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent conventional habits.

History. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta and, as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that all the *dikasts* were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanes selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Pericles has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to secure pay to *dikasts* who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant *dikasteries* previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme,¹ and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the *dikasteries*, while the dignity of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the last stands, we may suppose that the 6000 *Helasts* who filled the *dikasteries* were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

¹ *Thucyd.* viii. 57. Compare a curious passage, even in reference to the trial of Socrates, in the speech of that orator against Euthydemus.

de Mordax, s. l. — and of another completely vain observation, *clavier de ar. l'Esq.* lvi. 22.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS
BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE
BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE political alterations effected at Athens by Pericles and Ephialtes, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its further development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the dikasteria or in the assembly at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in attendance and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.¹ The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and coastwise trade; the reverse immediately preceding the thirty years' truce.

Personal
activity
was
promoted
during the
Athenian
democratic
revival of
Athens,
and activity
was the
chief
cause
thereof.

¹ *Eschylus, Myrmidons*, 11. 4, 15.

having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Boeotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the leadership of Athens, but with a common *syned* and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependents; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative *syned*, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was constituted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member.¹ It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the *Ægean*. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Samos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy

¹ Thucyd. ii. 16: about the Spartans. And so it might be said of the Peloponnesian confederacy—*ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἔχοντες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῶν ἡμετέρας ἀποδοῦναι*.

in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an invincible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her controlling power,—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synd of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 480 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependant subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members, nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so; for

Athens took no pains to inspire her allies with the idea of a common interest—preventing the allies from getting by the consciousness of her empire.

while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation, or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of geographical disunion, the tendency to isolated civil life, and the repugnance to any permanent extraneous obligations, in every Greek community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens enabled by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenians continued grouped at

the expedition as a matter of pride as well as profit.¹ Even Perikles, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the consent of some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the foolishness counsels of Perikles had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Perikles formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no amount of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the *Ægean waters*.² This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged as one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the *Ægean*. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and benefited as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the women in constant pay and training.³ And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Boeotia, and with difficulty recovered Euboea, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary allies is said to have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Antiphanes,⁴ which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for

¹ Thucyd. 2, 65. *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν.*

² Thucyd. 2, 65. *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν.*

³ Thucyd. 2, 65. *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἀποστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν.*

⁴ Antiphanes, *Supp.* 107.

ance of the Hellenotamiae, originally officers of the treasury, but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue,¹ from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, is stated by Xenophon at 5000 talents. Customs, harbour and market dues, receipts from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metec, &c., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents: which sum, added to the 600 talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanes² during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war (A.C. 425) gives the general total of that time as "nearly 5000 talents": this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alcibiades, which Thucydides nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1800 talents.³ Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the

point to a date not long after the first establishment of the tribute. It appears that the Athenian tribute on carrying off ships was not levied among the Hellenes, and was assessed (at least) as late as the middle of the Peloponnesian war (A.C. 425).

Thus, the a few investigations to which the case proved amenable in the issue of such did it ultimately high. But in general, the case recorded in it is small that Greek officers to not to represent the whole tribute assessed, but only the small fraction of it pertaining to the one unacknowledged transaction, which was paid over to a commander of mercenaries in the Persian service. The Hellenotamiae on this subject, being dependent upon the good word, did not think that their investigations as to help us to discover the initial magnitude of tribute levied. It would not significantly show the heavy pressure of it upon the allies. Nothing in Thucydides warrants this belief; moreover, we know distinctly from the fact that until the year 425 A.C. the total tribute was something not so much as a few cent. upon subjects and exports (Thucyd. vi. 34). How

much less it was we do not know; but it certainly did not reach that point. Nothing seems struck with the lightness of the tax due a man in this life. Very, oh, hell! It is possible that the very high assessments which appear on a list of the states appended to some copies of Isocrates' *Antidote* may refer to a date later than A.C. 425. During the closing years of the war, when Athens was struggling under the most severe pecuniary difficulties, it is not unlikely.

¹ Xenophon, *Anab.* vi. 1. 32, at which other authors; compare Thucyd. *Epist. Hist.* of Athens, b. 14, ch. 1, § 1.

² Aristophanes, *Frag.* 552, where *ἀπὸ τῆς ἑλπίδος*.

³ Very different writers on Athenian antiquities (Thucyd. *Epist. Hist.* of Athens, b. 14, ch. 1, § 1; Strabo, *Geogr.* 2. 10, 11, and 12; E. H. Leake, *The Thracian Peninsula*, vol. 1; compare, however, a passage in Thucyd. vi. 1, p. 40, *See Thucyd.* where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) except this statement, that the tribute levied by Athens upon her allies was decided some years after

accumulated in the Amopoleis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war—which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of 5000 talents (= £1,250,000), and was still at 5000 talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began.¹ This system of public economy, consistently laying by a considerable sum year after year, in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever,² goes far of itself to vindicate Pericles from the charge of having wasted the public money in unshrewd distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to condemn the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Kimon, no further expeditions were undertaken against the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The

delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after the capture of Aïnos by the Athenians; it may be at later date, but it cannot possibly be earlier.

New talents contributed in the winter immediately preceding the great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which expedition sailed about September 415, 131; cf. M. Kuhn and Alkibiades both went as commanders of that expedition; the latter was recalled to Athens for trial on the charge of misapplying about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way home, was condemned and sentenced to imprisonment in Kalliopeia, and did not return to Athens until 411 B.C., long after the death of Pericles, who remained in command of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, enjoying the full scope of his opportunities, and the complete failure and ruin, before Syracuse, and who perished himself afterwards near Syracuse prison.

Taking these circumstances together, it will at once be seen that there never was here been any time, but possibly or even after the capture of Aïnos, when Pericles and Alkibiades could have been exposed to any extent of unwise extravagance. The thing is absolutely impossible; and the charge in which such unscrupulous and unscrupulous misappropriation are imputed must be rejected;

furthermore it must have been consumed long after the pretended time of delivery, when the chronological value of profits had been forgotten.

I may add that the story of this expenditure of the talents by Alkibiades is virtually contrary to the statement of Plutarch, probably borrowed from Xenophon, who states that the Athenians probably increased their treasure to 1000 talents (Plutarch, *Alkibiades*, c. 18).

¹ Thucyd. i. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 10. The foresight of the Athenian people, in accumulating large accumulations of public money and laying it up for future wars, would be still more consistently demonstrated, if the statement of Xenophon the source were true, that they got together vast talents between the gates of Aïnos and the Hellespont expeditions. "It is not impossible that 1000 talents might have been laid by every year on the annual of tribute collected was so considerable."

Public Economy of Athens, ch. vi. p. 244, Eng. Transl. I do not believe his statement, but Mr. Xenophon and others, who do, ought to discuss to say it against the heavy remarks which they give in condemnation of the Athenian fiscal prodigality.

tribute money then remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it.¹ And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home.

Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot city was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens²—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Perikles and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Perikles. While discouraging all distant³ and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many hierarchies, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted 5000 citizens to the Thracian

Perikles
Athens
citizens
imperial
power
of
their city.

Thracian
Athens
citizens
planted
out
in
Macedonia
by
Perikles.
Colonies
of
Athenians
in
Thrace.

¹ Thucyd. i. 104-105; ii. 12. The revenues, at duty of two per cent. upon imports and exports at the Piræus, produced to the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which it was increased by Aristides, afterwards about 100,000, after the restoration of the democracy at Athens. Droysen, *Antiquities of the Greeks*, vol. ii. p. 101. This was at a period of depression in Athenian affairs, and when trade was declining and many so poor as to have been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war.

It would probably that this must have been the most considerable permanent source of Athenian revenue paid to the tribute; though we do not know what rate of contribution they was

imposed at the Piræus during the Peloponnesian war. Computing roughly the rate payment of Amphipolis (Thucyd. ii. 10, 11, and Aristides, *Mem.* 187), we may suppose that the regular and normal rate of duty was one per cent. or one hundred talents in the case of most cities, but less for some. See Droysen, *Antiquities of the Greeks*, vol. ii. p. 101-102, *Mem.* 187. The amount of revenue derived from this source, however, may have been so comparatively to the tribute.

² In Perikles, Thucyd. ii. 36. By Ktesias, Thucyd. ii. 37. By the comic poet, *Menander*, v. 10. By the historian, *Strabo*, vi. 10. By the geographer, *Strabo*, vi. 10, as a matter of course.

³ Perikles, Thucyd. ii. 36.

Chersonese, 500 to Neos, and 510 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he further repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from within, and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kleon,¹ had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the completion of the older Mithridates about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian propoiers, apparently intermingled with half-civilised Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Perikles even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinope, then governed by a despot named Timokles, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachos was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinopians. We may presume that on this occasion Sinopé became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before; but we do not know whether Kotyia and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinopé farther outward, which the 50,000 Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Perikles or not. Moreover the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Perikles produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast,² contributing certainly to the security of Greek trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, increasing their property in the islands as mere seigneurs (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which alone the loss of the Megaræ could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian

active personal and dependent relations between Athens and all parts of the Empire.

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 14.

² Plutarch, Perikles, c. 12, 22.

land invasions¹—others poor, and hiring themselves out as labourers.² The islands of Lesbos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Eubœa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peloponnesus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thracia and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Ægean, in 457 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thracia, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Eubœian Thracians, called Ennea Hædri or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighbouring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea Hædri have already been noticed—first that of Histæus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 495—485 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 485 B.C. under Leagrus and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and ex-

Amphipolis
in Thracia
founded by
Athens.
Athens is
about 3 m. N.W.

¹ *Strabo*, *Geog.* xiv. 2, § 34. *Strabo* also refers to the Athenian colonies in the islands of Lesbos, Imbros, and Skyros, and to the Athenian colonies in the territory of Eubœa, on the north of Eubœa.

² *Strabo*, *Geog.* xiv. 2, § 34. *Strabo* also refers to the Athenian colonies in the islands of Lesbos, Imbros, and Skyros, and to the Athenian colonies in the territory of Eubœa, on the north of Eubœa.

polled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000.¹ No serious loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasos, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining, to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the *klérouchoi*, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself; seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.² This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agaur, despatched from Athens in the year strategic
and impor-
tance of 480 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well-maintained, inasmuch as it occupied and maintained the valuable position of *Ennea Hekoi* in spite of those formidable Edonians, neighbours who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of *Ennea Hekoi* was exchanged for that of *Amphipolis*—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Greek city colonised from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to *Amphipolis*,³ and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. *Amphipolis*, connected with

¹ Thucyd. i. 105.

² Thucyd. i. 101; *Marcelline*, *Vie*, Thucyd. p. 18. See *Strabo*, *Libani* and *Plutarch*, *op. cit.* p. 18, who give a summary of Thucydides, as far as it goes to make out with any probability, the history, who occupied by land with *Macedonia* and *Thrace*, as well as with *Greece* (that of one of the *Thra-*

cia tribes, whose daughter *Agauris* was wife of *Macedonia* the conqueror of *Macedonia*. In this manner *Agauris* is supposed to be one of *Thucydides*'s family, being an *Attila* through *Agaur* and *Phil* (see *Marcelline*, i. 12).

³ Thucyd. iv. 104; p. 4.

the sea, by the Strymon, and the port of Ebon, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thracæ and Macedonia.

The colony of Thuri on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 445. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotonians, in 508 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants,

Population
by the
settlement
of Thuri,
in 445
B.C.,
was
about
1000.

dispersed at Lato and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city; nor did it suit the views of the Krotonians themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which no unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thracian

Settlement
of the colony
of Thuri,
in 445
B.C.,
was
about
1000.
The
settlement
of Thuri,
in 445
B.C.,
was
about
1000.
The
settlement
of Thuri,
in 445
B.C.,
was
about
1000.

settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonisation, the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xanthokritos, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Perikles with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thuri, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Boeotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites

procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolising for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thuri, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after an very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either drove or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of

the city upon equal principles among the colonies of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Kintonians, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies the Sybarites were masters of the city and likely to turn its power to the purpose of avenging their conquered anastom. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the religious dissensions of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thebes. How numerous the population of Thebes was we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—each was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Achaia, Achaia, Achaia, Achaia, Achaia, Amphiktyonia, Doris, Ios, Attika, Euboia, Neothia. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honouring an Athenian *Ekist*, or indeed any *Ekist* except *Apollis*.¹ The Spartan general Kleombrotos, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be led by Athens along with king Ptoikastos, removed to Thebes and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Thebans. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia half-way between the two, in the fertile territory called *Sittis*.²

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thebes is, that the rhetor Lykias and the historian Herodotos were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies.³ From the circumstance, that so small a proportion of the soldiers at Thebes were native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connexion with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Perikles was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom migration

Herodotos
and Lykias
were domiciliated
as citizens
at Thebes.
The
Athenians
settled
there as
colonists.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 55.

² Thucyd. vi. 55, 56; Herodotus, vi. 135.

³ Thucyd. vi. 55, 56.

⁴ The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the Saronic Gulf.

Thucyd. vi. 55; compare vi. 55, 56, 57; vi. 58. Thucydides does not even mention Thebes in his catalogue of the allies of Athens during the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 25).

was desirable, should rather become libraries in some of the islands or parts of the *Ægean*, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garbions for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.¹

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities contiguous to her own empire, and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Perikles and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Perikles had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told far more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmida into Æolia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Perikles had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than before, and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydides son of Hædolis. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Perikles; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Perikles assumed a constant character and organization, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the "honourable and respectable" citizens, as we had them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of underwriting regularly in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribu-

Quoted from Vol.—Hist. of Athens of peace. His political position. History of Perikles with Thucydides son of Hædolis.

foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by associated embellishment, sculptured and architectural, and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, martial, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Pericles in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Theocritides. And, considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Pericles continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the expenses of defence. What Theocritides and his partisans appear to have urged was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warlike against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life.* But Pericles was right in contending that such warlike would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian fleet was already kept away both from the waters of the *Ægean* and the coast of Asia either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed spurious) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The allies indeed might have had some ground of complaint against Pericles, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Theocritides.

Exposure of
Pericles
policy
and
against his
allies.

* *Pericles, Pericles, i. 28.*

and his party: none was it calculated to find favour either with aristocrats or democrats in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kleon than to Perikles—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies—we shall find that the schemes of Perikles were nevertheless entirely Pan-hellenic. In strengthening and arming Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction, he intended to craft her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism, combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the allegiance of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous defence of independent neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy such beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur,¹ which made her appear even much stronger than she really was, and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full licence of criticism—of eloquent parents earnestly followed—and of a love for knowledge without reservation of character. Such were the views of Perikles in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition far over measurable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to this projected expenditure—as violent and pointed did the status of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which

¹ Thucyd. i. 2.

the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism we are not informed; but we are clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Perikles, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Perikles and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism.¹ And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Perikles.

The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place about two years² after the conclusion of the 'Thirty years' truce' (445—443 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following that the great Periklean works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Perikles, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Salamis, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalæra: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Perikles now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance³ (seemingly not more one furlong) from it; so

Further
restriction
of justice at
Athens—
vote of
ostracism—
Thucy-
dides is
ostracised—
all B.C.

New walls
constructed
at Athens—
Third long
wall.
Walls to
Peiræus—
which is
nearly half
way to a
town, by the
ancient
super-
stition.

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 11—12. Also Diodorus Siculus, lib. 12, c. 10, and other ancient historians, and Strabo, lib. 9, c. 1, c. 2, c. 3, c. 4, c. 5, c. 6, c. 7, c. 8, c. 9, c. 10, c. 11, c. 12, c. 13, c. 14, c. 15, c. 16, c. 17, c. 18, c. 19, c. 20, c. 21, c. 22, c. 23, c. 24, c. 25, c. 26, c. 27, c. 28, c. 29, c. 30, c. 31, c. 32, c. 33, c. 34, c. 35, c. 36, c. 37, c. 38, c. 39, c. 40, c. 41, c. 42, c. 43, c. 44, c. 45, c. 46, c. 47, c. 48, c. 49, c. 50, c. 51, c. 52, c. 53, c. 54, c. 55, c. 56, c. 57, c. 58, c. 59, c. 60, c. 61, c. 62, c. 63, c. 64, c. 65, c. 66, c. 67, c. 68, c. 69, c. 70, c. 71, c. 72, c. 73, c. 74, c. 75, c. 76, c. 77, c. 78, c. 79, c. 80, c. 81, c. 82, c. 83, c. 84, c. 85, c. 86, c. 87, c. 88, c. 89, c. 90, c. 91, c. 92, c. 93, c. 94, c. 95, c. 96, c. 97, c. 98, c. 99, c. 100, c. 101, c. 102, c. 103, c. 104, c. 105, c. 106, c. 107, c. 108, c. 109, c. 110, c. 111, c. 112, c. 113, c. 114, c. 115, c. 116, c. 117, c. 118, c. 119, c. 120, c. 121, c. 122, c. 123, c. 124, c. 125, c. 126, c. 127, c. 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Plutarch, Perikles, c. 11—12. Also Diodorus Siculus, lib. 12, c. 10, and other ancient historians, and Strabo, lib. 9, c. 1, c. 2, c. 3, c. 4, c. 5, c. 6, c. 7, c. 8, c. 9, c. 10, c. 11, c. 12, c. 13, c. 14, c. 15, c. 16, c. 17, c. 18, c. 19, c. 20, c. 21, c. 22, c. 23, c. 24, c. 25, c. 26, c. 27, c. 28, c. 29, c. 30, c. 31, c. 32, c. 33, c. 34, c. 35, c. 36, c. 37, c. 38, c. 39, c. 40, c. 41, c. 42, c. 43, c. 44, c. 45, c. 46, c. 47, c. 48, c. 49, c. 50, c. 51, c. 52, c. 53, c. 54, c. 55, c. 56, c. 57, c. 58, c. 59, c. 60, c. 61, c. 62, c. 63, c. 64, c. 65, c. 66, c. 67, c. 68, c. 69, c. 70, c. 71, c. 72, c. 73, c. 74, c. 75, c. 76, c. 77, c. 78, c. 79, c. 80, c. 81, c. 82, c. 83, c. 84, c. 85, c. 86, c. 87, c. 88, c. 89, c. 90, c. 91, c. 92, c. 93, c. 94, c. 95, c. 96, c. 97, c. 98, c. 99, c. 100, c. 101, c. 102, c. 103, c. 104, c. 105, c. 106, c. 107, c. 108, c. 109, c. 110, c. 111, c. 112, c. 113, c. 114, c. 115, c. 116, c. 117, c. 118, c. 119, c. 120, c. 121, c. 122, c. 123, c. 124, c. 125, c. 126, c. 127, c. 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that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Pnyctic wall. It was accordingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Piræus, alleged by Isokrates to have cost 1000 talents, were constructed;¹ while the town itself of Piræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been hitherto without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets.² Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Piræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora.³ At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thorii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.⁴

The new scheme upon which the Piræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the novel grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periklean age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenæic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athénâ, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, frieze, and relief; lastly, the costly porch erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon

¹ Isokrates, *Studios*, p. 375–382. See the map of Athens and its environs, etc. 327.

² Isokrates, *ibid.* vii. 1; 400 pages, p. 123, s. 25.

³ See *Hippodamus*, vii. Greece, *Fraser*, ed. *ibid.* p. 126; compare the description of Plato in *Thioplaitos*, s. 1.

All the other towns now existing in

the Greek islands are put together in this same manner—narrow, muddy, crooked ways—no regular disposition (line of houses); not alone Athens is described as such, *ibid.*, *Letter*, vol. vii. s. 1, p. 10.

⁴ *Isokrates*, *Politis*, s. 1; *Isokrates*, *Politis*, s. 1; *Isokrates*, s. 1.

⁵ *Isokrates*, s. 1.

were both finished between 448 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 433 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.¹ Progress was also made in restoring or re-constructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Æthel Polias, the patron goddess of the city, which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Minerva at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Æthel at Eleusis, and that of Nemesis at Thessalon. Nor was the sculpture less remarkable than the architecture. Three statues of Æthel, all by the hand of Phidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 67 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon²—a second, of bronze, called the Laccadian Æthel—a third, of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Æthel Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not of course to Periklès that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in history, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Phidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution and adherence to a conventional type which marked the efforts of his predecessors.³ He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Periklès imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktinos, Kallikratis, Korobos, Mnisklès, and others—worked under his instructions; and he

Æthelios
and
Laccadian
—Phidias,
Iktinos,
Kallikratis.

¹ See, e.g., *Geography of Athens*, 437-438 and 439, p. 101-102, and 439.

² See *Geography of Athens*, 439-440, p. 102-103, and 440.

³ See *Geography of Athens*, 439-440, p. 102-103, and 440.

⁴ See *Geography of Athens*, 439-440, p. 102-103, and 440.

Æthelios by the hand of Phidias—four in the acropolis of Athens.

⁵ See *Geography of Athens*, 439-440, p. 102-103, and 440.

had besides a school of pupils and admirers to whom the mechanical part of his labours was cradled. With all the great contributions which Phidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peireus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, &c., in Greece¹—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Phidias as well as the paintings of the Theban painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pnyxii. Pictarch observes² that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her machine empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and

Effect of
these con-
tributions of
art and
architecture
seen upon
the minds
of contemporaries.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10. and vide *History Essay* upon Athens after Xerxes, especially as to the wall begun by and begun and finished and finished.

and history from the 480 B.C. to the 480 B.C. and the 480 B.C. and the 480 B.C.

² Pictarch, *Pericles*, p. 12.

especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.¹ The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the treasury, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 8000 talents in the aggregate (about £600,000).² The expenditure of so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, &c., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were purposely of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athena, and ivory employed in its place.³ Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than fifty talents.⁴ A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Greek feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich man who indulged in it. Perikles knew well that the visible splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged, influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Perikles, apparently not long after the commencement of the Thirty years' truce, witness how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it

¹ Thucyd. i. 65.

² See *Calder's Geography of Athens*, second ed. p. 3. pp. 302 and 303. Varro, *De Re Rustica*, lib. i. c. 11, writes *Attica*, instead of *Attika*, and the amount of 8000 talents, named by Herodotus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly increased. Mr. Wilkins (*Antiquities*, p. 36) expresses the same opinion; remarking that the transport of marble

from Paros &c. to Athens is easy, and on a descending road.

³ *Demosthenes*, *Prologus*, lib. *Oratorum*, c. 11. (1) *Demosthenes* for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa. It is not wonderful that he stated this sum, if he had been led to state the cost of them at 8000 talents.

⁴ *Calder*, *Marble*, i. 7, 8.

⁵ Thucyd. ii. 12.

with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a Pan-hellenic congress for Pan-hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Boeotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, money-mongering, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme.¹ It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name—a comprehensive basis not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realised under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Pericles. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of untroubled peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 35. Plutarch gives us precise data, and G. Müller (*Die Plakia*, 1894, p. 8) places these data, for convocation of a congress, before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Salamis.—i.e. before 480 B.C. But this date seems to me impossible: Thucydides was not yet recorded in prose, nor had

Boeotia as autonomous from the facts of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Pericles himself seems to have been at that time in a position to conceive so large a project, which calls in every respect much higher for the state of affairs than the Thirty years' truce, but before the Peloponnesian war.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens.¹ It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the same footing as these two: that is, paying no tribute-money—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Miletus lay the small town of Priene, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic confederacy. Regarding the possession of this town of Priene, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the Thirty years' truce (B.C. 445—438). Whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before themselves and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply;² whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government; leaving in it a garrison and carrying away to Lampsacus fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Ptolemaeus, the satrap of Lydia, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him

B.C. 445.
 Fourth of
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¹ Thucyd. 1, 102; cf. 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² Thucyd. 1, 119; (Ptolemy, *Periplus*, c. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ Thucyd. 1, 119; (Ptolemy, *Periplus*, c. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467

fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Perikles felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kynos and Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phoenician fleet¹ never came in sight, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pausanias certainly seems to have promised, and the Romans to have expected it. Yet I hesitate to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and assurances revealing among the Athenian allies, the citizen did not show openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chalkidonian promontory. The departure of Perikles, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Romans, suddenly sailing out of their harbour in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Nicias, surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land.² For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper. It was not until the return of Perikles that they were again blockaded. Reinforcements however were now multiplied to the hovering squadron—from Athens, forty ships under Thersites;³ Agass, and Phormion, and twenty

disputed and apparently confirmed proof of Roman-ship in that important document, and discredited.

¹ Diod. vi. 27.
² Pausanias, Perikles, c. 28. Pausanias seems to have had before him an account respecting this Roman expedition and many other Roman expeditions, Sicily, and Sicily, but the first expedition, and the capture of the harbor of Samos, offered him no room for error. And he offered Chalkidians the Roman general to have been the capture of Perikles himself, which is not to be reconciled with the account of Thersites.

The Sicilian expedition, Diod. vi. 27, about a century after Sicily, seems to have introduced many mistakes respecting the conduct of it there. See Pausanias, c. 28.

³ It appears very probable that this Thersites was the Athenian general. If it is Thersites the son of Nicias, we must suppose him to have been captured from Chalkidians before

the regular Roman expedition, in 425, so very insignificant in itself, but which there is nothing else to compare. The latter of the life of Perikles, as well as most of the naval action, dated this action.

For the same reason, it only has been a third source about Thersites; for the evidence to have the capture of which is not found. The fact is that Thersites captured all the ships of the Roman; and the regular expedition seems to have been of much greater or called Phormion, c. 28, p. 14, as already. The subsequent history of Thersites son of Nicias is recorded in complete probability. We do not have the history to which the remarkable passage in Aristophanes (Acharnes). The other names, Agass, and Phormion, are not the same as the Thersites, which the Chalkidians

voted for assisting the Romans. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know; but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the cause distinctly forbade compliance with the Roman request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to punish its own recalcitrant members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors.¹ Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again *condemned*, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 413 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Cleon and his landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.² As Samos remained, during the interval between 413 B.C. and 415 B.C., unrevolted, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens, and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government, so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.³

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Pericles was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, honors and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kynosarges. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the

application of the Roman to Sparta for aid against Athens—in a reduced ability through the Corinthians.

Government of Samos after the reconquest—oligarchical—without the Athenians—towards the democracy which they had previously established.

¹ Thucyd. i. 90, 91.
² Thucyd. viii. 55.

³ Ctesias, Hellenicæ, Hellenicæ Historiæ, vol. vi, p. 21.

the victories of her brother had been more glorious, as gained over Persians and Thracians, and not over Greeks and Romans. And the contemporary poet Iliu, the friend of Kimbra, reported what he thought an unusually boast of Periklēs—in the effect that Agamemnōn had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while he in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities.¹ But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honour of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favourable comparison with that of Agamemnōn and his host—not himself with Agamemnōn.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Persian war was not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril,² but rendered it stronger than ever; while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still further. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any further tendencies to dissension among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy.

Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy, which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens, and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Greek communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the national sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies

regions
of the
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¹ *Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 16*; *Thucyd.* vii. p. 405, 46. *Kimbra*, perhaps the ancestor of Athens about the Persian war, and the great city where the island was reconquered;—*compare Anonymus, Vesp. 126.*

² A short fragment remaining from the Greek poet *Eupolis* (*Kühnau, Po.*

vii. p. 405, 46. Kimbra, perhaps the ancestor of Athens about the Persian war, and the great city where the island was reconquered;—*compare Anonymus, Vesp. 126.*

of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the cities the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she considered herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disallow all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; raising the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.¹ As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic imitation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition, as the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Pericles nor Kleon indeed lays stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Poor, in these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly insisted on by Demosthenes² in the *De Corona*, respecting Mitylene after its surrender; and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preference of democracy or oligarchy in each.³

¹ Thucyd. II. 37: 11, 12. See the conference at the island of Mitylene in the strongest year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. v. 10 seq.), between the Athenian democrats and the oligarchs. I think, however, that this conference is less to be trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydides generally, of which more have

survived.

² Thucyd. II. 37. *οἱ πλεῖστοι τοὶ πόλιν ἔχουσιν ἡ δὲ δεινότης καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων ἀντιβολία τῇ πόλει, ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοθυμία καὶ ἀσφάλεια καὶ ἀνδρεία.*

³ See the striking observations of Thucydides, II. 37, 38; Aristotel. *Polit.* III. v. 2, 3.

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylene,¹ in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained news, warmly declared in favour of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people.² In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Abantion, in Amphipolis, in Mende, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas, we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his Gensivores, just as well as conspirators, soon gain their access. But neither in Abantion nor in Amphipolis would he have been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their property, and their harvest, still exposed in the hands without the walls.³ These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12.

² Thucyd. vii. 2-14. He observes also, respecting the Thasian oligarchy, that up to the last of the preceding democracy by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then, excluding the revolution of the four hundred at

Athens—that they immediately made arrangements for joining back to them in friendly relations political questions, etc. either as despotic institutions, and also as tyrannies, and that they were not able to do so.

³ Thucyd. iv. 10, 11, 12, 13.

following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Greek desire for separate autonomy,¹ and felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety. But their condition was not one of positive hostility, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change—partly from the coercive hand of Athens—partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them—and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more avowed to Athens than others.

The particular modes, in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as *kleruchs* (settlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was 600 talents yearly.² It appears to have been reviewed and the apportionment corrected in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. Afterwards, probably, it became more burdensome, though when, or in what degree, we do not know; but the alleged duplication of it (as I have already remarked) is both uncorroborated and improbable. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconsistency—reaction caused to the allies

¹ See the important passage, Thucyd. viii. 23.

² Thucydides, *Republics*. *Athen.* iii.

³ *Notes of cities and places under its empire, &c. at which it was apportioned.*

as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread clans and supports of the *Agora*, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The *synod* of *Dikæ*, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognising a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide peacefully how far each city had faithfully discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately, as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, present to the sight which *Sparta* and her confederacy also claimed and exercised.¹ Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this *synod*. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the *synod* being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens (taking this numerical statement of *Aristophanes* not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no tribunal except the *synod* of *Dikæ*, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens; yet

of these particular examples which demanded mention or redress at Athens, there is a more particularly definite and sufficient—not a more precise demand by Athenian magistrates.

¹ According to the principle laid down by the *Constitution* shortly before the Peloponnesian War—see especially the *Protagoras* article now quoted.

(*Plutus* 1. 47—48).

The *Leucosthenides*, on preferring their accusation of *Demosthenes* against *Thucydides*, demanded that he should be tried at *Sparta*, before the common Hellenic *synod* which held its sitting there, and of which Athens was then a member; that is, the *Spartan confederacy* of allies—not our great republic the *Athenians* (*Plutus*, st. 11).

we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn, between matters carried up thither and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens;¹ so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizens against citizens, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, &c., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

Yet the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of ascending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It was rather to regulate the relations ^{Imperial Athens compared with Imperial Sparta.} between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common appeal emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more inclined to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a *Deputy* (or oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan *harmost* or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the

¹ Aristotle, *De Caste* (Hæstia), c. 1, p. 126. It still rules Sparta, her *Deputy* cities being *Epistates*.

immensely overpowered by the unanimity of the Spartan haraots and Dekarchia, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recalled that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as liberators, proprietors, or traders. Of course therefore disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the haraots or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian *dikasteria*, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thracian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thersiphidai, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thracia, he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian *dikasteria*, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thracian. True it was of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a haraots and a partisan oligarchy. And we read anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the gravest outrages committed by the haraots or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Boeotian named Rhodame (of Leontes, in Boeotia) had been first

Scattered
Athenian
citizens
spread over
the Empire
—the allies
had no
redress
against
them,
except
through the
Athenian
dikasteria.

violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens; the son of a citizen of Oreea in Euboea had been also outraged and killed by the baronet Aristodimos;² in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the case before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their

The
dikasteria
offered
protection
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unscrupulous
acts of
a Spartan
citizen and
a Spartan
citizen.

complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or citizens, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished. We shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Pashis at Mitylene, cost him his

life before the Athenian dikasts.³ Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid scant only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those bolder citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favour or lenient-dealing.⁴ But this is only an inviolable measure of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied allies, but also to entertain complaints which they preferred against others.

² *Plut.*, *Perikl.*, c. 50; *Plut.*, *Ath.*, *Perikl.*, c. 1, p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*, *Perikl.*, c. 50.

⁴ Xenophon, *Hæc.*, *Ath.*, c. 1, 18, notes the custom, of all who did them wrong at Athens, to be compelled to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice.

Antiquities of Athens, vol. 1, p. 124, notes the custom, of all who did them wrong at Athens, to be compelled to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice, and to supplicate the dikasts for justice.

They suffered worse harshly under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conspiring us and making our empire yours."

History bears out the least of the Athenian writer, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens.¹ And an Athenian ally, indeed, might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject-ally, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikasterai, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to welcome the universal competence of these dikasteriai in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Aegean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-ally is never surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central jurisdiction was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteriai—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation" (if indeed we are to reckon this a real factor in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining), much less in those petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophanes,² such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the harbors, arising from the influx of sailors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of subordination between members and enforcement of duties towards the whole—a power inherited by Athens

¹ Demosthenes, *Antiphila*, §§. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

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² Xenophanes, *Hæc*, §§. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 4

from that system, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which and it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.¹ It may be that the history was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-States—and besides the latter had good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberate or wilful unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whenever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war—before the increased taxation and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the troubles which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that aggravated ferocity, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been introduced into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.² There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Samos down to the latest at Samos. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigour as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mytilene, Skione, and Miletus. The policy of Pericles, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, anxious to limit extension of empire as well as to throw increased burdens on the dependent States which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that sacred connection in the *Allean* by which all of them must have been united—not without a

¹ Xenophon, *Hæc.* viii. 1. 15. His opinion is in one of the most important passages which influenced the Athenians in taking the side and conducting of the allies in Athens for him, that the tyrants, or those great upon entering a State for him, became suddenly more so for him all the way for the allies throughout the war.

² It is a partial part of the history (ii. 6, 7) to represent the Athenian

disposition as prejudiced with political hatreds, much more than they could possibly get through; however that there were great doubts before, more could be brought on for him. It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to multiply complaints artificially in order to bring him for the allies.

³ From the well-known passage in the *Allean* at Miletus, ii. 6, 7, 8.

conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylene¹ at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech inspiring aid and setting forth the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon wantonness of tribute, unparliamentary interference of Athenian officers, harshness of bringing cases for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing to say except that they were *schismatics* and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent; and in the case of Mitylææ, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, neutral, and autonomous city. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity.² But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylææ might be strong enough to protect itself and its own concerns without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the *Ægean*, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.

¹ Thucyd. II. 11–14.

² In the Athenian orator Diodorus points it in his speech denouncing the Athenian pretensions which he imputed on Mitylææ—*ἡ γὰρ Μιτυληνῶν πόλις καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῶν κτίματα καὶ ἀνδραγαθὰ ἀνταρξάμενα γίγνεται*

καὶ ἡ πόλις, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ πόλις, καὶ ὁ πόλις.

³ It is to be perceived that the Athenian orator was essentially a proponent of dependence; Athens as an imperial state rendering assistance upon unreciprocated arrangements. To maintain friendly relations between

The orator
allies of
Athens have
imposed upon
themselves
in complete
dependence.

consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Sparta. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,¹ adding greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance, prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

So long as the policy of Coriath pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the events of Sparta, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the disposition of Coriath towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Coriath along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy.² What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonies themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and real respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Coriath and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epithormæ (known afterwards in the Roman times as Tyrinthium, hard by the modern Durazzo)—a colony founded by the Korkyraeans, on the coast of Epirus in the Ionian Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the similarity of Greek customs in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyraeans, in spite of their enmity to Coriath, had been obliged to select the Chief (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epithormæ

¹ Thucyd. i. 11.
² Thucyd. i. 11. (speaking of the end of the Peloponnesian war).

From that city—some of Hensfield's recent noted Platonists—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian writers. And then Ephesus, through a Kerkiraean colony, was nevertheless a recognized grand-daughter of the expression may be allowed of Corinth, the revolution in which was perpetrated by the colonists its most fully celebrated in honor of the Illinois.

Founded on the ruins of an existing peninsula on the west coast of the Euxine Tauri, Epiphania was at first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighbouring Hephæstia, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had refused it still further—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Hephæstia, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epiphænian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as supplicants at the temple of Hera, and themselves on the mercy of the Korkyraeans, and begged them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Hephæstia. Though the Korkyraeans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these supplicants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epiphænian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and whom their hearty social plans as well as their kinsmen were still to be found; while the Demos, or small proprietors and craftsmen of Epiphænia, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-land. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epiphænians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of

1. **Topic:**

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reference to developments and responses to contemporary issues with regard to the environment.

questionable propriety, their energies were directed first to rouse the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an expeditious sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra.—Inducing Epikles to the Corinthians as to the Greeks and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not ceasing to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epikles as a joint envoy from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake his defence—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Ionian, and Achaian; which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyran navy, was marched by land as far as Apollonia, and transported from thence by sea to Epikles.¹

The arrival of such a reinforcement raised the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyranes, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resisted it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were further inflamed by the Epiklesian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for aid, and appeals to the bonds of their Korkyran exiles, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a further reinforcement, which was sent to Epikles with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyranes commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land force of Illyrian—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons perished by this persecution we do not know; but at least enough to rouse to

The King
of Corinth
sent Epikles
to Corinth—
and Epikles
to Corinth.

Corinth the news that their troops in Ephesus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the needs of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes and three thousand hoplites of their own, they collected aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Felle in the island of Kephallenia, five by Ephesus, two by Trezene, one by Harmond, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia, together with pecuniary contributions from Thibes, Pilos, and Elis. They further proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Ephesus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to ensure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states—a harshness of feeling arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the action among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceful means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Ephesus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony, they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for

Source
of the
Korkyra
war
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Corinth and
the Pelop.
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arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city or to the Delphian oracle; each abster to determine to which of the two cities Epidaurum as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyraans beseeching letter was withdrawn from Epidaurum. Whereupon the Korkyraans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new allies and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyraans would acquiesce in the state quo on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.¹

Although the Korkyraans had been unwearingly hard in rejecting the first application from Epidaurum, yet in their propositions made at Corinth right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too Goddally aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration.

Accordingly, as soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidaurum, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyraans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes under Ariston, Kallikratis, and Timaree, with 8000 hoplites under Archonides and Isachides, had reached Cape Aktion at the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyraan herald in a little boat forbidding all further advance—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyraan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the ships of Epidaurum, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being speedily repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidaurum surrendered to their beseeching fleet, under constraint that the Corinthians within

¹ Thucyd. i. 25.

It should be held as prisoners, and that the other inter-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyraans remained undisputed masters of the neighbouring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimna, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the unreluctant practice of Grecian warriors, to kill all their prisoners¹—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllini the subject of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Akteion, for the defence of Leukas, Ambrakia, and Ambrakia. The Korkyraans fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimna, but no further action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.²

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the soldiers whom they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epiklesmas, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes; and in particular, they sent round, not only to the Peloponnesian ports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of men. By such prolonged efforts almost well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 180 sail:

¹ The Corinthians this treatment of prisoners of war among the ancient Greeks. I remember an incident from the recent history of Europe. It is recorded in *Macaulay's History of England*, vol. vi. ch. x. (1849), that the British fleet, after the battle of Balaclava, captured the Russian fleet, and the British fleet, after the battle of Balaclava, captured the Russian fleet.

² After the battle, some ships

were taken from the British and the Russian fleets. The general conclusion was that the British fleet was the more powerful, and the Russian fleet was the more numerous. The British fleet was the more powerful, and the Russian fleet was the more numerous. The British fleet was the more powerful, and the Russian fleet was the more numerous.

³ Thucyd. i. 94, 95.

twenty-seven triremes from Amphibia, twelve from Megara, ten from Rhia, as many from Lachæ, and one from Anaktoria.¹ Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Karkhidæ and four others were commanders-in-chief.²

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Karkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmonia. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island: from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the *Ægean*, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Karkyræ had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exerted paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionian Gulf: she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amiable relations with the Doric Karkyræ. But if there was thus no previous hat or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the treaty between Athens and Sparta it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.³ While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances

Application of the Karkyræans to the Athenians to be enrolled among the allies of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 2.—42.

² Thucyd. i. 2.—42.

³ Thucyd. ii. 1.—10. See also Thucyd. ii. 1.—10.

under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties. The Eorkyrman envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither with *desolate* hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people; and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratic, much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Eorkyrman envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the *Stratigi* or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The notice was no secret, for the Eorkyrman had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their presence at Athens (Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government, and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Eorkyrman envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation, which was

Address of
the Eorkyr-
man
envoys to
the Athen-
ian public
assembly.

Principal
features upon
which it
turns, as
given in
Thucydides.

use of force and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

The Kerkyraeans, after lamenting their previous imprudence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interests and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidaurus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay: moreover they were now exposed single-headed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organized under her auspices, including sixteen maritime towns even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this misemployment of her own resources, and would at the same time confer an invaluable obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. For next to her own, the Kerkiraean naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer she permitted Kerkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies; for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to win Kerkyra along with her naval force.¹ The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Kerkyraeans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' treaty. And although some might counsel that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Kerkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions: for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to

¹ Thucyd. i. 25. *οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν.*

Thucyd. i. 25. οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν, ἀποφραγνύσκειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀποφραγνύσκειν.

attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian States from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.¹

To these representations on the part of the Euboeans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and injurious policy pursued by Euboea, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all other former times²—which was the real reason why she had ever been refused at honest alliance. Above all things, she had always acted unfaithfully and wickedly towards Corinth her mother city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Greece mutually recognised, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully shared.³ Epidamnus was not a Euboean, but a Corinthian colony. The Euboeans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact in such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies; but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth

¹ Thucyd. i. 10—15.

² The Euboeans formerly Euboeotian Pol. 120; according to Thucyd. vi. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ According to the prospectus and introduction of the Euboeans, the Athenians were guilty of treachery, Thucyd. i. 10.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 10. Athens is here depicted as a city greedy and city-miserable, desirous to do all she can to secure her independence. "And in all this she has done up her rearer Euboean car-

riages, and let up quarters to them, and we should demand that." At this point Thucyd. repeats the facts, and declares his opinion on the subject.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of a city-state in regard to her allies. The position was such as to be interpreted under the general word *hospitium*; generosity and rights were supposed on the one side, hospitality with duty of reverence and obedience on the other—expressed in terms of action, though we do not know where the line was placed, and having probably in each individual case. The Corinthians were general magistrates in Epidamnus, called *Epitamnarchi* (Thucyd. i. 10).

even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others). The governing cause of war was at work, and it will infallibly come whatever you may determine respecting Erclysia: and, possession of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantages.* Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly predominant in the assembly;[†] but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the steady conviction of Pericles. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Erclysia, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Erclysienses, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required, which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Erclysia and her possessions in case they were attacked; nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lamachus as son of Kleon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Erclysia from ruin and would in fact find this war so as to weaken and cripple the moral force of both parties[‡]—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lamachus and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Erclysia or were Erclysienses possession of a slave to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Celtician armament of 180 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbour on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Chelmonium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Boeotia. There they established a naval

¹Thomson, J. M. *Alkaloids in Food-Plant Families*, Washington, D.C., 1949, pp. 1-10.

City lives in the language of
 "The City" and the "City" is the
 "City" of the City.

Abstract

5. The article the members of the executive committee under Lenin's direction is a fully explicit political program and, moreover, to them, as to the old political vanguard, it is clear that it is necessary to copy the document, the entire program and, of course, the entire program of work.

station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Egeatic tribes in the neighbourhood. The Egeatic fleet of 120 sail, under Melchides and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and 3000 Egeatic hoplites were posted on the Egeatic Cape Lechium.¹ Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Chalcidæum, and encountered in the morning the Egeatic fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet; next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambracians on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and manoeuvring were not conformable to the custom. The fleets were opposed with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Egeatic side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-to-hand war then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the staircase were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and swiftness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable part of his enemy—side, stern, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations.²

¹ Thucydides does not say to what the shipboard-war a greater advantage would have been a hand-to-hand war, equivalent to Athenian boxing, as we

Lamachus with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his men had full leisure to contemplate what they would despite as laboured handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the men broken and unmanageable,—orders could neither be heard nor obeyed,—and the individual valour of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Eorhyæans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the The Eorhyæans were defeated. Athenian allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lamachus. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Eorhyæans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and water-logged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with men, sailors, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless about the wrecks or keeping above water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own

see mentioned also in Thucyd. iv. 11; compare also vii. 21.

The Corinthian and Eorhyæan ships ultimately came to anchor at the Athenian anchorage by contracting

their crews with increased additional strength, and finding the Athenians went to a great boat, which, in another place was made to bear (Thucyd. vii. 21).

citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through three disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Kerkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast; and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon; but the Corinthian fleet, though their power had already been checked for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epiriote coast. The Kerkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching under Glaukon and Aradibolus, which the Corinthians had been the first to decry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Lockimus,¹ having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies.² At first the Kerkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Kerkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Kerkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of

¹ Thucyd. i. 11. At the same and various representations numbers do not correspond.

warfare was still on the side of the latter, who were however outnumbered with the loss of 3000 prisoners (300 of them slaves) captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient citadel. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyraans. And when their enemies called across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should

Arrival of a later
reinforcement
from
Athens—
the Co-
rinthians
lost policy,
surrendering all
their
Korkyraean
prisoners.

now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no heraldic staff (we should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyraans that this last idea was not instantly realised; for each of them as were near enough to hear incited the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Polydamas: we have come simply to aid these Korkyraans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition; but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra or any of her provinces, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer and the treatment of the men in the boat satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, stopping however to erect a trophy at Syphos on the Epirotic

Korinthians
not yet
professing
loyalty
between
Athens and
Corinth.

east, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Ambrakians at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyraans, planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the best and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The subsequent incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Ships
seized
by the Co-
rinthians
on their
return
to Athens.

Relieved now from all danger, the Korkyraans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even bore sufficient presence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected meeting of the last Athenian ships; but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undiminished, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her demands in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

They begin
to stir up
revolt
among the
Athenians
in the
Peloponnese,
a
policy of
divide et
regna.

On the isthmus of that lower peninsula called Peloponnes (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalkidiki, between the Thracian and the Euxine Gulfs) was situated the Dorian town of Patheia, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally selected from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter; inasmuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the

this of Eplaurion.¹ On various points of the neighbouring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalcidians and Boeotians, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring island territory, Myrtonia and Chalcidion,² was held by the Macedonian king Perdiccas, son of that Alexander who had taken just fifty years before in the expedition of Xanthus. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Ainos and Brynnis. Now Perdiccas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Dardas, holding independent principalities in the upper country,³ (apparently on the higher course of the Ainos near the Paionian tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdiccas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands.⁴ For the former were always more or less dependant on any powerful land neighbour, sometimes more dependant on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating sedulously the favour of Sicily and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.⁵ Perdiccas began

History of Athens with Perdiccas king of Macedonia, the territory along with Corinth against her — 44 In 440 B.C. Athens the Chalcidians to revolt from her — 440 B.C. — 440 B.C. — 440 B.C.

¹ See the geographical Commentary of Strabo upon Thucyd. vol. ii. c. 10, § 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² The words of Strabo, *Geograph.* lib. 10, c. 1, § 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

³ See the geographical Commentary of Strabo upon Thucyd. lib. 10, c. 1, § 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387,

directly began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottians to revolt from Athens; and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Euboea, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidea. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidea, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian leagues to a general declaration of war against Athens.¹ And he further prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Potidea further assigned some territory near lake Bolbe to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Euboean sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidea; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallis, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland—requiring them further both to deliver hostages and to send the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1600 hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Potidea in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidea, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidians sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determind a Lacedaemonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidea being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty

¹ Potidea, the chief object here, with danger. Nothing of value had only to only requires the rule already set. Subsequent circumstances. Amphipolis, consequently the key. Thucyd. I. 94, 95.

years' trace still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolved (meaningly about Alcibiades, 428 B.C.), at the same time that the argument under Archestratus sailed. The Chalcidians and Bottians revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.¹ Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perikles in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to attack of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therna, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philby and the brothers of Demas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pylos. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therna, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion—under Ariston son of Adimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament however was speedily sent forth—forty triremes and 2000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias son of Kallipides,² with four other commanders—who, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pylos. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perikles, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Ariston and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pylos to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Beron—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

² Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large


sum of 100 talents to Xeno of Sio, the philosopher, for instruction, philosophy, art, and political instruction (Plato, *Alcibiades*, l. i. c. 12, p. 146).

until after some time they were joined by Pharsalus with 1000 fresh hoplites from Athens. This general, landing at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallabak, marched slowly up to Potidea, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallabak, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force withdrew to guard it, leaving Pharsalus at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidike and Boeotian townships. The capture of Potidea being now only a question of more or less time, Ariston, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbours, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore withdrew forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesians. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warfare operations among the Chalkidians,¹ and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Deranghes, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Eorhyra, next distinctly and secondly at Potidea, spring those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

¹ Thucyd. i. 102.





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**BATTLE
OF
SALAMIS**
B.C. 480.

SCOTT'S HISTORY, Vol. IV.—Pls. 2



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